Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CHENNAI567
2006-03-27 12:11:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Chennai
Cable title:  

KERALA ELECTIONS: INFIGHTING SUSPENDED, RIVAL

Tags:  PGOV PINR IN 
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VZCZCXRO2669
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI
DE RUEHCG #0567/01 0861211
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271211Z MAR 06
FM AMCONSUL CHENNAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7787
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1559
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 4717
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 0464
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 1188
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CHENNAI 000567 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR IN
SUBJECT: KERALA ELECTIONS: INFIGHTING SUSPENDED, RIVAL
COALITIONS READY FOR POLLS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CHENNAI 000567 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINR IN SUBJECT: KERALA ELECTIONS: INFIGHTING SUSPENDED, RIVAL COALITIONS READY FOR POLLS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Communist-led Left Democratic Front poses a strong challenge to the ruling Congress- led United Democratic Front in the upcoming Kerala state assembly elections slated for April 22, 29 and May 3. Infighting, a perennial bane of the Congress party, has crept into the Communist party, too, opening up chances for unforeseen results, but on balance the Leftists seem to enjoy the upper hand. A Leftist victory could set back the clock on recent efforts to create a business-friendly climate in Kerala. End Summary. -------------- BACKGROUND: TWO JOCKEYING COALITIONS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Kerala politics is dominated by the traditional rivalry between two equally powerful coalitions, the United Democratic Front (UDF) led by the Congress party and the opposition Left Democratic Front (LDF) led by the Communist Party of India- Marxist(CPI-M). Kept at bay by the coalitions, the BJP remains in the margins, unable to elect any legislator to the state assembly to date. ¶3. (SBU) Ever since the coalitions took shape in the 1980's, the UDF and the LDF have alternated in power. This pattern of anti-incumbent voting continued in the last assembly elections of 2001, when it was the turn of the UDF to trounce the opponents. Our interlocutors believe that the voters' recurrent anger towards the ruling parties is due to factors such as the incurably high (20 percent) unemployment rate of Kerala which has created a pool of frustrated youth, and the state's hyperactive media which effectively assumes an opposition role. ¶4. (SBU) In the eight-party UDF, the Congress' junior partners are the Indian Union Muslim League (Muslims constitute 24 percent of Kerala's population) and a clutch of six other smaller parties or factions. Congress Chief Minister Oommen Chandy is the most prominent leader in the UDF but former Chief Minister A.K. Antony remains a significant player. The LDF, also made up of eight parties, includes the CPI(M), the Communist Party of India (CPI),the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) and other smaller parties. Additionally, the LDF has a tactical understanding with the Indian National League (INL),a party of Muslims. Opposition Leader V.S. Achuthanandan, party State Secretary Pinarayi Vijayan, LDF Convener Paloli Mohamme
d Kutty, and Central Committee Member M.A. Baby are the top leaders of the CPI(M). -------------- ALLIES AT THE CENTER, OPPONENTS IN STATE -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Communist parties' support of the Congress-led government at the Center has not lessened Congress vs. Communist opposition at the state level in Kerala. The CPI(M),however, has little difficulty in explaining this apparent paradox to its cadre. According to them, the common enemy BJP makes the UPA a necessary evil at the Center while at the state level, the BJP's electoral irrelevance rules out the need for such leniency. ¶6. (SBU) The Communist parties' virulent opposition to GOI policies is in fact one of the principal election issues. For example, the GOI's perceived "capitulation to U.S. pressure" on Iran's nuclear program is a major theme of Leftist street-corner campaigns. The Congress and its coalition partner Muslim League are visibly defensive: Congress legislator K.V. Thomas explained to Post how the party leaders took pains to keep Sonia Gandhi away from the local media when she visited Kerala on March 4 for fear that any comment on the Iran issue might become the headline the next day. -------------- -------------- CONGRESS SPLIT AND REUNION: THE WHEEL COME FULL CIRCLE -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Acute factionalism within the Congress party had been the bane of the UDF government. As conflict between the camp followers of octogenarian Congress CHENNAI 00000567 002 OF 003 leader Karunakaran and the then-Chief Minister A.K. Antony worsened in 2004, all the Congress party candidates suffered humiliating defeats in the Lok Sabha elections. This led to Antony's resignation as Chief