Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06COLOMBO142
2006-01-25 05:19:00
SECRET
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:
SRI LANKA: ARMY COMMANDERS PREPARE FOR TWO KINDS
VZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHLM #0142/01 0250519 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 250519Z JAN 06 FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2432 INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 8874 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 5759 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 3793 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2807 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9212 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 2919 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1992 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
S E C R E T COLOMBO 000142
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2016
TAGS: MOPS PINS PTER CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ARMY COMMANDERS PREPARE FOR TWO KINDS
OF WAR IN JAFFNA
REF: USDAO COLOMBO IRR 6 816 0036 06
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle. Reasons 1.4 (B&D)
S E C R E T COLOMBO 000142
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2016
TAGS: MOPS PINS PTER CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ARMY COMMANDERS PREPARE FOR TWO KINDS
OF WAR IN JAFFNA
REF: USDAO COLOMBO IRR 6 816 0036 06
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle. Reasons 1.4 (B&D)
1. (S) Summary: On January 10, poloff accompanied Defense
Attach to Security Forces Headquarters Jaffna (SFHQJ) at the
Palaly military base on the Jaffna peninsula. During the
three hour visit poloff and DATT met with the commanding
general, received a tactical briefing and attended a frank
needs assessment with commanders of two brigades deployed in
Jaffna. While a direct attack is clearly not imminent,
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) security forces are preparing
for a conventional thrust by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) as well as continuing to deal with guerrilla
attacks by smaller LTTE cells and their irregular supporters.
The need to counter these two threats has swollen troop
strength in the peninsula to almost 40,000 soldiers. While
all commanders felt confident in their ability to withstand
an LTTE offensive, they displayed a troubling lack of
intelligence about LTTE positions just beyond their lines,
and were frank about their equipment deficiencies. Our
interlocutors interpreted the upswing in violence as a Tiger
attempt to gain bargaining power and predicted that any
conventional attack would also be a limited grab for leverage
prior to negotiations. End summary.
Lay of the Land
--------------
2. (U) A map of the Jaffna peninsula can be found in the
palm of your hand. Raise your right forearm, palm facing you
and cock your hand to the left. Point Pedro would be where
the thumb joins the hand, the Palaly military complex is the
first joint of the index finger, Jaffna town is where the
pinky joins the palm. Chavakachcheri falls around the middle
of the bottom edge of the palm. The Army Forward Defensive
Line (FDL) is where your watch or bracelet would hang. Like
the two bones in the forearm there are two land approaches up
to the peninsula. The center of the forearm where the veins
and tendons are is a series of lagoons, swamps and tidal
marshes. The critical A-9 highway runs along the lower
thicker bone while the thinner upper bone of the arm is a
long undeveloped spit of land similar to a barrier island.
The infamous Elephant Pass, where the Sri Lankan Army (SLA)
took a drubbing in April 2000, despite having tanks and total
air superiority, would be the elbow.
Not Expecting Rain, Still Carrying Umbrella
--------------
3. (S) On January 10, DATT and poloff flew to the Palaly
military complex on the Jaffna peninsula for a three-hour
tour. Newly appointed commander of security forces in Jaffna,
MGEN Chandrasiri, outlined the situation. The career tank
officer did not believe that a broad LTTE offensive was
imminent, but was nonetheless preparing for a limited LTTE
incursion to gain leverage during future negotiations.
Rather than recapture Jaffna town, he theorized that an
attack would occur near Point Pedro, which would put direct
pressure on the airfield, port and headquarters in Palaly.
He added that the Army had received unconfirmed information
of an artillery ranging round being fired in the avenue of
approach to Pt. Pedro. Seasonal monsoon rains have submerged
many of the positions along the FDL and made the use of tanks
of other heavy vehicles impractical, he reported.
