VENEZUELAN MILITARY MORALE DECLINING?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000078

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
FOR FRC LAMBERT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2021
TAGS: PGOV MARR VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN MILITARY MORALE DECLINING?

REF: A. A. 04 CARACAS 00053

B. B. 04 CARACAS 03874 LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

C. C. 04 CARACAS 03230

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) Because of the unreliability of its sources, Post
cannot assess with certainty the state of Venezuelan military
morale. Nonetheless, Post has received over the last six to
nine months more credible indications that military morale is
declining. The most convincing reports concern
disgruntlement over corruption in the armed forces. The GOV,
meanwhile, is acting as if it were aware of the problem. For
example, President Hugo Chavez offered an across-the-board
salary increase in June 2005. GOV statements and reports
from Embassy sources also show that the GOV is concerned
about the potential for coup plotting within the military.
Post has received no indications, however, that any coup is
imminent. Given the GOV,s reported infiltration of
anti-Chavez groups, any such attempt would most likely fail.
If military morale is indeed waning, we should not rule out
Chavez' ability to win it back. End Summary.

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Military Morale Declining?
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2. (C) This cable examines the possibility and implications
of a decline in military morale. Post regularly receives
exaggerated reports of military discontent from retired
officers. Nonetheless, the urgency expressed by a variety of
retired and active-duty military sources of late coupled with
actions taken by the GOV suggest President Hugo Chavez may be
losing some military support and that general discontent
among active duty officers may be increasing.

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The Evidence
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3. (C) Post has received over the past six months more
reports of varying credibility that military morale is
suffering. Retired Vice Admiral Rafael Huizi told poloff in
October 2005 that discontent in the ranks over military
corruption was growing. DAO sources also report that
officers not benefiting from kickbacks are becoming more
resentful. (Note: DAO reports that the GOV,s practice of
ignoring the FARC along the Colombian border has been
increasingly frustrating some officers, as well.) Such an
analysis tracks with reports from other Embassy sources that
Chavez is most vulnerable among mid-ranking officers (i.e.,
U.S. Army captain-, major-, and lieutenant
colonel-equivalents). Many of these officers, who have not
experienced the ideological indoctrination of their
subordinates, have seen their peers promoted above them for
loyalty rather than competence.


4. (C) Some problems with lower ranking personnel may be
festering, as well. Military officials reported "strong
discontent" among some military cadets after the cadets
received orders to give up their dormitories and serve food
to attendees of the World Youth and Student Festival in
August, according to press reports. According to some

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retired military officers, lower ranking military personnel
are unhappy with the new Venezuelan military uniforms (REF A)
because these soldiers appreciated the identification with
the U.S. military that the old, U.S.-style BDU conveyed. The
retired officers tell us these troops oppose the new
Venezuelan defense doctrine and reserve force for the same
reasons.

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GOV Reaction
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5. (S/NF) Chavez relies on Venezuela,s Military
Intelligence Department (DIM) to root out internal military
dissent. Although Chavez emphasizes alleged U.S. subversion,
DIM focuses more heavily on countering opponents to President
Chavez within the military. Chavez appears to trust DIM more
than its civilian counterpart, the Department of Intelligence
and Prevention Services (DISIP). DIM acquired increased
resources in 2005 and had more stable leadership than DISIP.
DISIP polices the Venezuelan military only as a secondary
objective.


6. (C) As Post has received indications that low-level
discontent is rising and morale is falling, the GOV has
appeared overanxious about military subversion. GOV
statements and actions over the past nine months show a
heightened concern that troops may be plotting to overthrow
Chavez. The press published in July portions of an extensive
internal military report planning for "asymmetric warfare"
that cited internal conspiracies and splintering morale as
weaknesses of the armed forces. Upon capturing a cache of
explosive devises, ammunition, and uniforms in May 2005, a
Venezuelan intelligence (DISIP) spokesman attributed the find
to an effort aimed at catching retired military officers
conspiring with the help of active duty accomplices. The GOV
blamed retired and active duty military officers--with the
backing of the CIA--again in December for trying to sabotage
the legislative elections by killing people. In a manner
consistent with Post,s policy on restricting and avoiding
meetings with coup plotters (REF B),poloff met in October
with a group of retired and active duty officers who, it
become apparent at the meeting, had been discussing the
possibility of removing Chavez from office. These officers
said Venezuelan intelligence was following active duty
officers who had been removed from their jobs but remained on
the payroll more closely than retired officers. An active
duty captain added that the Ministry of Defense was extremely
concerned about threats it received in emails. (Note: Post
routinely receives unsolicited emails calling for civil
disobedience.)


