SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL CO-CHAIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001465 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL CO-CHAIR REPRESENTATIVES EXCHANGE VIEWS IN LEAD-UP TO BRUSSELS MEETING REF: A. COLOMBO 1461 ¶B. COLOMBO 1457 Classified By: CDA JAMES MOORE FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Samaraweera, Foreign Secretary Palihakkara, and Peace Secretariat Head Kohona SIPDIS met with local Co-Chair representatives at the Foreign Ministry September 7 to exchange views in the lead-up to the September 12 Co-Chair meeting in Brussels. Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) interlocutors expressed readiness to return to negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),addressed concerns about NGOs' access to conflict-affected areas, committed to independent investigations of human rights abuse allegations, and asserted willingness to address legitimate Tamil grievances. GSL representatives sought international pressure on the Tigers to urge them to negotiate. Following the meeting, the Foreign Minister expressed thanks to the Charge' for US efforts to limit LTTE arms procurement and financing. End summary. -------------- CO-CHAIRS SHARE CONCERNS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On short notice, the Foreign Ministry called a September 7 meeting with local representatives of the Tokyo Donor Conference Co-Chairs (US, EU, Norway, and Japan) to exchange views in the lead-up to the September 12 Co-Chairs meeting in Brussels. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) group consisted of Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, Foreign Secretary HGMS Palihakkara, Peace Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona, and MFA Additional SIPDIS Secretary Geetha de Silva. Representing the Co-Chairs SIPDIS were the ambassadors and acting chiefs of mission of Japan, the European Union, Germany (on behalf of the Finns, who hold the EU presidency but do not have representation in Colombo),Norway, and the US. ¶3. (C) Japanese Ambassador Araki said the international community was primarily concerned about the status of the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA),internally displaced persons (IDPs),the transport of humanitarian assistance and access for NGO workers, and the investigation of human rights abuse allegations. Charge' Moore noted that the recent heavy fighting would likely factor into the Co- Chairs' assessment of how best to move toward a lasting peaceful resolution. He said it would be important to ascertain whether the LTTE is prepared to commit to a negotiated settlement. He urged the GSL to be above reproach on human rights abuse allegations and to conduct an independent investigation of the killing of 17 NGO workers in Muttur. ¶4. (C) Foreign Minister Samaraweera reiterated the GSL's readiness to cease hostilities if the LTTE is prepared to make a similar commitment. The GSL is willing to negotiate with the LTTE, and has made seven overtures since President Rajapaksa came to office in November, Samaraweera said. He said the LTTE had carried out repeated attacks, killing an average of five soldiers per day since January. He said the LTTE had threatened Sri Lanka's economic and defense "lifelines" by shelling Trincomalee from Sampur. -------------- -------------- GSL ADDRESSES HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) According to Samaraweera, a large part of the humanitarian problem in the eastern town of Muttur stemmed from LTTE attempts to force Muslims out of the COLOMBO 00001465 002 OF 003 area. He said the GSL had reports of over 200,000 IDPs, and the government, in conjunction with the ICRC, had sent relief supplies to the north and east. "It is in our interest that humanitarian assistance flows smoothly to the north," he said. He added that there had been "some confusion" over rules governing NGO activities, but an August 29 notice from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) will provide adequate guidance and clarification for NGO workers. The Foreign Minister shared a copy of the notice, which says NGOs do not need to register with the MoD and that expatriate workers for the UN, USAID, and other recognized agencies would not require work permits from the MoD. ¶6. (C) Samaraweera called the killing of 17 NGO workers in Muttur "abhorrent," and said the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission had been too hasty in assigning blame to GSL security forces while an investigation was still underway. Peace Secretariat Head Kohona claimed Tiger propaganda drew attention away from LTTE human rights atrocities. Samaraweera concurred, but said he agreed with the Charge's view that the government "must be above reproach." He commended the US model of holding independent investigations of abuse allegations and taking action agains perpetrators. He added that President Rajapaksa had contacted the head of Amnesty International during his recent visit to London, and the GSL is working on "terms of reference" for an independent, international investigation of the Muttur case. -------------- FINDING A PEACEFUL WAY FORWARD -------------- ¶7. (C) The Charge' asked FM Samarawera for a read-out of President Rajapaksa's August 31 meeting in London with Prime Minister Blair (ref A). They both assessed the peace process needs to be reinvigorated, Samaraweera reported. The GSL may look to the UK's experience with the Northern Ireland conflict to find a way to bring the LTTE back to negotiations, he said. The GSL told Blair that the role of Norway as facilitator should continue. In our meeting, however, Samaraweera criticized "some European governments" for being "soft" on the LTTE and believing the Tigers' propaganda. ¶8. (C) In addition to international efforts, Samaraweera also sought domestic consensus on the ethnic issue. He expressed hope that the opposition United National Party (UNP) would work with the government within the constitutional committee to develop a long-range political solution. Contrary to Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa's September 6 comments to Charge' (ref B),Samaraweera said the President will not make any immediate announcements about the conflict. However, when the President returns from the UN General Assembly in New York, his Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) will publicly reiterate its call for maximum devolution within a united Sri Lanka. ¶9. (C) He noted that the SLFP had rejected the Marxist, Sinhalese chauvinist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna's (JVP's) proposals to withdraw from the CFA and reject Norway as the peace facilitator. He said accepting the JVP's position would strengthen the LTTE. Rather, he assessed, it would behoove the government to reach out to the Tamil community. "Tamils do have grievances, but they want to live with us. If we address their grievances, that will weaken the LTTE further," he said. ¶10. (C) In the meantime, though, Samaraweera hoped that international pressure could bring the Tigers back to COLOMBO 00001465 003 OF 003 negotiations. He again reiterated the need for the Norwegians to engage with LTTE head Prabhakaran, noting that such an intervention caused the LTTE to fulfill Prabhakaran's commitment to refrain from violence prior to the February GSL-LTTE meeting in Geneva. Following the meeting, Samaraweera spoke to the Charge' privately and expressed thanks for US support for the GSL. Referring to both the FBI arrests of LTTE suspects and the US initiative to set up a contact group on LTTE arms and financing, Samaraweera said the GSL greatly appreciated US engagement. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) It appears that GSL officials have taken into account many of our recent messages. Government interlocutors firmly committed to investigate the Muttur incident and to allow improved access for NGOs. In addition, in seeking advice from British conflict resolution experts and expressing willingness to better address Tamil concerns, the GSL seems to be shifting from an immediate military focus to longer term strategic planning. While this is an important first step on the government's part, other actors, such as chauvinist Sinhalese political parties and politicians unwilling to sacrifice short-term partisan gains for the national interest, not to mention the volatile LTTE, may still scuttle such efforts. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry has consistently expressed a willingness to seek a peaceful solution, but over the last five weeks of heavy fighting, the defense establishment has been in the driver's seat. It is not yet evident that more moderate voices will now prevail. MOORE