Chandrasiri speculated that any offensive would come in the
next three to four weeks and any gains would have to be
consolidated by March when the ground would be dry enough for
tank operations. When asked by poloff how long his troops on
the line could hold against an LTTE attack, MGEN Chandrasiri
replied, "if the line can hold for 48 hours, the Tiger attack
will run out of steam." When asked about the ability of his
forces to withstand a siege of Jaffna should the LTTE cut the
supply lines, he revealed that all three brigades have 30
days rations and ammunition in place. An additional 90 days
of supplies are held in the Palaly complex. Standing in
front of a map showing SLA positions in Jaffna, the DAO asked
where the LTTE position were and the MGEN replied, "I'm not
sure."
Violence is the New Peace
--------------
4. (S) According to BGEN Zacky, SFHQ Chief of Staff in
Jaffna, the current rise in violence is part of a long term
LTTE strategy that should have had Jaffna in flames by
December 2005; however the armed forces' refusal to be
provoked and the reluctance of the general Tamil population
to return to war has kept this scenario from igniting. When
asked about recent Tamil protests accusing the Sri Lankan
Navy (SLN) of the rape and murder of a local teen, Zacky
evinced an unsettling dismissive attitude, discounting the
unrest as the Navy's problem. According to SLA estimates,
300 LTTE cadres are operating in the greater Jaffna peninsula
and some 3000 Tamils had crossed into Tiger-controlled
territory in the last four months to receive rudimentary
military training ranging between two and twelve days. Most
of the daily hand grenade attacks are carried out by these
hastily trained homeguards. These reluctant recruits often
forget to pull the pin before throwing the poorly aimed
grenade. The deadly claymore-style command detonated
directed weapons are manufactured by the LTTE in their own
factories. These devices contain 20 Kg of explosives pushing
a spray of hundreds of steel balls into a soft skinned target
like a bus, tractor or foot patrol. Usually detonated by
wires, they are increasingly triggered by a remote signal
similar to a garage door opener or a cell phone, from a range
of up to 300 meters.
5. (C) As the A-9 highway enters the Jaffna peninsula near
Chavakachcheri, it branches out to several secondary roads on
which the SLA must use over 3000 soldiers daily to protect
six possible supply routes, according to Zacky. The actual
route used for SLA convoys on any given day is random, but
all six must be covered to avoid tipping off the LTTE. A
briefing map with an overlay shows most of the recent attacks
against the SLA were concentrated in Jaffna town (urban, lots
of people, easy to hide) followed by Point Pedro and
Chavakachcheri, two locations that are touchstones to the
Tamil diaspora. Media reports of resistance in these places
are thought to resonate with the Tamil diaspora and spur
donations. Another SLA map overlay of over 100 cordon and
search operations shows them evenly distributed across the
peninsula, indicating that they are more likely to be done at
random than based on Qpecific information regarding LTTE
operations. The Army confirmed reports of some 300 families
leaving Jaffna into Tiger territory, but dismissed most of
them as LTTE plants returning to their side, families with
members on active duty with the LTTE or persons feeling
guilty for supporting the LTTE and nervous about getting
caught.
Send Lawyers, Guns and Money. Hold the Lawyers.
-------------- --------------
6. (S) MGEN Chandrasiri and two brigade commanders offered
the following needs assessment. They cited improved body
armor and night vision devices as critical for their FDLs.
They lamented the lack of spare parts for their vehicles,
particularly night vision systems for their tanks, and tires
for their armored vehicles. Even basic heavy trucks would
improve their mobility, they asserted. A new radio system to
upgrade their existing "Cougar" network would improve their
command and control. They requested assistance in jamming
signals to foil remotely detonated bombs. Perhaps influenced
by Hollywood's image of American intelligence gathering, the
commanders asked if the USG could provide some real-time
satellite imagery to alert them of any impending LTTE attack.
The DATT pointed out that rebuilding their fleet of remotely
piloted vehicles would better suit their needs.
Comment
--------------
7. (C) The commanders in Jaffna feel ready and confident in
their ability to handle the situation. However, the LTTE is
nothing if not inventive and unpredictable. While equipped
for a conventional fight, the SLA has to face an
unconventional threat. Furthermore, the LTTE has highly
motivated fighters, while SLA morale, particularly in Jaffna,
is harder to measure. The Jaffna commander's apparent lack
of knowledge about the opposing forces is troubling, however,
and Zacky's suggestion that the Navy's problems were not the
Army's problems, if shared by other generals, is worrisome.
