SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR NOV. 20-21 CO-CHAIRS

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 001919 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR P AND SCA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM PREF MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR NOV. 20-21 CO-CHAIRS MEETING REF: COLOMBO 1838 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d). FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER FROM AMBASSADOR BLAKE WASHINGTON MEETING MARKS OPPORTUNITY TO RE-ASSESS -------------- -------------- ¶1. (C) The November 21-22 meeting in Washington comes at a critical moment. Since the last Co-Chairs meeting on September 12 in Brussels, the situation in Sri Lanka has deteriorated markedly. The Washington meetings therefore mark a good opportunity to take a hard look at what more we can do to get the parties to agree to a lasting ceasefire and get them back to a sustained negotiating process. Failure to do so would likely mean a continued downward spiral here. ¶2. (C) We managed ) with some heavy lifting from A/S Boucher and other Co-Chair Special Envoys ) to get the government and the Tamil Tigers to Geneva. While both sides agreed there were some useful exchanges, talks broke down on the second day over the question of reopening the Kandy-Jaffna highway (A-9). Even if we can get the GSL and the Tigers back to the table, the Supreme Court decision voiding the merger of the North and East provinces is an obstacle to progress, and an issue the Co-Chairs should reach a common position on in Washington. ¶3. (C) On the ground, there have been numerous and significant case-fire violations by both sides. In October, before Geneva, an ill-considered Sri Lankan Army offensive at the Jaffna Forward Defense Line went seriously awry; the Army suffered hundreds of casualties and lost six tanks. An LTTE truck bomb at Habarana killed over 100 sailors. Then, the Sea Tigers attacked a Sri Lanka Navy base at Galle, in the deep South. ¶4. (C) Since Geneva, in November, the Air Force bombed the de facto LTTE capital of Kilinochchi, killing five civilians and damaging an internationally-funded hospital. The Sri Lankan Army shelling of an IDP camp in Vakarai killed a large number of displaced persons who were also tsunami victims. In short: The 2002 Cease-Fire Agreement is, for practical purposes, dead. ¶5. (C) Clearly, both sides have reneged on commitments not to engage in offensive military operations. Both sides are using military actions to position themselves in advance of �00A;talks. Regrettably, it is not clear that either side has bought into the argument that a purely military solution is not possible. Hardliners on both sides are pushing for ever more aggressive military moves. The risk of an accelerating escalation, a total breakdown of the CFA, and a return to open warfare is real. HUMAN RIGHTS TRAMPLED ON, HUMANITARIAN SITUATION CRITICAL -------------- ¶6. (C) The humanitarian situation in Jaffna and in the East remains bleak. We have a forum for dialogue with the GSL on NGO access issues, but the reality is that access problems are as bad as ever. Likewise human rights violations have continued unabated. UN Special Advisor Allan Rock highlighted during his visit last week the culture of impunity that exists for human rights violators. The ongoing breakdown of law and order, especially in the East, and the failure of the Government (not to mention the LTTE) to investigate or punish any violations, have opened the door for the Karuna group and abusers to carry on their trade of murder and kidnapping for political and criminal ends. Shadowy figures assassinated Tamil National Alliance MP Nadaraja Raviraj, inviting a possible retaliation in kind from the LTTE. One bright spot is that the Government has diligently negotiated the Terms of Reference for the human rights Commission of Inquiry, which the Government hopes can begin its work December 1. Because of the widening and expensive scope of the Commission's work, only the Japanese among the international community have named their observer. ¶7. (C) While no Co-Chairs meeting at this level is routine, this one takes place at a difficult and even critical juncture. Following are some ideas on how we might seek to reverse this downward spiral. RECOMMIT TO THE CEASEFIRE -------------- ¶8. (C) The most urgent priority is to get both sides to recommit to a real and durable ceasefire, and to the terms of the Cease-Fire Agreement. Co-Chair exhortations and the Parties' own ceasefire commitments have been routinely ignored by both sides. The best hope for something more durable is to get sustained peace talks going without preconditions. ¶9. (C) Another essential element of any sustained ceasefire will be to plus up the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission, who are the only independent group that report honestly on ceasefire violations and can therefore cut through the fog of charges and counter-charges the Government and LTTE level against each other after each military incident. Since the departure of the EU monitors at LTTE request, the SLMM is stretched so thin that its monitors are at more risk than ever ) as shown by the recent firing on SLMM commander Solvberg by the Sri Lankan army at Pooneryn. The SLMM told me they think the LTTE might be willing to reconsider its request to withdraw the EU monitors because they realize the important role the SLMM plays. Failing that, the Co-Chairs should discuss other options such as taking Switzerland and New Zealand up on their offers to provide monitors. GETTING TALKS OFF DEAD CENTER -------------- ¶10. (C) The formula of getting two fairly large delegations in the room together without a clear agenda has probably served out its usefulness. The Norwegians tried to finesse the problem of endless negotiations over an agenda by not having one in Geneva. It didn't work very well, in part because the Government did not come prepared to talk substance. Foreign Minister Samaraweera told me the GSL hopes to have a devolution package ready by the end of November that they are then prepared to discuss with the LTTE at the next round. He also confirmed they are prepared to return to talks without preconditions, even if fighting is going on. This is encouraging, but is not by itself enough to ensure that meaningful talks will take place. BOOSTING NORWAY'S FACILITATION EFFORTS -------------- ¶11. (C) While making clear our continued strong support for Norway's facilitation efforts, we should use the Washington meetings to explore how we might enhance the success of negotiations: -- To help both sides formulate reasonable and coherent negotiating strategies, should the international community ask respected international NGOs with experience in peace negotiations such as the Public Interest Law and Policy Group or the Berghof Foundation to help each side develop such strategies? The Norwegians will come prepared to brief on past Track II ideas that were considered, but welcome other ideas. -- To help ensure more productive negotiating rounds, should the Co-Chairs suggest both sides hold expert level intersessional working groups between rounds of formal negotiations to tackle major issues, seek to reach agreement where possible and then kick the sticky issues up for resolution at the higher level meetings? Working groups could meet (with the Norwegians present) on overarching political issues such as the devolution package, but could also discuss humanitarian access and logistical issues. -- Should the Co-Chairs recommend to the Parties that they agree to the appointment of an international mediator of the stature and experience of Martti Ahtisaari (who himself is probably too busy) to help the two sides work through difficulties? NOT ALL GLOOM AND DOOM -------------- ¶12. (C) You will find our European friends to be particularly gloomy and pessimistic about the current situation. While they have good reason, we must also remember that Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict is not intractable. This is not Darfur, or even the Bosnia of the early 1990s. Most Sri Lankan Tamils live in the South and West, not in LTTE-controlled areas or even in the proposed Tamil-majority area of the Northeast province. Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims live in close proximity to each other, have an extensive web of contact between the communities, and even intermarry. (For example, one member of the LTTE delegation to the October Geneva talks was half-Sinhalese.) ¶13. (C) There are some positive developments and some assets we can build on to try to help. The MoU on cooperation between the principal parties in the South provides a promising avenue to develop a common way forward on the peace process and other national issues. The government is beginning to hear the message that they need to be better than the Tigers by cleaning up their act on human rights. ¶14. (C) The Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights with international observers is a start in this direction. More will be needed, but we and Sri Lanka's other friends have a moral obligation to follow through on this initiative. If we can develop a consensus with our Co-Chair friends on how to restore the ceasefire and better support a more lasting and deeper negotiating process, we can provide some measure of hope and help the parties to begin to rebuild trust and confidence. BLAKE