SRI LANKA: MAJOR PARTIES AGREE TO COOPERATE ON WAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001755

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM PREF MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: MAJOR PARTIES AGREE TO COOPERATE ON WAY
FORWARD FOR PEACE PROCESS

REF: COLOMBO 1693

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and
the main opposition United National Party (UNP) signed a
Memorandum of Understanding on October 23 setting out a
Common Minimum Program to resolve the conflict in the north
and east and to address other national issues. Most
significantly, the MoU reaffirms the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement
with Norway as facilitator -- a position that two Singhalese
nationalist parties who supported President Rajapaksa in the
November 2005 election vehemently oppose. The Co-chairs and
other Western diplomats view the agreement as a positive
element in reaching a "southern consensus" that could lead to
a viable peace proposal from the Government of Sri Lanka.
The agreement remains vague, however, and implementing it
will put both the government and the UNP under strain. UNP
leader Ranil Wickremesinghe's shaky position within his party
introduces another element of instability. End Summary.

A Common Minimum Program
--------------


2. (U) On October 23, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP),the
main constituent of the United People's Freedom Alliance
(UPFA) government, and the opposition United National Party
(UNP) signed a Memorandum of Understanding. Political
leaders, members of parliament and religious dignitaries
witnessed the signing, which took place after President
Mahinda Rajapaksa's Cabinet unanimously endorsed the draft
earlier that day. The agreement is the result of four rounds
of talks between September 11 and October 11. The MoU sets
out a Common Minimum Program (CMP) to resolve the conflict in
the north and east and to collaborate on electoral reforms,
good governance, economic development, restructuring of the
education system and social development.


3. (U) The Speaker of the Parliament called the signing of
the MoU an "historical and positive development," in light of
recent destabilizing military developments. Opposition
Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe remarked that Sri Lanka's two
leading political parties had agreed that only a "political
settlement" would solve the ethnic issue and that he was
hopeful the two parties could reach a consensus. President
Rajapaksa reiterated his commitment to protect democracy and
thanked the UNP for supporting good governance.

Alliances New and Old
--------------


4. (U) The latest SLFP-UNP talks resulting in the October 23
MoU is not the first time the two main political parties have
sought a consensus. In fact, the SLFP and UNP have engaged
intermittently in such discussions since 1997.
Wickremesinghe lamented that in previous rounds the two
parties had not found sufficient common ground.


5. (C) The MoU will allow for the continuation of the 2002
Ceasefire Agreement with Norway as facilitator of the peace
process. The Marxist-Singhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (JVP) and Buddhist monk-led Jathika Hela Urumaya
(JHU),who supported President Rajapaksa in the November 2005
Presidential election, vehemently oppose these positions,
however. It seems clear that the MoU between the SLFP and
the UNP, if put into action, will force the JVP-JHU to break
with the government, making them effectively the main
opposition in Sri Lanka.

President, Opposition Discuss MoU with A/S Boucher
-------------- --------------


6. (C) In his October 19-20 meetings with Government of Sri
Lanka (GSL) and opposition leaders, Assistant Secretary of
State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher inquired
about the status of the proposed MoU between the SLFP and the

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UNP. President Rajapaksa told him on October 19 that
discussions were ongoing. He added that he had invited other
parties, not just the UNP, to take ministerial posts in his
government if they want to join the Common Minimum Program
(CMP). Some in his party were concerned that the Singhalese
nationalist JVP would gain strength if they became
effectively the sole opposition, the President said. He
added that in that event, he would take his case to the
people and take his chances.


7. (C) Opposition United National Party (UNP) leader Ranil
Wickremesinghe told A/S Boucher October 20 that his party
generally has welcomed the agreement with the governing Sri
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). According to Wickremesinghe, the
UNP will bolster government peace efforts, support the SLFP
in parliament, and participate fully in the All-Party
Conference. However, the debate continues among party
members about whether party officials should accept cabinet
portfolios. He noted, however, that the latter point might
be moot since there are not enough posts available to meet
the demand.


8. (C) In an October 20 meeting with UNP-allied Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress leader Rauf Hakeem, Ambassador Blake asked
whether Hakeem thinks the latest SLFP-UNP discussions had the
potential to address Muslim concerns that they have a role in
a political solution. Hakeem responded ambivalently, saying
he expects the government to consult with them on any final
agreement -- but that they have not yet done so.

An Emerging "Southern Consensus"?
--------------


9. (C) COMMENT: It has been clear for a long time that a
government dependent on Singhalese nationalist parties would
never be able to offer a peace proposal that the Tamil Tigers
and even more moderate Tamil groups could consider seriously.
The Norwegian facilitators, other Co-chair Ambassadors and
most local observers share our analysis that the major
parties' agreement represents the best chance yet for
developing a "southern consensus" that could lead to a
realistic peace proposal from the government side. That
said, the MoU - as publicly released - is vague. (The more
detailed papers the MoU refers to are not in the public
domain, and we have not yet seen them.) There are many
political factors that could still derail the arrangement
before its implementation. Not the least of these is the
increasingly shaky position of UNP leader Wickremesinghe
within his own party. Should this erupt into a full-blown
leadership battle within the UNP -- or if there is
significant internal UNP dissension over whether to accept
ministerial slots -- the deal could still come undone.
BLAKE