SCENE SETTER FOR SRI LANKA ARMY COMMANDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001951

SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- ADDED ADDRESSEES/SLUG LINES

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
SECDEF FOR USDP:ISA-ADMIN
JOINT STAFF FOR J2/J-5-EUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM PREF MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR SRI LANKA ARMY COMMANDER
FONSEKA'S NOVEMBER 28-29 VISIT TO WASHINGTON


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Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) Summary: General Sarath Fonseka, Commander of the Sri
Lankan Army, will conduct a self-invited visit to Washington
November 28-29 to meet with Department of State and Pentagon
officials. Fonseka, the target of an April 2006 Tiger
suicide-bombing attempt on his life, has pursued a hard-line
policy toward the LTTE. Fonseka's visit represents an
opportunity for State and Defense officials to underscore our
support for the GSL and its right to defend itself against a
terrorist, separatist insurgency. However, we also need to
make clear that this support is neither uncritical nor
unconditional. The U.S. believes strongly there is no
military solution to the conflict. Our policy is aimed at
bringing the parties back to the table. As the Ambassador
has pointed out to the Secretary of Defense and other senior
GSL officials, some recent SLA operations appear to go beyond
responding proportionately to provocations; we want both
parties to exercise maximum restraint and avoid all offensive
operations.


2. (C) SUMMARY continued: We should also tell Fonseka that
the credible allegations of collusion among rogue elements of
the government and security forces with paramilitary groups
such as the "Karuna faction" require an appropriate response.
We should urge that the military end its ties with the
renegade Karuna group and address security forces' human
rights violations. We should also quietly inform Fonseka
that continued pursuit of offensive military actions could
result in the suspension of U.S. supply of offensive weapons
such as the Bushmaster. The GSL also should expect some
Members of the new Democratic Congress to take a keen
interest in the deteriorating human rights situation in Sri
Lanka. End Summary.

Short Biography
--------------


3. (C) General Sarath Fonseka, appointed Commander of the Sri
Lanka Army (SLA) from December 6, 2005, commanded troops
fighting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the
north of the island for most of his career in the infantry.
He served twice as Commander of the Security Forces in
Jaffna. The target of an April 2006 Tiger suicide-bombing
attempt on his life, Fonseka has pursued a hard-line policy
toward the LTTE. He is a Legal Permanent Resident of the
U.S. currently residing in Sri Lanka under a waiver of the
U.S. residency requirement. General Fonseka's appointment as
Commander is subject to annual renewal. Secretary of Defense
Gothabaya Rajapaksa has reportedly recommended Fonseka's
extension when his current assignment expires in December
2006, but President Mahinda Rajapaksa (Gothabaya's brother)
has yet to take action on it. Fonseka will conduct a
self-invited visit to Washington November 28-29 to meet with
Department of State and Pentagon officials.

Irrational Exuberance
--------------


3. (C) Since July 2006, Sri Lanka's military establishment
has been characterized by an attitude of over-confidence.
Fonseka and other military leaders seem to believe a military
defeat of the LTTE is possible. On the ground, there have
been numerous and significant ceasefire violations by both
sides, which initially produced successes for the government
side. In July, security forces reopened a water sluice in
Mavilaru forcibly closed by the LTTE, then captured Sampur,
an area south of Trincomalee harbor from which LTTE artillery
had threatened ships. Periodic Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF)
raids temporarily paralyzed Tiger artillery positions on
Pooneryn, from which the Tigers threatened the Jaffna
peninsula, as well as Sea Tiger bases in the east. The Sri
Lanka Navy intercepted several LTTE supply shipments, ranging
from a large ship to small trawlers carrying weapons.


