VENEZUELAN OPPOSITION DEBATES BETWEEN CONDITIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000718 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER FRC FT LAUDERDALE FOR CLAMBERT COPENHAGEN FOR DLAWTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN OPPOSITION DEBATES BETWEEN CONDITIONS AND CANDIDATE REF: A. CARACAS 00480 ¶B. 05 CARACAS 3596 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Since early January, the opposition has debated whether and how to unite forces for the December 3 presidential election. The current dilemma over whether to focus solely on securing transparent electoral conditions or to also choose a single opposition candidate has resulted in three pro-opposition alliances. One, organized by Enrique Mendoza, has devised a list of voting conditions under which it will participate in the election. Another, called Juntos Por Venezuela, supports Mendoza's list, but also thinks a single presidential candidate is needed to rally support for the opposition's cause. NGOs fed up with the parties' ineffectiveness have formed "4-D," named after the high abstention observed during the December 4, 2005 legislative elections. This group favors a return to the manual vote or will likely abstain from the race. Meanwhile, Venezuelan electoral watchdog NGO Ojo Electoral, which consists of government and opposition supporters, is quietly working on solutions, such as a proposed audit of the voter registry, to restore voter confidence in the electoral system. Its efforts have brought heavy government surveillance. The March 15 release of the EU observation mission's final report on the 2005 legislative elections may boost the opposition's will. Still, the opposition will have to overcome its fear of losing its steadily shrinking political base to successfully press its cause. End Summary. -------------- -- Conditions and Machinery First, then Candidate -------------- -- ¶2. (C) Ex-Miranda State Governor and opposition coordinator Enrique Mendoza is organizing the fight for electoral transparency. He opposes a candidate search now to avoid fracturing the opposition's still fragile alliance and detracting from the fight for acceptable voting conditions. On February 23, he led several opposition parties in signing an agreement listing the 10 conditions under which they would participate in the December 3 presidential election. The group includes abstention promoters Accion Democratica and other mainstream opposition parties, but notably excludes former opposition stalwart Christian Democrat Party (Copei) and up-and-coming Primero Justicia (PJ),whose Secretary General had previously approved the draft. While the conditions have been widely publicized, they will probably not be formally presented until the new National Electoral Council (CNE) is installed (ref a). ¶3. (C) Some of the conditions on the list were recommended by international observers in their preliminary reports, such as a new, impartial CNE; a reliable electoral registry (REP); enforcement of the prohibition on using public funds for campaigning; and equality of air time for campaign ads. Several are new or were previously rejected by the CNE including, a manual count of all voting machine receipts; voting software that guarantees vote secrecy (in light of last year's audits indicating the possibility of revealing CARACAS 00000718 002 OF 004 how each person voted (ref b)); the fulfillment of legal requirements for updating and publishing the REP, publishing electoral norms, and executing the military's "Plan Republica" electoral support mission; audits of all election processes, including voter registration, voting, and vote tabulation; wide publication of the citizens chosen to be poll workers; and the creation of a National Electoral Review Board comprised of seven political party and four NGO representatives. ¶4. (C) The list also includes other conditions the CNE conceded to last year, including the blocking of the transmission of data during the vote; an audit of all voting software; credible international observers; and, on a one-time basis for the 2005 Assembly elections, the elimination of the fingerprint machines and electronic voter list. On February 25, CNE President Jorge Rodriguez said the conditions agreed to during the last elections, with the exception withdrawing the fingerprint machines, would be maintained for the 2006 race. ¶5. (C) Mendoza told poloff March 1 that his next step would be building a political machine, particularly in the barrios. Selecting a candidate could wait until May, he opined. Mendoza has been encouraging various political parties to build their respective bases in the barrios. His goal is to target 5.5 million poor people, in hopes of getting 4 million votes. He also plans, possibly with the NGO Sumate's help, to train 1,500 supporters to train opposition members selected as poll workers for election day. Mendoza will approach the private sector at home and abroad for funding. Mendoza was optimistic about the opposition's ability to defeat President Chavez, if it could stay unified. ¶6. (C) The key date in Mendoza's plan is June 3, after which electoral law prohibits changes to the CNE and electoral norms. (Comment: That said, the CNE did agree to many changes after the statutory cutoff