SRI LANKA: JVP INSISTS CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT MUST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000382 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: JVP INSISTS CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT MUST BE AMENDED REF: COLOMBO 377 Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a March 8 meeting, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) General Secretary Tilvin Silva and JVP MP Vijitha Herath told poloff that their party generally supported Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) talks with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Geneva February 22-23 but insisted that the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) must be amended and Norway replaced as facilitator. The two Politburo members provided no specifics on how the GSL should proceed but contended that President Rajapaksa's victory at the November polls after campaigning on an anti-CFA platform proves that "the people want a different approach" to the peace process. Despite this hardline stand, the JVP's public opposition to Geneva has been relatively restrained--a position we believe may change if the JVP makes significant gains in the March 30 local elections. We expect President Rajapaksa, who understands Norway's effectiveness as facilitator, will ignore the JVP's public posturing about Oslo. We will continue to impress upon our interlocutors, including those in the GSL, our support for Norway's role. End summary. -------------- TALKS ARE GOOD; CEASEFIRE OKAY, BUT AGREEMENT MUST BE "CORRECTED" -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff met with Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) General Secretary Tilvin Silva and JVP MP Vijitha Herath on March 8 to discuss the party's views of the February 22-23 talks between the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Geneva. Silva (who did almost all of the talking during the meeting) said that the JVP supported everything about the talks, including the extensive inter-party consultations the GSL held before Geneva and the way the talks were held, except the joint communique, in which the GSL committed to "respecting and upholding the Ceasefire Agreement" (CFA). "The (Geneva) process was good up until the final statement," Silva said. He added that the GSL team did a good job of preparing before the talks and marshalled so much evidence of LTTE violations "that the LTTE had to take a few steps back." ¶3. (C) That said, "the CFA is not proper," Silva asserted, and "should be corrected." The GSL should not have committed itself to upholding a flawed agreement, he said. Silva emphasized that the JVP supported President Mahinda Rajapaksa--and the people elected him--because he promised to amend the CFA. If he came into power by criticizing the CFA, Rajapaksa cannot suddenly commit to abide by it now that he is president, Silva argued. Rajapaksa's victory in November proved that "the people want a different approach" to the peace process, Silva said; the JVP stand thus does not represent a mere party view but the will of the people. ¶4. (C) When asked the JVP's specific objections to the CFA, Silva and Herath responded that the CFA grants equal status to both parties to the conflict. That the GSL is democratically elected and the LTTE is a terrorist organization is not reflected, they complained. In addition, the CFA refers to areas controlled by the Tigers and areas controlled by the GSL. (Note: When asked if it is the JVP's position that there are no areas in Sri Lanka under LTTE control, Silva clarified, "There are some areas under LTTE control. The problem is that the government has given them recognition.") That anti-LTTE paramilitaries were required to disarm but the LTTE was not skewed the agreement in favor COLOMBO 00000382 002 OF 003 of the Tigers, they asserted. Moreover, Silva said, the CFA as written goes beyond cessation of hostilities to include other subjects, such as freedom of movement, political activities and "many administrative areas." ¶5. (C) The JVP supports the cessation of hostilities, the Politburo members emphasized, and recognizes that the GSL must talk to the Tigers. The JVP welcomes the second round of talks scheduled for April 19-21 in Geneva--and wants the GSL to use that meeting to amend the CFA. When asked how the GSL could persuade the Tigers to accept the amendments envisioned by the JVP, Silva did not reply directly, noting only that the JVP recognizes there would be "complexities" and "practical problems" in the process but nonetheless believes "a practical solution is possible." If the discussion is handled properly, the GSL can bring the LTTE to a "favorable position," he asserted, adding that in the past GSL negotiators had "been behaving as if the LTTE were uncontrollable" and consequently conceding too much. -------------- ROLE OF NORWAY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -------------- ¶6. (C) Poloff asked about reports in the local press March 8 that JVP MP Wimal Weerawansa had called in Parliament for the removal of Norway as facilitator in the peace process. Silva and Herath reiterated the JVP's frequent claims that Norway is partial to the Tigers. The "red carpet" reception provided the Tiger delegation when it visited Oslo after the talks in Geneva proves that Norway supports the LTTE, they claimed. Silva said that he could provide numerous further examples of such partiality, but unfortunately there was not enough time. The two party heavyweights both brushed off suggestions that the JVP meet with the Norwegian Embassy to discuss its concerns, asserting that such a discussion would be pointless. While both said they were glad that Norway would no longer head the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), they said it remained to be seen how Sweden would perform in that role. ¶7. (C) The JVP "admires with respect" the U.S. attitude toward the Tigers, Silva said, especially its designation of the Tigers as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. He credited the Ambassador's January 10 speech (in which he referred to U.S. military aid to Sri Lanka) as being instrumental in convincing the Tigers to come to the table. The international community should adopt the same attitude toward the LTTE as it has toward Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, Silva said, be very clear about the difference in legitimacy of the GSL and the LTTE, and use its influence to persuade the Tigers to give up terrorism. The LTTE won't change its policies because of international opinion, Silva continued, but it cannot totally disregard it either, adding that the LTTE depends on a certain amount of international good will for its own security and its fundraising efforts in the diaspora. As Sri Lanka's closest neighbor, India will continue to be interested in events in Sri Lanka, Silva predicted, but will refrain from taking a more active role. -------------- LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Silva and Herath said the JVP is heavily focused on campaigning for local government elections, now scheduled for March 30, adding that the party will contest in all districts except Mannar, Kilinochchi and Jaffna. (Note: The party is even fielding candidates in the LTTE-controlled district of Mullaitivu, even though they conceded that "we find it difficult to work" there.) The JVP has already begun holding rallies (unlike either of the two larger parties) and is getting a positive response, they reported. The party has only been participating in local elections for the past ten COLOMBO 00000382 003 OF 003 years, Silva noted, and has made steady gains ever since. The JVP expects this trend to continue, and is anticipating making significant inroads in this election in the Colombo suburbs (although not in Colombo itself). The peace process will not figure in the campaigns, Silva predicted; people are far more concerned with local issues like electricity, roads and waste management. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) The JVP representatives resisted repeated attempts to draw them out on the specifics of what they realistically expect from the GSL's engagement with the Tigers and how their party would do things differently. That is hardly surprising. The vicissitudes of the peace process have little practical impact on the JVP's southern vote base, and the party can score cheap political points by appealing to this constituency's romanticized nationalist notions without having to deal with the fall-out. But while the party has publicly registered its dissatisfaction at the joint statement (along with the requisite potshot at Norway),the JVP has kept a relatively low profile before, during and after the talks in Geneva compared with the media storm and street protests it generated during former President Kumaratunga's efforts to conclude a tsunami assistance agreement with the LTTE last year. We expect that this will remain the same until after local elections at the end of this month when, if the JVP does as well as it hopes, it will come out hammer and tongs against purported GSL "concessions" to the Tigers. In the meantime, we are certain President Rajapaksa, who understands very well Norway's effectiveness as facilitator, will ignore the JVP's public posturing about Oslo. We will continue to impress upon our interlocutors, including those in the GSL, our support for Norway's role. LUNSTEAD