MURDER PROTESTS DIE DOWN IN VENEZUELA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000959 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2021 TAGS: PGOV PHUM ELAB KDEM SCUL VE SUBJECT: MURDER PROTESTS DIE DOWN IN VENEZUELA REF: A. CARACAS 942 ¶B. CARACAS 939 CARACAS 00000959 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor, for Reason 1.4(b). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) After three days of mourning and protests over the tragic kidnap/murders of three Venezuelan-Canadian youths, Venezuela appears to be returning to normal. This latest spate of protests was unconventional in that it stemmed from social unrest rather than traditional political strife and that it drew a whole new class of protester, principally youths, into the streets. Opposition groups were almost a no-show in the protests, failing miserably to direct blame for the murders, which may have involved corrupt Caracas policemen, to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela's (BRV) declining capacity to govern. The BRV, on the other hand, managed the political situation (though not necessarily the investigation) with unusual agility, especially Minister of Interior Chacon. President Hugo Chavez, who normally stays above the day-to-day political fray, finally came out the evening of April 6 to condemn the murders. The Chavista talking points separated the murders from the institutional deterioration of the police and launched the campaign to pass the National Police Law. Cardinal Jorge Urosa, who had been reticent to speak before his installation, came out surprisingly strong, urging government authorities to find the murderers and stamping out BRV allegations that the demonstrations were part of a political conspiracy. Finding the actual perpetrators of crimes is not the BRV's forte, though we expect prosecutors will eventually pin the blame on someone for the sake of expediency. We expect these kind of isolated social crises, based on failures in BRV governance, will continue to flare up, but so far there is no respectable opposition figure who can channel these anxieties into an effective political force. End summary. -------------- Protests Die Out -------------- ¶2. (C) After two days of widespread protests over the shooting deaths of the Faddoul brothers, and that of El Mundo photographer Jorge Aguirre, it appears that Venezuela is returning to a state of calm (refs). As of April 7, most groups had not decided on whether to push a new round of protests, especially complicated by the coming of Holy Week (the equivalent of Spring Break in Venezuela). Unlike the mass protests of previous years, these demonstrations saw the active participation of college students, notably but by no means exclusively from Catholic institutions (the victims were abducted on the way to Catholic school). The student demonstrators mostly assembled in small groups, perhaps 500 at the most, and blocked key routes in the city (though by the second day and with National Guard persuasion they kept one lane of traffic open). The message was, "Justice," i.e., mourning for the victims (often expressed in moments of silence during which the protesters would sit quietly in the street),demands that the guilty parties be apprehended, and the need for improvement in state security services. It should also be noted that, after Aguirre was gunned down, reporters from opposition and government news sources held small but well covered demonstrations, with one being received personally by Attorney General Isaias Rodriguez. -------------- Opposition AWOL -------------- ¶3. (C) Traditional opposition political groups tried to capitalize on the protests by calling for the resignations of CARACAS 00000959 002.2 OF 004 Minister of Interior Jesse Chacon and Caracas Mayor Juan Barreto (the latter because of evidence that some Metropolitan Police were behind the crime). They were largely unsuccessful, however, in mobilizing their supporters. This is probably due to the dual reasons that years of failed marches have turned most opposition supporters away from street protests and that many saw the marches as the politicization of a very tragic crime. An April 6 march, for example, had been slated to the Ministry of Interior building but was ultimately converted into a small protest in the pro-opposition area of Altamira after marchers failed to show. Despite these failures, Caracas-based party Primero Justicia did hold a press conference to highlight the BRV's abysmal record on crime, noting that 76,504 people had been murdered in Venezuela over the last five years, far more than during any past administrations. -------------- BRV Political Response Gets a B -------------- ¶4. (C) It took the BRV two days for its spin machine to start up, but it was largely successful. The Chavista talking points were: -- blame the crime on the criminals, not the police; -- blame corrupt police on the corrupt "Fourth Republic;" -- offer the passage of the National Police Law -- which will put now-decentralized police forces under national government control -- as the solution to police corruption. -- give rational treatment to the student protesters, who are merely "expressing support for the investigation," while attacking the traditional opposition groups; and -- blast the media for conspiring to stir up resentment against the government (see para 6). While the BRV's propaganda salvo did not do a thing to improve security conditions here, politically speaking, it effectively parried the demonstrators and riposted with a re-energized effort to pass the controversial police law, which had repeatedly slipped down the Chavistas' legislative agenda due to internal bickering. ¶5. (C) Interior Minister Jesse Chacon gave perhaps the best performance by welcoming the student protesters at his offices. Press reports stated that Chacon agreed to speak to student leaders and will hold follow up meetings with them. The press also reported that Chacon offered to let the student select two representatives to provide input into the National Police Law. ¶6. (C) President Chavez came out on the evening of April 6 with a staged press opportunity (with only official media) at Miraflores Palace. Chavez condemned the killings, blaming them on extreme "individualism" (read, "lack of Bolivarian solidarity") in the perpetrators. He warned the media not to politicize the killings. He also expressed sympathy for the death of Italian-Venezuelan businessman Filippo Sindoni, slain the week before. (Comment: Normally, Chavez prefers to let subordinates handle the BRV response to bad news like the Faddoul killings, but he broke silence after media sources questioned why the President had not addressed the public during a period of mourning.) 