4. (C) In October, however - just days before the parties
were to meet in Geneva -- an ill-considered Sri Lankan Army
offensive at the Jaffna Forward Defense Line (FDL) went
seriously awry; the Army suffered hundreds of casualties and
lost six tanks. Then, an LTTE truck bomb at Habarana killed

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over 100 sailors. Finally, the Sea Tigers attacked a Sri
Lanka Navy base at Galle, in the deep South, demonstrating
they could strike anywhere in the country and putting a
serious dent in the important tourism industry. Despite
these apparent defeats, the military establishment seems to
remain fixed on establishing decisive military superiority
over the LTTE.

Human Rights Record Murky
--------------


5. (C) During Fonseka's tenure, and especially in the last
few months, the human rights situation has deteriorated
markedly. Following a 10-day mission to Sri Lanka, United
Nations Special Advisor on Children and Armed Conflict Allen
Rock told the press his mission "found strong and credible
evidence that elements of the government security forces are
supporting and sometimes participating in the abductions and
forced recruitment of children by the Karuna faction." Rock
cited eyewitness reports in which security forces had
detained young Tamil males from which Karunas could select
fresh recruits. The Nordic-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
backed Rock's claims in a November 14 public statement.


6. (C) While the Sri Lanka military has been forthcoming in
providing individual names for Leahy amendment vetting, they
have been reluctant to give us names of units under
investigation for human rights abuses for our ACES database.

Military Assistance
--------------


7. (C) The military establishment appears to suffer from a
selective hearing loss regarding our policy towards
counter-terrorism and the peace process in Sri Lanka. We
have stressed that we support military assistance for
self-defense but that we do not believe there is a military
solution to this conflict. Military sources have told DATT
that the SLA perception is that the U.S. supports offensive
moves against the LTTE in a common battle against global
terrorism despite our public and private messages urging
restraint.


8. (C) The military is requesting additional training in such
areas as psy-ops and civil affairs. The Sri Lanka Navy (SLN)
wishes to purchase Bushmaster 30 mm guns for its fast attack
craft, which will provide a critical advantage over Sea Tiger
gunboats. Given ongoing Sri Lankan military actions, we
believe it is time to signal to the GSL that continued
offensive military actions and disproportionately strong
responses to LTTE actions would oblige the U.S. to suspend
provision of offensive weapons such as the Bushmaster. We
recommend Washington use the Fonseka visit to quietly signal
this change in policy. If approved, Ambassador will deliver
same message to the Foreign Minister and Defense Secretary
Rajapaksa on the Ambassador's return from the November 20-21
Co-Chairs meeting in Washington.


9. (C) The Embassy, with concurrence from the Department,
cancelled the October 2006 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
exercise citing force protections concerns. However, while
the MEU was, in fact, suspended for security-related reasons,
we also did not want to further embolden the military to
respond disproportionately to LTTE attacks or plan offensive
operations. The GSL was disappointed and has already put us
on notice that they will want to reschedule the MEU next
year.

Clarifying Our Message
--------------


10. (SBU) Post recommends the following general talking
points for all meetings:

-- Don't get carried away with perceptions of Tiger weakness
or opportunities for military victories. Tigers still highly
capable; there is no military solution.

-- Exercise maximum restraint; cease offensive operations.
US concerned that GSL has gone beyond defensive actions in

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recent engagements. Such actions risk LTTE retaliation in
kind which could jeopardize any prospect for peace talks --
our highest priority.

-- We must hold a legitimate, elected government to a higher
standard than a terrorist group. That's why the US Embassy
issued a statement after the Vakarai shelling that killed
approximately 60 IDPs.

-- Stop tolerating abductions and child soldier recruitment
by Karuna faction.

-- GSL should hold itself accountable for human rights
violations. We are willing to help with this, both on
civilian and military side.

-- Failure to refrain from disproportionate responses and,
especially, attempts to go on the offensive could result in
suspension of U.S. military assistance particularly supply of
offensive weapons.

-- Members of the new Democratic majority in the House have
expressed concern about human rights violations by the Sri
Lankan military. The GSL should expect greater scrutiny and
attention from the new Congress.

BLAKE