CHAVEZ VS. BUSH 2006

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000666 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER FRC FT LAUDERDALE FOR CLAMBERT COPENHAGEN FOR DLAWTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: CHAVEZ VS. BUSH 2006 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) An apparently authentic 2006 campaign plan for President Chavez's political party, the Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR),has been circulating on the internet and reported on by the press. The plan includes campaign themes and objectives as well as strategies for communication and party organization. Importantly, the plan also details how the Chavistas expect to achieve their goal of winning 10 million votes in December's presidential election. The most striking component, however, is how bluntly the plan describes the strategy of demonizing the United States even describing President Bush as the number one political obstacle to Chavez's reelection. While we cannot be sure of the document's authenticity, the strategy outlined in the document is extremely consistent with Chavez's early February speech announcing he was running against the United States and not the opposition, as well as with his and his party's comments and actions since then. End Summary. -------------- MVR Campaign Plan 2006 -------------- ¶2. (U) The 2006 campaign plan of President Chavez's Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR) party has been circulating around the internet since it was supposedly presented in the MVR's National Commission of Organization and Electoral Policy at the end of January. The document outlines the electoral strategy of Chavez's party for the upcoming elections in December 2006, which stresses the importance of creating a dichotomy between Chavez's Bolivarian revolution and the imperialist United States. The document alleges that the United States is actively planning to discredit the electoral process in the upcoming elections by promoting abstention. In one scenario envisioned by the authors, the United States would recruit a candidate and help unify the opposition, only to have them pull out at the last minute. The plan stresses that the MVR must strive to eliminate any opportunity for the United States to question the 2006 electoral results. -------------- Campaign Objectives and Themes -------------- ¶3. (U) The primary objective in the 2006 campaign plan is to reelect President Chavez with a minimum of 10 million votes. In addition, the plan lays out several sub-objectives which include strengthening the Bolivarian Revolution and its ideal of 21st Century Socialism, strengthening the social and political organizations of the MVR, reinforcing the desire for independence in Latin America and finally, "defeating George Bush and his talking puppets." ¶4. (U) To achieve these objectives the document outlines 13 campaign themes that should be highlighted by the party members. These include: popular participation and power, employment, security, anti-corruption, 21st Century Socialism, highway administration, repossession of rural and urban land, Latin American integration, imperialist aggression, sovereignty and independence, social missions, poverty, and housing. -------------- Ten Million Votes...Yeah, Right CARACAS 00000666 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶5. (U) Despite the fact that President Chavez was only able to obtain at most six million votes in the 2002 referendum (and only 3.7 million total voters in the December 2005 parliamentary elections) the MVR is determined to get ten million votes in the 2006 election. While it seems a difficult task, the document details a plan for accomplishing this goal. The first part of the plan is to expand the electoral registry by about 2.7 million registered voters before the next election (this will take the list of eligible voters to just below 17 million). Of this 2.7 million (who, according to the plan, should be grateful to the MVR for giving them the right to vote),the MVR expects to win two million votes (74 percent). To get the remaining two million (plus a cushion of a few hundred thousand) the MVR expects to capture 60 percent of those voters who abstained in the 2002 election. -------------- United States Primary Obstacle -------------- ¶6. (U) Strikingly, the plan states that the principal adversary of Chavez and the MVR is not the opposition, but rather the United States and its "transnational corporate conglomerates." In several places, the document personally vilifies President Bush. This is consistent with an early February speech by Chavez and with subsequent statements and actions by other officials. The plan asserts that in addition to actively promoting abstention in the elections, the United States will intervene in the process through psychological operations and acts of terrorism. ¶7. (C) As a secondary obstacle to its success, the MVR plan cites inefficiency and corruption in government, which, they say is causing concern with voters. The plan, however, is careful not to lay the blame at the feet of the Chavez administration, but rather accuses the ministers, mayors, governors, and national assembly deputies of this inefficiency. In fact, the plan asserts that an overwhelming majority of Venezuelans support President Chavez, yet many are discontented with the rest of his executive cabinet as well as the ruling mayors and governors. Interestingly, the document does not attempt to refute allegations of inefficiency and corruption, which fits with recent actions by Chavez, who has boisterously condemned and threatened corrupt officials, all the while highlighting the many accomplishments his administration has achieved. -------------- Party Politics -------------- ¶8. (U) In addition to voter discord over poor public administration, the plan also acknowledges some "friction" within the MVR and calls for reinforcement of the party base, which it calls "militantes." While the plan believes internal elections would be damaging to the party if held before December, it suggests this possibility for the first half of 2007. The plan also elaborates on how the MVR should be organized, dividing the country into "electoral battle zones. Within these zones, "electoral battle units" (UBEs) will patrol the neighborhoods and ensure that those listed on the electoral registry get out to vote. -------------- No More Red Shirts? -------------- ¶9. (C) The plan also elaborates on President Chavez's image CARACAS 00000666 003 OF 003 and how it should be portrayed in the upcoming campaign. In all cases he should be referred to as "President Chavez" to preserve his image as a statesman. In this same vein, all photographs for official campaign materials should show Chavez smiling, wearing a coat and tie as well as the various "symbols of power" which include the presidential sash and the "Gran Cordon del Libertador" a gaudy gold chain with a medallion picturing Simon Bolivar. When possible, pictures should show Chavez interacting with other heads of state or participating in multilateral organizations. The combination of these things, according to the plan, will cement Chavez's image as a statesman and solid leader. This insistence on portraying Chavez as a statesman contrasts brusquely with the sometimes coarse personality he exhibits on an almost daily basis. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The most striking feature of this plan is the paranoid belief that the United States is actively trying to disrupt the elections. Little or no discussion is given to the opposition or any potential candidate as would be expected in a political strategy. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine whether the document is an actual strategy or an attempt at misinformation. Its wide availability could raise questions regarding its authenticity, yet the strategy outlined is consistent with the actions that Chavistas have taken so far, especially with respect to the strategy of demonizing the United States and President Bush. It is likely, however, largely a general plan for rank and file MVR consumption. If authentic, the MVR also likely has more developed and less public strategies including actions against the opposition. BROWNFIELD