TAR PARTY SECRETARY TRIES TO PRESSURE NGOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHENGDU 001256 SIPDIS SIPDIS EPT FOR EAP/CM AND S/STC DEPT ALSO FOR DRL/IRF AND TIBET COORDINATOR BANGKOK FOR USAID/MSTIEVATER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2026 TAGS: PHUM EAID ECON PGOV CH SUBJECT: TAR PARTY SECRETARY TRIES TO PRESSURE NGOS REF: A) CHENGDU 904; B) CHENGDU 464; C) CHENGDU 410; D) CHENGDU 230; E) 05 CHENGDU 614 CHENGDU 00001256 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: James A. Boughner, Consul General, United States Consulate, Chengdu. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the Tibetan Autonomous Regions (TAR) could be facing increasing difficulties, according to a scholar from the Tibet Academy of Social Science. The scholar described an internal document authored by TAR Party Secretary Zhang Qingli which dismissed the importance of international NGO (INGO) aid, cautioned about INGOs' "hidden agendas" and mandated increased scrutiny by local officials. Most INGOs, including some that receive United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding, have so far been unable to renew contracts with existing partners, although they are allowed to continue to operate. Contradictions between statements by local officials of support for USG aid in the TAR and policies centered on internal control that treat such assistance with suspicion will certainly continue; however the ability of INGOs to find new partners or renew existing agreements will be an important indicator of continued tacit official tolerance for their operation in the region. End Summary. A More Restrictive Atmosphere -------------- ¶2. (C) Congenoff met recently in Chengdu with a long-time contact from the Tibet Academy of Social Science (TASS) (Ref. B). The scholar, who requested the meeting when he was in town for a visa interview, was eager to give Congenoff an update on the status of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). He said that in general, international NGOs (INGOs) are having difficulties in the TAR. The atmosphere has become more restrictive under the governance of TAR Party Secretary Zhang Qingli, who officially took office in May 2006. The contact said Zhang is trying to put his own stamp on the TAR, and increased restrictions on NGOs are one facet of that policy. TAR Internal Document Dismisses Value of INGO Aid -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The TASS scholar claimed to have recently seen an internal document authored by Zhang dismissing the importance and impact of INGO aid in the TAR. He referred to a specific passage in the document that read, "Why are there so many INGOs with so little money in the TAR? Compare that aid with the support the TAR receives from other provinces and municipalities from inland China. . . the aid from those INGOs is nothing." The scholar added the document also mentioned two specific INGOs by name and concluded that they, as well as other INGOs in the TAR, had "hidden agendas." The document reportedly concluded with a mandate by Zhang that all local officials "carefully study" the work of INGOs in the region. (Note: this mandate tracks with what Congen has heard in recent months from contacts in the TAR. In October, an INGO representative in Lhasa reported that officials from the TAR Foreign Affairs Office (FAO),unaccompanied by project officers from the INGO, had visited their project sites in distant reaches of the region. End Note). INGOs Stymied in Renewal of Agreements -------------- ¶4. (C) The scholar said that with the exception of a few INGOs in the TAR, most remain stymied in their attempts to renew contracts and partnership agreements. He discussed two well-established INGOs that receive aid from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as some of those that have had difficulties. When a director of one of the INGOs asked the scholar for his advice on how to resolve the impasse, the scholar said he suggested the INGO 1) hold a high-level meeting with the government; 2) present a comprehensive report on the INGOs' work; 3) look for new partners; and 4) restructure the office. He added that the INGO employed too many local staff of poor quality, some of whom used to study in India. The contact claimed this staff profile was a red flag for the government because people who have previous experience in India are automatically suspect. ... But Still Have Business as Usual -------------- ¶5. (C) Although many INGOs have not yet been able to renew their agreements, they have not been asked to modify programs, dismiss staff or close offices. Most are operating as usual, continuing cooperation with local project partners and planning for 2007 and beyond. While the Party Secretary and certain high CHENGDU 00001256 002.2 OF 002 level cadres in the TAR may view INGOs with deep suspicion, the response from most local level bureaucrats has been very supportive of cooperative projects. Local bureaus realize work being done by INGOs is filling gaps in government provision of services, and may times, local officials even take credit for the work. New NGO in the TAR -------------- ¶6. (C) The scholar said he was heartened by the registration of a new NGO with the Bureau of Civil Affairs in the TAR. The Tibet International NGO Organization (TINGO) is a government-organized NGO (GONGO),the scholar admitted, but he hoped it would lend credibility to the work of NGOs in general. He was asked to consult for the organization, but declined to do so because he is too busy working with another INGO in the TAR. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Over the past 13 months, post has reported on the continued contradictions between statements by local officials of support for USG aid to INGOs in the TAR and internal control-oriented policies which view such aid with suspicion (Reftels). Such contradictions will certainly continue. The ability of INGOs to find new partners or renew existing agreements, however, will be an important indicator of continued tacit official tolerance for their operation in the region. Even though the Party Secretary and certain high level cadres in the TAR may be deeply suspicious of INGOs, they have not chosen to shutter their operations, and response from most local level bureaucrats continues to be supportive. ¶8. (C) The representatives of INGOs funded by the USG frequently stress to us that, as part of a policy of full transparency, they regularly submit thorough project and financial reports to the TAR FAO and their substantive partners. They also feel strongly that any attempt to conceal such details would be both futile and inherently counterproductive. BOUGHNER