point for the December 2005 National Assembly elections.) If the opposition secures its conditions, Mendoza will use the increased support base to campaign for the unified candidate. If not, he will call for abstention and use the machine to launch demonstrations. He admitted that the mass protests he imagines could trigger repression, but said such action could help the opposition's cause by exposing what he called Chavez, anti-democratic tendencies. -------------- Conditions and Candidates At Once -------------- ¶7. (C) On February 22, the day before Mendoza's group unveiled their 10 conditions, Juntos Por Venezuela (JPR) made its debuted. This group includes PJ, Movement Toward Socialism, Izquierda Democratica, and other smaller opposition parties. The main difference between JPR and Mendoza's group is their belief the opposition should select a candidate sooner to better organize and mobilize supporters. Several JPR supporters also signed the list of electoral conditions. Other differences are minor. For example, JPR's document implies a longer-term focus that goes beyond electoral conditions to improving Venezuelan democracy. The group also promises to offer an alternative political platform, although their document only outlines vague democratic principles so for. CARACAS 00000718 003 OF 004 -------------- Civil Society Moves On Its Own -------------- ¶8. (C) Frustrated with the opposition parties' ineffectiveness, civil society NGOs are taking up their own fight for improving electoral transparency. On March 6, they formed "4-D," named for the massive abstention during the December 4, 2005 legislative election. Their manifesto, "December 4: A Mandate of the People to the Nation," started as an on-line petition that has attracted over 5,500 signatures so far. The 4-D calls for transparent conditions, a manual vote, and an independently-audited, publicly available REP. Failing that, they urge abstention. In what appears to some to be the a quasi-political platform, 4-D's manifesto calls for respect for human rights, press freedom, and private property, employment generation, and increasing state oil company PDVSA's technical capacity. Some of 4-D,s leaders include media mogul Marcel Granier, high-profile businessman Rafael Alfonzo, and Verdad Venezuela leader and lawyer Tulio Alvarez. While she did not sign the manifesto, Sumate,s Maria Corina Machado reportedly privately supports the group as well. -------------- Ojo Watches Out -------------- ¶9. (C) Separately, domestic NGO Ojo Electoral, comprised of government and opposition supporters, has been quietly working on several proposals to help restore voter confidence. Following up on a 2005 agreement between the electoral watchdog and the CNE, Ojo submitted a proposal in mid-February to audit the REP. Their audit would review the REP for the accuracy of its data, as well as, a field study to determine if the registry reflected the number of eligible voters in the population. In addition to the audit, Ojo also proposed a formula for a high level, technical commission consisting of experts from government, political parties, and national universities to fully audit all voting process. The recommendation builds on an idea initially floated by CNE President Rodriguez after last December's discovery of a defect in the voting software that could reveal how people voted (ref b). The commission would not receive government funding and would make its findings and recommendations public. According to a March 13 article in local newspaper El Nacional, the CNE has yet to respond to either proposal. ¶10. (C) In the same article, Ojo directors Father Jose Virtuoso and Carlos Genatios mention that the NGO is also working with government, opposition, civil society, and university representatives to create an agenda for national dialogue. Unfortunately, Genatios has told us that Ojo's work has attracted BRV concern and led to an increase in surveillance of its members since November 2005. The scrutiny has resulted in several canceled meetings with poloffs. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The opposition's debate and subsequent maneuverings occur amidst the looming fear of losing even more of its CARACAS 00000718 004 OF 004 already shrinking base. The traditional opposition parties were caught off-guard and embarrassed by their inability to direct the grassroots movement that led them to withdraw from last year's legislative election and do not want it to happen again. (Other observers actually lauded the parties for listening to their base - an atypical move by the top-down traditional parties.) Hence, they are hedging their bets by forming competing, yet complementary, pressure groups and, in the case of AD and Copei, periodically advocating abstention in hopes of positioning themselves to be the opposition standard-bearer if Chavismo eventually implodes. To truly be successful, however, opposition parties will need to sacrifice some of their own self-interests and maintain a unified front, something that has proved difficult for them to do. Their cause may receive a boost from this week's release of the EU observation mission's final report on the legislative elections, which could be used to support many of the opposition's electoral demands. BROWNFIELD