7.(C) Of course, the BRV maintained its signature antics of conspiracy spotting. National Assembly Deputy Iris Varela claimed that more than 500 Colombian paramilitaries were operating in Venezuela (and responsible for most crime). Deputy Francisco Ameliach alleged an imperial U.S. plot was afoot to destabilize the country. Communications Minister CARACAS 00000959 003.2 OF 004 Willian Lara attacked Primero Justicia (PJ),claiming that ads for PJ presidential candidate Julio Borges (filmed a month earlier) were part of a conspiracy to spark widespread social unrest. -------------- Never Miss A Shot At the Media -------------- ¶8. (C) Lara also requested CONATEL, the state telecom regulator, to review all private media transmissions to ensure compliance with the Social Responsibility Law ("Ley RESORTE"),which prohibits media sources from inciting people to violence. CONATEL announced it had gone into permanent session for the duration of the crisis, issued a warning letter to all-news channel Globovision, and threatened to cut off the channel for three days as a sanction. Globovision fired back in a rare on-air editorial by its president, that it was complying with the constitutional right of citizens to be informed. (Comment: Ley RESORTE was drafted as the Chavez supporters' "never-again" solution to the private media smear they took during the events of April 2002. This was the first real chance for the BRV to use its powerful, new weapon in the midst of a crisis, and it wasted no time deploying it. While as of this writing CONATEL has yet to sanction any media, RESORTE is certainly looming over the private press.) -------------- -------------- Cardinal Throws Cold Water On BRV Conspiracy Talk -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Newly-installed Cardinal Jorge Urosa took the unprecedented step of holding a press conference April 6 to call for peace and respect for human rights. Urosa, who as Archbishop of Caracas had moderated his public statements, made two high-profile, televised public statements. During his press conference, the Cardinal said that it was legitimate for the protesters to express their pain and that such demonstrations did not amount to a conspiracy or an attempt to destabilize the government. He told citizens, however, to channel their pain into legal and constitutional expressions. He also urged police authorities to find the responsible parties for the crimes. In addition, Papal Nuncio Giacinto Berlocco offered some comments when receiving some protesters at the Nunciature, urging the BRV to defend the lives of all citizens and declaring that impunity for the perpetrators would be interpreted as an official endorsement of violence. -------------- Who Did It? -------------- ¶10. (C) If past cases are any clue, we will probably not know who all the guilty parties are. The semi-lucid Attorney General Rodriguez, after saying that the Faddoul murderers had Colombian accents, said there were indications that at least two Metropolitan Police officers were implicated. New video emerged of the photographer's killer fleeing the scene of the crime (after the murder victim successfully snapped a picture of the back of his executioner leaving the scene), though there were no immediate leads. Also, Rodriguez announced he had assigned special prosecutors to the Sindoni case and suggested that Sindoni's murder was not a kidnapping but rather a hit related to Sindoni's business dealings. (Comment: The BRV typically plays musical chairs with investigators, prosecutors, and even investigating agencies in high profile cases, so we should not be surprised by delays in some of the cases. In any event, it is probable that the BRV will find someone to accuse for the Faddoul deaths, even if the accused are not actually culpable.) -------------- Comment CARACAS 00000959 004.2 OF 004 -------------- ¶11. (C) This incident may very well typify the future of conflict in Venezuela. As the BRV's capacity for governance continues to degrade -- caused by incompetence, corruption, and neglect -- we may see more social-based crises such as these. The profile of the average demonstrator, at least in this case, changed markedly from the middle-aged, upper-middle class "escualido" to younger people who probably do not have a strong political affiliation (though we believe they tend to be anti-Chavez). We did not see any clear evidence of poor people from the barrios "coming down" to protest, though there were some indications that the protesters were from different social classes. Media coverage tended to favor better neighborhods, pehaps that is why there were fewer images of poor demonstrators. Also, we note the Catholic Church played a critical role in this moral-based conflict, with Urosa nearly neutralizing the BRV's extremist conspiracy talk. Of course, what we have not/not seen is the emergence of an opposition leader who could cobble together a coordinated response to the BRV, beyond just blocking a few streets. We note, however, that the long-dead Coordinadora Democratica was founded only after social groups got riled up over Chavez' attempts to pass new education regulations. While many of the groups that comprised the Coordinadora are now all but extinct, it is possible that some future social flare-up like what Caracas experienced this week could beget some fresh political opposition to Chavez. BROWNFIELD