7. (U) Chavez, meanwhile, has announced internal military
policy changes that appear aimed at improving morale. In a
September "Alo Presidente" broadcast, Chavez criticized
discrimination by rank in the armed forces and reminded
listeners he had allowed cadets to wear civilian attire on
their days off. Separately, press reports citing military
sources noted in June that performance in development and
other public service positions would help officers get
promoted to senior ranks.

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Salary Hike
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8. (C) The GOV has planned and initiated expenditures that

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appear aimed at boosting and gauging military morale. In
April, the National Assembly proposed a draft organic law on
military social security, which would provide health,
housing, and social security benefits costing the GOV 1.2
trillion bolivars (roughly USD 580 million at the official
exchange rate),according to press reports. In May, military
circulated a directive announcing salaries would be frozen
for the remainder of 2005. Press reports citing active duty
sources said the military had released the directive to see
how the troops would react. A retired officer predicted the
military would follow the announcement with a salary increase
once it had smoked out dissenters with the bad news. That
increase came seven weeks later. During a June 24 speech in
which he warned that imperialist forces were seeking to
"weaken the monolithic cohesion" of the Venezuelan armed
forces, Chavez announced a sixty percent pay hike for cadets
and junior enlisted personnel, and a fifty percent increase
for officers and senior enlisted personnel.


9. (C) The opposition reacted sharply to the announced wage
increase. Alianza Bravo Pueblo president Antonio Ledezma
attributed the raise to the "fear" he said existed throughout
military barracks, according to press. Reverting back to his
party,s populist past, Christian Democrat (COPEI) secretary
general Cesar Perez Vivas criticized the announcement because
it did not provide salary increases to other sectors.
Retired Vice Admiral Huizi told poloff in October the raise
had not improved morale because the military had not received
its annual cost of living increase in five years.

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Chavez' Imminent Overthrow Unlikely
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10. (C) Post has received no indications of an imminent coup
attempt, despite Chavez' December remonstration in Colombia
about plotting. In any case, a coup attempt would currently
appear to stand little chance of success. An active duty
army colonel in the group referenced in paragraph six told
poloff in July that opposition military officers met in small
groups throughout the country but had no means of
communicating with each other securely. Some of their cells
had been infiltrated by Chavista whistleblowers, he added.
Group members told poloff during the October meeting that
Chavez was positioned to squash any uprising. They claimed,
however, that they could turn the military against him with
only 100 officers if he ordered repressive action against the
opposition.


11. (C) Some anti-Chavez officers appear to underestimate
the extent the GOV can penetrate their networks. Retired
National Guard Maj. Gen. Felipe Rodriguez told reporters he
had Venezuelan military and intelligence sources warning him
of operations to capture him before the military arrested him
for "rebellion" in June. The aforementioned active duty
colonel, moreover, was overconfident in the security of the
Internet, telling poloff he could keep his identity secret
with his email account,s "blind carbon copy" function.

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Comment
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12. (C) Post,s sources are notoriously unreliable about the
current state of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, but some of
their reasoning appears sound. A five-year failure to
provide cost of living adjustments in a country with

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double-digit inflation would necessarily take its toll on
morale. Given the military,s involvement in social
missions, its opportunities to earn kickbacks are perhaps
unprecedented under Chavez (REF C),yet such earning
potential could indeed create friction between haves and
have-nots. On the other hand, the alleged discontent over
uniforms and doctrine may be the grumbling of those officers
already opposed to Chavez rather than evidence of a morale
decline.


13. (C) If morale is indeed falling, Chavez' ability to
recapture military loyalty should not be underestimated. The
charismatic President constantly extols the military as
instrumental to his revolution. Additional spending on
military salaries and entitlements could make Chavez'
soldiers feel as valued as he describes them.
WHITAKER