CO-CHAIRS AMBASSADORS MEETING: READOUT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001578 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/INS, USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV CE SUBJECT: CO-CHAIRS AMBASSADORS MEETING: READOUT OF KILINOCHI MEETING - NEXT STEPS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND NGO ISSUES, AND RECOMMENDED URGENT APPROACH TO UNHRC Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Norwegian Amb Brattskar told Co-Chair Ambassadors in Colombo on September 26 that LTTE leader Tamilselvan had conveyed Prabakharan's decision that the LTTE is prepared to return to peace talks in Oslo in October. However, the LTTE also threatened that if the GSL is not ready to engage, the LTTE would not consider itself restricted by the ceasefire and would take its fight to the south and other parts of Sri Lanka. Norwegian Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer is expected in Colombo this weekend to try to nail down the agreement of both sides regarding the date and venue for talks. Once those are determined, Co-Chair Ambassadors plan to meet with President Rajapakse to express support for the resumption of negotiations and urge maximum flexibility with regard to practical arrangements. Other co-chairs would meet with the LTTE to make a similar point. EU Head of Mission Wilson briefed other Ambassadors that the UN Human Rights Commission Resident Representative is working with the GSL on the terms of reference (TOR) for the Human Rights Commission that will have international observers to investigate past human rights abuses. Wilson expressed concern about preliminary indications that the TOR might be narrow in scope which would limit the scope and credibility of the mission. Co-chair Ambassadors agreed to recommend to capitals that each Co-Chair country suggest to High Commissioner Arbor that she send a high level representative this week to Colombo to work with the GOSL to ensure credible TOR. This is urgent because the Government hopes to conclude work on the TOR by next week. Post recommends the Department instruct UN Mission to meet with Arbor urgently to request that she send a representative. End Summary. Meeting in Killinochi -------------- ¶2. (C) Norwegian Amb Brattskar briefed on his Friday, September 22 meeting with LTTE leader Tamilselvan, which he characterized as longer and more productive meeting than he had expected. After reviewing the Co-Chairs' statement, Tamilselvan expressed surprise that the Co-Chairs had not mentioned the closure of the main A-9 road that links Jaffna. Brattskar pointed out that the Co-Chairs had also not mentioned the failure by the LTTE to guarantee safe passage of ICRC ships to Jaffna. Tamilselvan retorted that the LTTE could not do so because they could not guarantee that "others" might not take action against such ships. The LTTE further argued that since the A-9 is a vital part of the Cease Fire Agreement, it would have been appropriate for the Co-Chairs to mention this, whereas the passage of ships to Jaffna was not a part of the CFA. The LTTE also expressed concern that the Co-Chairs had not mentioned the government offensive in Sampur. ¶3. (C) Brattskar reported that he was able to reconfirm the LTTE' willingness to participate in talks with the GSL. He said he made the political case that this was a good opportunity for the LTTE both to get it story out and to dispel the perception that the LTTE has been the obstacle to the resumption of talks. Brattskar noted that he told the LTTE pointedly that if they failed to come to negotiations, the situation would become much worse for them. Tamilselvan responded by making clear first of all that his message came from Prabakharan himself, rather than the LTTE leadership (the latter is the normal LTTE characterization of their messages). Prabakharan's message was that the LTTE had listened to the Co-Chairs' advice to resume talks and the LTTE had decided to heed that advice. However, the LTTE wants the government to stop its offensive military actions. COLOMBO 00001578 002 OF 004 Brattskar said he had pointed out to Tamilselvan that a halt to military actions had to be a two-way street. Last Chance for Peace? -------------- ¶4. (C) Tamilselvan said that if the GSL is ready to return to talks and the peace process, then the LTTE is also ready. However, he added that if the government was unwilling to do so, the LTTE would "look for other ways to promote the cause of the Tamil people." Tamilselvan elaborated the LTTE would not be restricted by the CFA if talks failed since the GOSL does not seem to be confined by the CFA, and he vowed that the LTTE would take its fight to the south and other parts of the country. Tamilselvan concluded by saying the Tigers would prefer to have talks take place in Oslo in October, but they are flexible on both venue and timing. He also expressed his desire to meet with the Co-Chairs before resuming talks with the GSL. ¶5. (C) Brattskar noted that he asked Tamilselvan and the GSL to not look for excuses that would prevent their attending the talks. For example, he urged that the LTTE not make an issue out of transportation for the LTTE delegation in and out of the country. Parenthetically, Brattskar told Co-Chair ambassadors that the government had broken its promise to the Norwegians after the failed talks in Oslo in June by not providing their normal security arrangements for the LTTE at the Colombo airport upon the LTTE delegation's return. Instead, the delegation was forced to wait for at least an hour in the public part of the arrival terminal where anyone might have recognized the delegation and had the opportunity to threaten them. Brattskar said he had made the same point to the government side and had further urged the government not to go to the press or seek a written guarantee from Prabakharan since any such public