DEFENSE SECRETARY EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001889 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR P AND SCA/INS, USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016 TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER CE SUBJECT: DEFENSE SECRETARY EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE MAJOR LTTE ATTACK REF: A. COLOMBO 1828 ¶B. COLOMBO 1863 ¶C. COLOMBO 1884 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) In a November 10 meeting with Defense Secretary Rajapakse, Ambassador expressed concern about growing indications the Sri Lankan military was taking disproportionate military action against the LTTE that jeopardized prospects for a return to peace negotiations. Peace Secretariat Director Kohona and Rajapakse expressed regret for the civilian deaths in the bombings at Killinochchi and Vakarai, but said public perceptions that the LTTE is weak were misplaced. The LTTE mobilized 20 naval vessels and sank two GSL naval craft in a November 9 engagement south of Point Pedro off the coast of Jaffna, killing 15 and capturing 4 Sri Lankan sailors. On November 6 the LTTE flew a light plane that Rajapakse worried might be a training run for an aerial suicide attack to show the LTTE's strength prior to Prabhakaran's November 27 Heroes Day Speech. Rajapakse and Peace Secretariat Director Kohona explained that the GSL objective was to deny the LTTE the impression they can gain militarily so they will have an incentive to engage seriously at the peace talks. End Summary. Why Such Heavy and Disproportionate Military Action? -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador requested to meet alone with Rajapakse to detail the USG's concern about the scope and disproportionality of recent GSL military actions. Anticipating the Ambassador's message, Rajapakse invited acting Foreign Secretary Geeta DeSilva, Director General of Naval Operations Samarasinghe and Peace Secretariat Director Kohona to join. Ambassador explained the USG's concern that the GSL appeared to be taking military actions that increasingly seemed to be more offensive than defensive (such as the bombing in Kilinochchi (ref a),often seemed disproportionate to the minor LTTE movements or actions that precipitated the GSL actions, and suggested a lack of concern for the safety of civilians (such as the Vakarai bombing - ref c). These actions collectively blurred the GSL's own pledge it would only engage in defensive action, and might easily lead to LTTE reprisals, which in turn would diminish the chances for a reurn to negotiations. What, the Ambassador asked was the GOI's intention with its recent actions? LTTE Stronger Than Perceived -------------- ¶3. (C) Rajapakse explained that the LTTE is far stronger than is commonly believed. He cited a November 9 attack by 20 LTTE boats on a seven vessel GSL naval convoy south of Point Pedro off the east coast of Jaffna. The LTTE boats engaged in a pincer action during which they managed to separate two GSL vessels, which LTTE suicide boats then rammed and sank. Admiral Samarasinghe said 5 sailors had been killed, fifteen were missing and presumed dead, and four had been captured by the LTTE. He explained that the action came at a time when the Navy is already stretched thin because it is escorting humanitarian convoys from Colombo to help re-supply Jaffna (ref b). The Ambassador noted that in initial briefings he had received from the Sri Lankan military when he arrived in September, the GSL had believed they had inflicted heavy losses on the LTTE. How had the LTTE been able to reconstitute capabilities so fast? Rajapakse explained the LTTE had been able to re-supply the parts and other equipment lost, which was why they could now COLOMBO 00001889 002 OF 002 increase their operational tempo. He reiterated the urgent need for Bushmaster weapons so that the LTTE could not outgun the Sri Lankan navy. The Ambassador noted that Army Chief General Fonseka would be able to get the status of the Bushmasters during his visit to Washington later this month. The Ambassador also urged the GSL to receive at a high level a team from Raytheon coming the week of November 13 to discuss Raytheon's offer of aerial radars on Beechcraft. Such radars would greatly increase GSL capacity to detect LTTE re-supply efforts several hundred miles offshore. Rajapakse said this was an important visit. LTTE Preparing Suicide Air Attack? -------------- ¶4. (C) Rajapakse also expressed great concern about a training flight that an LTTE light aircraft had taken the evening of November 6. He said that while there had been previous sightings of the plane flying, this was the first time that military radar had detected and tracked the plane. He speculated that the plane might be preparing to undertake a suicide bombing of a target that could not be targeted by a car or suicide bomber on the ground. Rajapakse predicted LTTE supremo Prabhakaran would need a military or other victory to show his strength before his November 27 Heroes Day speech. He said the GSL was particularly concerned a suicide plane might target the Ratmalana military airport outside Colombo, the military side of the air base at Colombo's international airport where the Air Force's Kfirs are stationed, the base at Anuradhapura where a helicopter squadron is stationed, or possibly the President's residence in Colombo. The Ambassador asked how long it would take to scramble the Kfirs to intercept such a mission. Rajapakse thought at least 30 minutes, which would be too long to stop an attack on Anuradhapura. He also expressed concern that the plane might fly at night since the LTTE knows the Kfirs do not have night vision. Asked about GSL plans to acquire night capability, Rajapakse said the next generation of Kfirs would likely have such capability and the Indians would provide the requisite training. Restraint Still Needed -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador thanked Rajapkse for his briefing, noted that any nation must of course defend itself, but stressed the need to take the utmost care to avoid civilian casualties and noted that the U.S. looked to the GSL to exercise restraint to help prepare the ground for what we hoped would a resumption of peace negotiations in early January. Kohona said the GSL regretted the civilian deaths at Killinochi and Vakarai He and Rajapakse explained that the GSL objective was to deny the LTTE the impression they can gain militarily so they will have an incentive to engage seriously at the peace talks. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Rajapakse and Kohona took a much more conciliatory line with the Ambassador than in an earlier briefing on the Vakarai incident to a wider audience (ref c). It is difficult to know whether the LTTE has been able to rearm as much as the GSL claims. Whatever the case, the Ambassador laid down an important marker for the GSL to exercise more restraint and be much more careful to avoid civilian casualties. BLAKE