SRI LANKA: A/S BOUCHER PRESSES GOVERNMENT TO MAKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 001752

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: A/S BOUCHER PRESSES GOVERNMENT TO MAKE
A VIABLE PEACE PROPOSAL

REF: COLOMBO 1706

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT O. BLAKE, JR. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a two-day visit to Sri Lanka, Assistant
Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher

SIPDIS
pressed Sri Lankan government and opposition officials to put
meaningful proposals on the table for future rounds of peace
talks with the Tamil Tigers. Boucher assured the government
of Sri Lanka and the Sri Lankan public of U.S. support in the
fight against terrorism and willingness to cooperate on
security. He also underscored the importance of cooperating
with international human rights monitors and taking firm
action to investigate and punish human rights abuses. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a meeting on October 19 with Sri Lankan President
Mahinda Rajapaksa, Boucher said the U.S. appreciated the
enormous pressure that recent Tamil Tiger provocations were
bringing on the government to respond. However, it was
important to exercise restraint and get to talks in Geneva.
Rajapaksa responded that coming to terms with the main
opposition United National Party and other "southern" parties
on a framework for a peace proposal to the Tigers was the
most important order of business for his government. (Septel
reports status of a new arrangement for cooperation between
the two major parties.) Boucher said the U.S. hoped that Sri
Lanka would get a broad-based government that would have the
support needed to put a viable peace proposal on the table.


3. (C) Rajapaksa said his government would take a new
approach to negotiations. He was less interested in trying
to patch up the frayed Ceasefire Agreement than starting a
serious dialogue with the Tigers about settlement issues.
What did the Tigers want, he asked? Dividing Sri Lanka was
off the table. Rajapaksa said he could not imagine offering
them more - or less - than his formula of "maximum
devolution." Boucher observed that there are many experts on
devolution, including Indian ones, who could help, but it was
clearly the Tigers who were most in need of good advice. Did
they have the capacity to negotiate meaningfully on
devolution? What about the rest of the Tamils who don't
support the Tigers, but wanted to participate?


4. (C) Rajapaksa responded that the Tamil Tigers' ultimate
aim is to break away from Sri Lanka. The Tigers don't want
federalism; they want at most confederation, he argued -- and
they were willing to kill other people, including Tamils, who
don't agree with them. Boucher again urged Rajapaksa to
reach out to other groups such as the UNP, put forward a
realistic proposal, and seek a commitment from the Tigers to
real negotiations. He hoped the Tigers were finally getting
the message that they could not continue to bet on military
force as the solution.


5. (C) Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera elaborated on
Rajapaksa's points. The government did not want to get
embroiled in a discussion in Geneva about strengthening a
Ceasefire Agreement that was, for practical purposes, dead,
he said. The talks should move into core issues that would
address questions of a final settlement. Samaraweera said
that the level of bitterness had increased in recent months,
so the first meeting should have limited objectives, but set
a timetable and a framework for future sessions.


6. (C) Samaraweera pointed out that the new arrangement with
the United National Party would have to become more concrete
before the government could make more specific proposals, but
a joint committee of legal experts should have a draft in
time for a second session that could come as early as
November. Samaraweera said that if the United National Party
were truly concerned about progress on peace, getting its
support should be easy. Otherwise, the President would try
to "go above their heads" by going directly to the people,
perhaps by holding a referendum.


7. (C) In a later meeting, the principal opposition leader,
United National Party head Ranil Wickremesinghe, told A/S
Boucher there were a number of elements required to gain
concessions from the Tigers at talks. The government must
limit the Karuna faction's activities, stop military action,
and address the Supreme Court-ordered de-merger of the north
and east (reftel). "The government must go (to talks) ready
this time. The international community should press for
this." Since Tamils still face active discrimination, the
government must provide concessions to draw Tamil civilians
away from the Tamil Tigers. He claimed that he had done so
while serving as Prime Minister, but in his current
assessment, "the military has a hard-line Sinhala view,"
making outreach to the Tamil community difficult.


8. (C) On lessons learned from previous, failed rounds of
negotiations, Wickremesinghe thought it important to act
quickly and set time limits, so as to give the Tigers
parameters. The Co-Chairs should continue to urge a return
to talks. Wickremesinghe is planning a trip to India in
November to meet political leaders; he said he intends to
raise the issue of increased Indian engagement with Sonia
Gandhi if he meets her.


9. (C) Sri Lankan Muslim Conference (SLMC) leader Rauff
Hakeem told us that for peace talks to succeed, the
Government and facilitators would have to persuade the Tigers
to consider core issues. Talks about an interim agreement or
"conditions of normalcy" have proven in the past to be mere
"time-buying exercises" on the Tigers' part, he said.
Because Tamils and Muslims have separate identities as
communities, Muslims should have their own delegation to
peace talks. However, he expressed confidence that both
Government and Tiger leaders know the importance of Muslim
concerns ) and recognize Muslims must be a party to any
future peace agreement.


10. (C) COMMENT: A/S Boucher's visit helped keep the
Government of Sri Lanka focused on the importance of peace
talks. The government's strategy of moving directly into
"core issues" will likely meet resistance from Tiger
negotiators, who will again want to discuss interim
arrangements, including reviving the ceasefire agreement. It
will therefore be important to lower expectations for the
Geneva talks and emphasize the importance of launching a new
process. It will also be important to try to bring down the
level of violence that has poisoned the atmosphere for talks,
particularly in recent weeks.


11. (SBU) Assistant Secrtary Boucher cleared this message.
BLAKE