requirements would virtually ensure that the LTTE would refuse. ¶6. (C) Brattskar told the Co-Chairs that the next step is for the Norwegians to work out an agreed date and venue for the talks. He noted that the government already had ruled out talks in early October because of domestic political commitments, so the GON is targeting mid-October to start the negotiations. Brattskar noted that Norwegian Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer plans to come to Colombo next Sunday or Monday (i.e. October 1 or 2) to firm up these details. Brattskar's personal assessment of his meeting with Tamilselvan was that it had gone better than he had expected and that the "door is now open a crack" for negotiations. ¶7. (C) Ambassador thanked Brattskar for the detailed readout and suggested that once Hanssen-Bauer has worked out a specific date and venue for the talks to begin, the Co-Chairs seek an appointment with President Rajapaksa by the end ofthe week of Oct 2 to express support for the resumption of negotiations and urge maximum flexibility with regard to practical arrangements. Ambassador further suggested that it would be useful for senior officials in Co-Chair capitals to call the GSL at that time to reinforce these points. Other Co-Chair ambassadors agreed that both would be sensible approaches. Human Rights Mission -------------- ¶8. (C) EU Head of Mission Julian Wilson then briefed on conversations that he had had with UN Human Rights Commission Resident Representative Rory Mungoven regarding GSL preparations for a human rights mission. Wilson reported that the UN had taken the position that if the mission's COLOMBO 00001578 003 OF 004 terms of reference (TOR),which the government is now developing, are acceptable and meet minimum international standards, the UN would agree to send a representative as part of the international observer group for the mission. Wilson commented that the GOSL Solicitor General was drafting the terms of reference and that he could be expected to take a narrow, legalistic approach under which domestic Sri Lankan Law would take precedence over international human rights law. Wilson said that from the very preliminary indications he had received, the TOR would have a relatively narrow focus looking at just ten prominent cases and would not seek to pursue investigation and prosecution of those that might be implicated in the commission's findings. ¶9. (C) Wilson commented that it is critically important that the international community seek to shape the TOR to give the human rights mission the scope and credibility that we all expect of it. Wilson said that he had suggested that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Arbor send a high level representative to work quietly with the GSL to ensure a credible TOR document. However, Arbor reportedly declined to do this, arguing that her local representative in Sri Lanka Mungoven could act in her stead. Wilson noted that Mungoven is capable but relatively junior, and that it would be important for the UN to send a high-level representative who would have the weight to press for a credible TOR and who could report back to Arbor on the results, with a public reproach to the GSL if the TOR were not deemed to be credible. After some discussion, Ambassador suggested that Co-Chair ambassadors recommend to capitals an approach to Arbor that she reconsider her position and send a high-level representative this week to work with the GSL to shape the Terms of Reference. Co-Chair ambassadors agreed to make this recommendation to capitals today. Ambassador further urged that the mission be structured so that it would also report on LTTE human rights violations and thereby be balanced since the LTTE bears responsibility for substantial and significant violations. Co-Chair ambassadors agreed. Consultation Mechanism on NGO Issues -------------- ¶10. (C) Wilson further briefed on a European proposal for a bi-weekly coordination meeting between bilateral donors and senior GSL officials to address humanitarian AID and access issues. The EU proposes that the GSL be represented by Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa of the Ministry of Defense, SIPDIS Public Security, Law and Order, Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights Samarasinghe, and Mr. S. B. Diyaratne, Commissioner General of Essential Services, and that the donors be represented by the United Nations as Chair of the Interagency Standing Committee, the Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Sri Lanka, and the Chair of the Bilateral Donors' Group in Sri Lanka. He further suggested the Co-Chair ambassadors attend this meeting since Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa would not otherwise take the meeting seriously. Co-Chair ambassadors agreed that given the importance and urgency of the many aid and access issues, Co-Chair ambassadors should participate in such meetings. They further agreed to seek input from their capitals in preparing to raise this issue at the proposed Co-Chair Ambassadors' meeting with President Rajapaksa at the end of next week. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) As Brattskar noted, the LTTE's reconfirmation that they are prepared to enter into talks is a welcome but fragile undertaking. Both sides continue to violate the COLOMBO 00001578 004 OF 004 cease fire and commit serious human rights abuses. It is therefore urgent that Norway complete negotiations on date and venue as soon as possible, before a flare up of fighting complicates matters further. Post will continue to urge maximum restraint by the GOSL. Likewise we now have an important opportunity to shape the mandate and mission of the human rights commission that President Rajapakse has endorsed to ensure that it has the breadth and scope to ensure a credible investigation, and appropriate prosecution and punishment. BLAKE