SRI LANKA: MONITORING MISSION BRIEFS SCA/INS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001604 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM PREF MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: MONITORING MISSION BRIEFS SCA/INS DIRECTOR; SEES PEACE TALKS AS FAR HOPE REF: A. COLOMBO 1601 ¶B. COLOMBO 1597 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: SCA/INS Director Marcia Bernicat, on an orientation visit to Sri Lanka, met with Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Press and Information Officer (PIO) Thorfinnur Omarsson on October 2. Omarsson expressed the monitors' fear that the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) will continue to pursue its perceived military advantage in an attempt to capture Elephant Pass, the thin land bridge which links the Jaffna peninsula to the rest of the island. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) will likely target Colombo if the parties are unable to return to talks, he said. Omarsson added (PROTECT) that the LTTE leadership expressed to the SLMM that it would follow military options if the GSL does not open the A9 highway linking Jaffna and the Tiger-controlled Vanni to the rest of the island. End Summary. Threats and Postures -------------- ¶2. (C) In an October 2 briefing for SCA/INS Director Marcia Bernicat, SLMM PIO Thorfinnur Omarsson predicted that the GSL armed forces would push forward for a greater territorial advantage before going to peace talks. The LTTE, on the other hand, he said, has no other option but to go through the motions of returning to talks in order to have an opportunity to regroup after losing battles with security forces at Mavilaru, Sampur, and Jaffna (refetels). He added, "In fact, there is no ceasefire, though the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) remains in place." ¶3. (C) Ommarsson mentioned confidentially a meeting called by LTTE political wing leader S.P. Tamilselvan last week. Ommarsson (PROTECT) said that Tamilselvan told the SLMM "almost as a threat" that if the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) would not reopen the A9 highway to Jaffna, which was closed after fighting erupted at the Forward Defense Line (FDL) in Muhamalai, Jaffna on August 11, the LTTE would pursue "other," assumedly military, "options." The SLMM, he said, is urging the GSL to open the A9 road as a requirement of the Ceasefire Agreement. Sampur vs. Elephant Pass -------------- ¶4. (C) The GSL has not yet granted the SLMM permission to inspect the Forward Defense Line (FDL) at Muhamalai, but Omarsson said the SLMM has reason to believe that security forces have pushed the line south by as many as several kilometers. Omarsson reported that last week Jaffna commander Major General Chandrasiri told SLMM Chief Lars Solvberg that fighting would continue at the FDL "through October." Omarsson said: "We think the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) will try its very best to go to Elephant Pass, which is within shooting range of (LTTE-headquarters) Kilinochchi. This move is understandable militarily, but gaining territory south of Muhamalai means a break of the CFA." ¶5. (C) Because both parties are engaging under the assumption that the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) holds, a forward military push by the GSL will be a clear break of the CFA. Both parties agreed on the location of the line of control at Muhamalai, Jaffna at the signing of the 2002 CFA, the PIO explained. Sampur was not specifically defined, though it was de-facto LTTE controlled. Since the LTTE provoked the GSL at the Mavilaru sluice gate and in Muttur (reftels), Omarsson said, the GSL could argue that its July 2006 capture of Sampur was a defensive move and therefore not a violation of the CFA. ¶6. (C) Bernicat shared Omarsson's concern that the parties might forgo peace talks, noting: "Our greatest fear is that the GSL will believe it can actually win militarily." Omarsson told us that members of the defense establishment COLOMBO 00001604 002 OF 002 assume a full-scale offensive against the Tigers will be "bloody but short. But it won't be short." He predicted that guerilla-style terrorist attacks would continue indefinitely even if security forces pushed as far south as Kilinochchi. Talking About Talks While Tigers Regroup -------------- ¶7. (C) Omarsson analyzed that neither party is committed to peace talks at this juncture. He echoed what the GSL has stressed to us in recent meetings: "It is common knowledge that the LTTE used the CFA period to build its strength. They were never totally committed to the CFA." Now, he argued, the LTTE's only option is to make the motions of returning to talks in order to regroup after defeats at Mavilaru, Sampur and Jaffna. He added that: "The GSL doesn't want to talk. It gained confidence (from military victories) in Sampur and Jaffna. The GSL feels it can break the Tigers," if not defeat them completely. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Omarsson's analysis of the current conflict was balanced and informed. The SLMM's assessment that the parties will not readily return to peace talks reinforces the obstacles facing the international community in convincing the GSL to cease military engagement and return to negotiations. BLAKE