Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CARACAS661
2006-03-13 11:04:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:
TAMPING DOWN IRANIAN URANIUM RUMORS IN VENEZUELA
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 CARACAS 000661
SIPDIS
SECRET NOFORN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS PARM VE IR
SUBJECT: TAMPING DOWN IRANIAN URANIUM RUMORS IN VENEZUELA
***********************
* Missing Section 001 *
***********************
CARACAS 00000661 002 OF 002
Navy and National Guard officials are worried over the fact
that the shipment is being overseen by a foreign shipping
company. Another rumor has Chavez kicking out the U.S. Naval
Attache to distract from the breaking story of uranium
excavation.
7. (S/NF) Comment and action request. Most of these
scenarios seem to be the product of the conspiratorial
proclivities of Venezuelan society and may be masking more
simple, though troubling, explanations. Absent the uranium
angle, for example, Post might have concluded the Esmeralda
airstrip was serving as a forward operating base for
questionable operations on the Colombian border and/or for
social programs for the indigenous. We admit, however, that
Post does not have the technical personnel capable of
assessing these reports, particularly regarding issues
related to uranium mining. We would appreciate the opinion
of relevant Washington agencies on whether the reports bear
further scrutiny. Specifically, we question why Iran would
need to come as far as Venezuela to find uranium. Also, of
what use would tractor and cement factories be to preparing
uranium for export (we assume they would not process ore here
for weapons-grade use)?
8. (C) Action request, continued. Post has also begun to
receive press inquiries regarding these press reports. Often
the questions dovetail into larger issues such as the Iranian
nuclear program and IAEA discussions. As these questions
clearly fall outside our purview, Post would appreciate
guidance on how to handle them.
BROWNFIELD
SIPDIS
SECRET NOFORN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS PARM VE IR
SUBJECT: TAMPING DOWN IRANIAN URANIUM RUMORS IN VENEZUELA
***********************
* Missing Section 001 *
***********************
CARACAS 00000661 002 OF 002
Navy and National Guard officials are worried over the fact
that the shipment is being overseen by a foreign shipping
company. Another rumor has Chavez kicking out the U.S. Naval
Attache to distract from the breaking story of uranium
excavation.
7. (S/NF) Comment and action request. Most of these
scenarios seem to be the product of the conspiratorial
proclivities of Venezuelan society and may be masking more
simple, though troubling, explanations. Absent the uranium
angle, for example, Post might have concluded the Esmeralda
airstrip was serving as a forward operating base for
questionable operations on the Colombian border and/or for
social programs for the indigenous. We admit, however, that
Post does not have the technical personnel capable of
assessing these reports, particularly regarding issues
related to uranium mining. We would appreciate the opinion
of relevant Washington agencies on whether the reports bear
further scrutiny. Specifically, we question why Iran would
need to come as far as Venezuela to find uranium. Also, of
what use would tractor and cement factories be to preparing
uranium for export (we assume they would not process ore here
for weapons-grade use)?
8. (C) Action request, continued. Post has also begun to
receive press inquiries regarding these press reports. Often
the questions dovetail into larger issues such as the Iranian
nuclear program and IAEA discussions. As these questions
clearly fall outside our purview, Post would appreciate
guidance on how to handle them.
BROWNFIELD