Improving coordination among the services in Jaffna and
developing a tactical intelligence network would further the
effectiveness of the troops deployed there.
LUNSTEAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2016
TAGS: MOPS PINS PTER CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ARMY COMMANDERS PREPARE FOR TWO KINDS
OF WAR IN JAFFNA
REF: USDAO COLOMBO IRR 6 816 0036 06
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle. Reasons 1.4 (B&D)
1. (S) Summary: On January 10, poloff accompanied Defense
Attach to Security Forces Headquarters Jaffna (SFHQJ) at the
Palaly military base on the Jaffna peninsula. During the
three hour visit poloff and DATT met with the commanding
general, received a tactical briefing and attended a frank
needs assessment with commanders of two brigades deployed in
Jaffna. While a direct attack is clearly not imminent,
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) security forces are preparing
for a conventional thrust by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) as well as continuing to deal with guerrilla
attacks by smaller LTTE cells and their irregular supporters.
The need to counter these two threats has swollen troop
strength in the peninsula to almost 40,000 soldiers. While
all commanders felt confident in their ability to withstand
an LTTE offensive, they displayed a troubling lack of
intelligence about LTTE positions just beyond their lines,
and were frank about their equipment deficiencies. Our
interlocutors interpreted the upswing in violence as a Tiger
attempt to gain bargaining power and predicted that any
conventional attack would also be a limited grab for leverage
prior to negotiations. End summary.
Lay of the Land
--------------
2. (U) A map of the Jaffna peninsula can be found in the
palm of your hand. Raise your right forearm, palm facing you
and cock your hand to the left. Point Pedro would be where
the thumb joins the hand, the Palaly military complex is the
first joint of the index finger, Jaffna town is where the
pinky joins the palm. Chavakachcheri falls around the middle
of the bottom edge of the palm. The Army Forward Defensive
Line (FDL) is where your watch or bracelet would hang. Like
the two bones in the forearm there are two land approaches up
to the peninsula. The center of the forearm where the veins
and tendons are is a series of lagoons, swamps and tidal
marshes. The critical A-9 highway runs along the lower
thicker bone while the thinner upper bone of the arm is a
long undeveloped spit of land similar to a barrier island.
The infamous Elephant Pass, where the Sri Lankan Army (SLA)
took a drubbing in April 2000, despite having tanks and total
air superiority, would be the elbow.
Not Expecting Rain, Still Carrying Umbrella
--------------
3. (S) On January 10, DATT and poloff flew to the Palaly
military complex on the Jaffna peninsula for a three-hour
tour. Newly appointed commander of security forces in Jaffna,
MGEN Chandrasiri, outlined the situation. The career tank
officer did not believe that a broad LTTE offensive was
imminent, but was nonetheless preparing for a limited LTTE
incursion to gain leverage during future negotiations.
Rather than recapture Jaffna town, he theorized that an
attack would occur near Point Pedro, which would put direct
pressure on the airfield, port and headquarters in Palaly.
He added that the Army had received unconfirmed information
of an artillery ranging round being fired in the avenue of
approach to Pt. Pedro. Seasonal monsoon rains have submerged
many of the positions along the FDL and made the use of tanks
of other heavy vehicles impractical, he reported.
Chandrasiri speculated that any offensive would come in the
next three to four weeks and any gains would have to be
consolidated by March when the ground would be dry enough for
tank operations. When asked by poloff how long his troops on
the line could hold against an LTTE attack, MGEN Chandrasiri
replied, "if the line can hold for 48 hours, the Tiger attack
will run out of steam." When asked about the ability of his
forces to withstand a siege of Jaffna should the LTTE cut the
supply lines, he revealed that all three brigades have 30
days rations and ammunition in place. An additional 90 days
of supplies are held in the Palaly complex. Standing in
front of a map showing SLA positions in Jaffna, the DAO asked
where the LTTE position were and the MGEN replied, "I'm not
sure."
