SRI LANKA: ARMY'S U.S.-FUNDED HUMANITARIAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001140 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ARMY'S U.S.-FUNDED HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAM A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE ¶1. (SBU) Summary. The Sri Lanka Army's (SLA) U.S.-sponsored humanitarian demining program, begun after the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed a Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in February 2002, has lately hit snags which bring into question the program's viability in a no peace, no war environment. Low-level LTTE and paramilitary attacks on Sri Lanka military targets and each other have led to suspension of work at sites in the North and East, and mine detection dogs (MDD) have failed to uncover live mines in areas being cleared for civilian resettlement. Nevertheless, representatives from the U.S. government contracting organization RONCO deem the SLA's humanitarian demining program a crucial confidence-building measure that will falter without continued U.S. government funding and support. End summary. Returning Land to Civilians -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Sri Lanka Army (SLA) specializes its humanitarian clearance activities in low-density mine fields, which it prepares for civilian resettlement. Since 2002, US-funded contractor RONCO has trained 600 deminers and mine detection dog (MDD) handlers within the SLA and overseas clearance activities at sites throughout the island. As these soldiers rotate, approximately 40 soldiers work on demining sites at any given time. The Marshall Legacy Foundation donated 12 MMD to the SLA. ¶3. (SBU) Violence and low-level military engagement between the LTTE and security forces has increased in two phases since the November 2005 Presidential election which brought former Prime Minister Rajapaksa to power, with a lull in March 2006 following ceasefire talks between the two parties in Geneva in February. The unstable situation caused the suspension of demining sites throughout the north and east through much of this period. Because military vehicles have been repeat targets of LTTE claymore and shelling attacks, moving demining teams near north-central Vavuniya, in particular, presents a security risk. RONCO Deputy Sri Lanka program manager Mike Walsh told poloff June 29 that demining activities in Jaffna and some areas of Trincomalee district were unaffected by increased security concerns because of the presence of military-controlled High Security Zones (HSZ), which allowed demining equipment and personnel to be moved freely. ¶4. (SBU) Sri Lanka's national humanitarian demining program "will always be semi-military," RONCO technical advisor Craig Crosby explained to poloff July 6, "because they can't put Sinhalese civilians in Tamil areas or they'll become a target" of the LTTE. He added that the SLA, with the assistance of RONCO, facilitates 70% of humanitarian demining work in the north of the island, because international demining agencies also use them as a liaison to work in areas with a heavy military presence. Disoriented Dogs -------------- ¶5. (SBU) RONCO technical advisor Craig Crosby described to poloff on July 6 an incident in which mine detection dogs (MDD) overlooked two live mines in a low-density field near Trincomalee. The area had been deemed mine-free and ready to be returned for civilian repopulation when manual de-miners discovered the two mine with rakes. The entire minefield had to be reworked manually after the dogs failed. However, 8 of 12 dogs were reaccredited in a UN-observed test July 11, with 100 percent detection of mines up to 6 centimeters. The dogs will be trained to detect mines up to 15cm within three weeks. ¶6. (SBU) K-9 Consultant Dan Hayter explained to poloff on July 6 that the MDD's mistakes were not surprising given their lack of experience in live mine fields. The security situation has kept them primarily at the SLA's training COLOMBO 00001140 002 OF 002 facility in the southern area of Embilipitiya: "The dogs have learned short cuts, like humans do. They pick up the odor from the person handling the mine, or the scent of freshly dug soil rather than the explosive material." ¶7. (SBU) Hayter felt sure that if the dogs could get back in the field, the dogs would rise to the occasion and their handlers would gain the confidence to read when the dogs were having an off day. While international NGOs tend to work in high-density mine areas and therefore have "strong numbers" in terms of the number of mines recovered, the SLA focuses on low-density areas. Added Crosby, "the figures don't reflect the real value of what (the SLA deminers) are doing." These low-density areas, Hayter explained, are "suspect" areas near other mine fields which must be completely clean before they can be turned over to civilian populations, but make difficult work for "starting-level" dogs. Hayter stressed that all the assets, including the MDD, handlers, deminers and brush clearance equipment, must be on the field for the humanitarian demining program to be a success. Rallying for the SLA -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Clearly passionate about Sri Lanka's demining program, Crosby argued to poloff on July 6 that the SLA's humanitarian demining program "is absolutely critical to the national plan" as a "functioning structure" within the military with "all the ingredients for a sustainable, world-class clearing body." There had been miscommunication and mistakes made within the military, he lamented -- such as newly-trained deminers or dog handlers being rotated to other jobs soon after completion of training -- adding it could take as many as twenty years for humanitarian demining to become a manageable national program. With RONCO likely pulling out in December 2006, and international NGOs such as HALO and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) expecting to pull out by 2008 according to the UNDP Mine Action Office, the SLA will be the only remaining -- but severely underfunded -- humanitarian demining body in Sri Lanka. ¶9. (SBU) Crosby noted that Sri Lanka's biggest humanitarian demining resource is manpower within a poor country that without assistance is unlikely to allocate limited resources to humanitarian demining. He argued, "If the Department of State pulls out all funding now, everything we've done here will disappear because they can't sustain it operationally yet." But the program is crucial: "This is the military assisting with the national capacity, rebuilding Sri Lanka, and correcting its own mistakes." On July 11 Crosby told poloff he had called on SLA humanitarian demining liaison Brigadier A.W.J.C. de Silva on July 7 to inform him the GSL demining program is "in a critical phase." According to Crosby, Brigadier de Silva spoke with Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa on the evening of July 7 to express his commitment to keeping the program viable. Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Comment: Despite the understandable bias of our contracting organization, Crosby makes valid points about the sustainability of a GSL humanitarian demining program in a resource-poor country. Dan Hayter's unbiased assessment of the MDD is also reassuring. SLA humanitarian demining represents a confidence building measure similar to the others we have been recommending to the GSL. It is vital that USG funding of this program continue as a key element of the U.S. commitment to the peace process here. End comment. ENTWISTLE