Minister, paving the way for Oommen Chandy to take over. Chandy hardened the stance against the rebels, prompting Karunakaran and his son Muraleedharan to quit the Congress with their followers to form the "Democratic Indira Congress- Karunakaran," (DIC-K). In early 2006, Post contacts across the state, including Congress leaders, were unanimous that the UDF was facing a sure defeat in the upcoming 2006 elections. ¶8. (SBU) Dashing the hopes of Karunakaran and son Muraleedharan, the CPI(M) decided to rebuff their bid to join the LDF. On March 23, DIC(K) was forced to make a U-turn, signing an agreement with the Congress party and securing a modest share of 17 seats to contest out of the state's 140. The DIC(K) agreement, which reportedly promises a merger with the parent party after the elections, has ended the worst of the feuding at the top level, but many district workers of the DIC(K) seem unwilling to digest the eleventh-hour capitulation. The continuing discontent has taken the sheen off the "homecoming" of Karunakaran, although many believe the deal will be advantageous to the UDF in some constituencies. -------------- -- CREEPING DECADENCE: INFIGHTING ERUPTS IN CPI(M) -------------- -- ¶9. (SBU) While the Congress party was closing ranks, a faction dispute that had been simmering within the CPI(M) erupted. Reacting angrily to the party decision not to field Opposition leader octogenarian V.S. Achuthanandan in the upcoming election, party workers took to the streets, some of them shocking the leaders by marching on the party offices. In its Political Organizational Report, the CPI(M)'s 18th party Congress of April 2005 had expressed "serious concern at the persisting disunity and factional tendencies in Kerala", but no one seems to have expected it to spill-out so close to the elections. Clearly shaken by the popular reaction, the CPI(M) politburo changed its earlier stand and decided to field Achuthanandan in the elections, a move that has now embarrassed the "official" faction of the CPI(M) in Kerala. CPI(M) (national) General Secretary Prakash Karat, fellow Politburo members Sitaram Yechury, R. Umanath and S. Ramachandran Pillai spent several hours on March 24 in back-to-back meetings with the State Committee and State Secretariat sorting out the issue and pacifying the dissidents. Key journalist sources in Kerala believe that the decision to bring back Achuthanandan to the electoral scene has brought the situation under control, although some do not rule out the possibility of leakage of votes. CPI(M) Central Committee Member M.A. Baby (protect) told Post: "the situation seems to be generally in favor of the LDF, although one cannot rule out undercurrents." ¶10. (SBU) Achuthanandan's differences with CPI(M) State Secretary Pinarayi Vijayan are mostly to do with the former's ambition to become the Chief Minister of Kerala and take total control of the party and the administration. Unlucky Achuthanandan was widely expected to become Chief Minister after the 1996 elections, but his opponents within the party allegedly conspired for his defeat in the Mararikulam constituency. In 2001 elections, he won but the party lost. 83-year old Achuthanandan, who has studied only up to the 7th year in school, is widely considered an old generation communist strongly opposed to reform. His reputation as an honest politician has however won him many admirers inside and outside the party. He also has strong support from his Hindu "Ezhava" caste, a dominant group within the CPI(M). Achuthanandan had refused to publicly support Pinarayi Vijayan when Vijayan's alleged role as Minister for Power (1996-98) in awarding a $80 million power contract to Canadian company SNC Lavlin raised allegations of graft. The controversial deal, criticized by the Comptroller and Auditor General, is now being investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). CHENNAI 00000567 003 OF 003 -------------- -- COMMENT: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF LEFTIST VICTORY -------------- -- ¶11. (SBU) If Communist hardliner Achuthanandan succeeds in becoming the Chief Minister and his faction gains the upper hand in the CPI(M),Kerala's recent efforts to change the historically negative perceptions of its business climate are likely to receive a setback. For example, given his background, it will be unlikely for Achuthanandan to take a pro- business position on issues such as the pending Coca Cola dispute in Palakkad. He is also likely to reopen agreements such as the one between Kerala and the Dubai Internet City for an IT infrastructure project in Cochin. Leftist rhetoric might take center-stage until the recurrently angry voters turn their ire once again on the Communists. ¶12. (SBU) The Kerala electoral contest may not be as one-sided as it would have been a few months ago. However, the DIC(K)-Congress agreement has come rather too late in the day to inspire camaraderie among the Congress ranks. On the LDF side, the CPI(M) has been prompt with its fire-fighting, thereby limiting the damage. On balance, the LDF seems to have an upper hand, although, as M.A. Baby pointed out, "undercurrents" cannot be ruled out. END COMMENT HOPPER

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