Violence is the New Peace
--------------
4. (S) According to BGEN Zacky, SFHQ Chief of Staff in
Jaffna, the current rise in violence is part of a long term
LTTE strategy that should have had Jaffna in flames by
December 2005; however the armed forces' refusal to be
provoked and the reluctance of the general Tamil population
to return to war has kept this scenario from igniting. When
asked about recent Tamil protests accusing the Sri Lankan
Navy (SLN) of the rape and murder of a local teen, Zacky
evinced an unsettling dismissive attitude, discounting the
unrest as the Navy's problem. According to SLA estimates,
300 LTTE cadres are operating in the greater Jaffna peninsula
and some 3000 Tamils had crossed into Tiger-controlled
territory in the last four months to receive rudimentary
military training ranging between two and twelve days. Most
of the daily hand grenade attacks are carried out by these
hastily trained homeguards. These reluctant recruits often
forget to pull the pin before throwing the poorly aimed
grenade. The deadly claymore-style command detonated
directed weapons are manufactured by the LTTE in their own
factories. These devices contain 20 Kg of explosives pushing
a spray of hundreds of steel balls into a soft skinned target
like a bus, tractor or foot patrol. Usually detonated by
wires, they are increasingly triggered by a remote signal
similar to a garage door opener or a cell phone, from a range
of up to 300 meters.
5. (C) As the A-9 highway enters the Jaffna peninsula near
Chavakachcheri, it branches out to several secondary roads on
which the SLA must use over 3000 soldiers daily to protect
six possible supply routes, according to Zacky. The actual
route used for SLA convoys on any given day is random, but
all six must be covered to avoid tipping off the LTTE. A
briefing map with an overlay shows most of the recent attacks
against the SLA were concentrated in Jaffna town (urban, lots
of people, easy to hide) followed by Point Pedro and
Chavakachcheri, two locations that are touchstones to the
Tamil diaspora. Media reports of resistance in these places
are thought to resonate with the Tamil diaspora and spur
donations. Another SLA map overlay of over 100 cordon and
search operations shows them evenly distributed across the
peninsula, indicating that they are more likely to be done at
random than based on Qpecific information regarding LTTE
operations. The Army confirmed reports of some 300 families
leaving Jaffna into Tiger territory, but dismissed most of
them as LTTE plants returning to their side, families with
members on active duty with the LTTE or persons feeling
guilty for supporting the LTTE and nervous about getting
caught.
Send Lawyers, Guns and Money. Hold the Lawyers.
-------------- --------------
6. (S) MGEN Chandrasiri and two brigade commanders offered
the following needs assessment. They cited improved body
armor and night vision devices as critical for their FDLs.
They lamented the lack of spare parts for their vehicles,
particularly night vision systems for their tanks, and tires
for their armored vehicles. Even basic heavy trucks would
improve their mobility, they asserted. A new radio system to
upgrade their existing "Cougar" network would improve their
command and control. They requested assistance in jamming
signals to foil remotely detonated bombs. Perhaps influenced
by Hollywood's image of American intelligence gathering, the
commanders asked if the USG could provide some real-time
satellite imagery to alert them of any impending LTTE attack.
The DATT pointed out that rebuilding their fleet of remotely
piloted vehicles would better suit their needs.
Comment
--------------
7. (C) The commanders in Jaffna feel ready and confident in
their ability to handle the situation. However, the LTTE is
nothing if not inventive and unpredictable. While equipped
for a conventional fight, the SLA has to face an
unconventional threat. Furthermore, the LTTE has highly
motivated fighters, while SLA morale, particularly in Jaffna,
is harder to measure. The Jaffna commander's apparent lack
of knowledge about the opposing forces is troubling, however,
and Zacky's suggestion that the Navy's problems were not the
Army's problems, if shared by other generals, is worrisome.
Improving coordination among the services in Jaffna and
developing a tactical intelligence network would further the
effectiveness of the troops deployed there.
LUNSTEAD