NORWAY'S ENVOY "MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001620

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER CE
SUBJECT: NORWAY'S ENVOY "MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT
MEDIATION PROSPECTS

REF: BLAKE/BOUCHER E-MAIL 09/02/06 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. SUMMARY: (C) Norwegian mediator Hanssen-Bauer briefed
Co-Chair Ambassadors on October 2 on his meetings with Sri
Lankan government officials. He said that the GSL had denied
media reports of preconditions for possible talks with the
LTTE. The GSL would prefer November 10 or October 28 for
talks, and was interested in Switzerland as a possible venue.
Hanssen-Bauer was concerned about making travel arrangements
for the LTTE delegation and asked the Co-Chairs for
suggestions on how to avoid transiting Colombo. The
Co-Chairs agreed that there was a substantial risk of actions
by either side that could inflame or derail the process, and
that an early date for resumption of talks was desirable. In
a separate meeting, Ambassador told Defense Secretary
Rajapaksa that a resumption of offensive operations by Sri
Lankan forces would likely result in the U.S. canceling the
joint military exercise planned for October. End summary.


2. (C) Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer told the
Co-Chair Ambassadors that the GSL had given him a proposal
for talks without preconditions to present to the LTTE
leadership in Kilinochchi. His government interlocutors told
him to "ignore" a story in the Sunday Times of Colombo
setting out three conditions for talks. The GSL assured him
that (reports to the contrary) it had no pre-conditions.
Hanssen-Bauer said that he was "moderately optimistic" that
his mediation would be able to bring the two sides together
for another round of talks soon. In his view, a brief window
of opportunity was opening. He observed that the GSL was
responding in a positive way to the statement issued by the
September 11-12 Co-Chairs meeting in Brussels. This showed
that pressure from the international community to return to
the negotiating table was working.


3. (C) Hanssen-Bauer said he was telling both sides not to
think in terms of a one-off event. Rather, he was seeking to
lower expectations, get the process back on track, and look
for opportunities for confidence-building measures. Hanssen
Bauer said he did not see any possibility of meeting with
Tiger supremo Prabhakaran at this stage: "Maybe later, when
things calm down." However, he was sure that Prabhakaran
would not permit LTTE negotiator Tamilselvan participate in
any talks without his blessing.


4. (C) The Norwegians had suggested October 18-25 for talks.
However, the GSL said they would prefer November 10 (when
budget debates in Parliament will largely be over),or
October 28. The Norwegians will push for the earlier date.
All the Co-Chair Ambassadors concurred, concerned that in the
current fluid situation, much could occur before the end of
October - during which time any number of things could occur
to derail talks. Regarding the venue, the GSL had indicated
that sensitivities about the last, abortive meeting would
rule out Oslo this time. Switzerland may be an attractive
option for both sides. Hanssen-Bauer told the Co-Chair
Ambassadors that while he had discussed with A/S Boucher the
possibility of a high-level meeting in Washington on October
27, that date will have to change given the new proposed
dates from the GSL


5. (C) Hanssen-Bauer said he was particularly concerned
about travel arrangements for the LTTE delegation. Based on
the humiliating treatment they received last time on their
return via Colombo airport, they had said categorically they
would not use that route again. Hanssen Bauer said that
clear, transparent, logical guarantees were needed that the
LTTE could proceed unhindered. He asked the group to get

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back to him with suggestions for logistics.


6. (C) COMMENT: The Co-Chairs are all concerned that the GSL
may follow the advice of many hardliners in the military (and
among Sinhalese chauvinists) to press their military
advantage and try to wipe out the LTTE now. Ambassador
suggested that if both sides agree to talks, we will need to
press at our level and from capitals for military restraint.
He noted that A/S Boucher Richard was considering traveling
to Sri Lanka October 19-20; other Co-Chairs might consider
sending high level officials in staggered intervals during
October to maintain support for negotiations. The other
Co-Chairs agreed.


7. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: In a separate meeting with the
Foreign Secretary and Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa,
Ambassador stressed that the U.S. priority was to support the
peace process. The USG, he reiterated, believes that a
purely military solution to the conflict is unrealistic. The
GSL officials agreed that the recent military advances by Sri
Lankan forces had created an opportunity for talks. Action
should now move to the diplomatic track: "The time is ripe
for talks." Ambassador pointed out that the Sri Lankan media
and public might misinterpret the planned bilateral military
exercise in October as an indication of U.S. support for a
broadened Sri Lankan military offensive against the Tigers.
The USG was working on media guidance to counter this. He
emphasized that the U.S. supported Sri Lanka's right to
defend itself against terrorist acts. However, renewed
offensive operations by the Sri Lankan forces would mean that
we would have to cancel the exercise. Both men nodded.


BLAKE