VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS: THE EMBASSY'S TAKE ON VOTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 003609

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2026
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS: THE EMBASSY'S TAKE ON VOTING
DAY

REF: A. CARACAS 03530

B. CARACAS 03531

C. CARACAS 03598

CARACAS 00003609 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) Post sent out roughly 40 observers to seven states
and Caracas for the December 3 presidential election.
Although they did not have official observer credentials,
Embassy observers were able to enter approximately 75 percent
of the roughly 120 voting centers visited. Emboffs were thus
able to provide real-time election information to the
Department, enhance post's ability to assess electoral
developments, and analyze international observer and National
Electoral Council reports. With the notable exception of one
team that was briefly detained, the day proceeded without
incident. Embassy election observers noted isolated voting
irregularities, such as misuse of government resources, but
nothing that suggested a systematic pattern of electoral
fraud. End Summary.

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Post Sends Observers Far and Wide
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2. (C) Post sent approximately 40 emboffs to Caracas and
seven states, including Zulia (opposition challenger Manuel
Rosales' base),Barinas (President Chavez' home state),
Miranda, Carabobo, Aragua, Vargas, and Anzoategui. Four of
these areas (Caracas, Zulia, Miranda, and Carabobo) contain
Venezuela's largest electorates. The others, though
important, rarely attract international attention. In fact,
only a handful of Emboffs reported actually seeing or hearing
about EU, OAS, or other National Electoral Council
(CNE)-accredited observers along their routes.


3. (C) With the exception of the U.S. Consular Agent in
Maracaibo, who was accredited as part of the local diplomatic
corps, Emboffs were not officially credentialed. Post
notified the Foreign Ministry of our intention to visit
voting centers. Nevertheless, our observers gained entry
into 75 percent of the more than 120-plus polling places
visited. In most cases electoral officials and military
elements guarding the voting centers were very receptive to
observers, eagerly showing them around and explaining the
process, even in pro-Chavez neighborhoods. One team and
their vehicle were blocked by military authorities outside a
polling station for less than an hour, but were released
after Embassy intervention.


4. (C) The reports from our observers gave post real-time
insight into election day events and were fed into post's
sitreps (Refs A and B). This information was invaluable,
given Venezuela's polarized news coverage and the BRV's
threat to suspend broadcasts had disturbances occurred.
Emboffs were able to watch for patterns in irregularities,
discrimination, or intimidation that could have suggested a
disadvantage for opposition supporters. Occasionally voters
approached Emboffs to ensure they documented issues and some
of these observations were passed to international
observation missions, facilitating resolution of problems.


5. (C) Emboffs also helped verify opposition contacts'
claims that they would have witnesses in every electoral
table, which would have helped Post evaluate fraud claims or
potential requests for Embassy support in the event of a
disputed race. Emboffs also verified that election day
rumors of unrest were exaggerated, which informed the
Embassy's security posture and operating plans the next day.
This function became particularly vital as voting centers
closed and people gathered at centers to ensure electoral
authorities followed proper procedures for the audit.
Finally, post's program showed Venezuelans a friendly USG
face in a wide range of places to counter anti-US propaganda
from the BRV.

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Emboffs Detect Irregularities, but Nothing Systematic
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6. (C) Emboffs' observations tracked with those of

CARACAS 00003609 002.3 OF 002


international observers previously reported (Ref C).
Election day was calm, with voters in more of a festive than
contentious mood. Fingerprint (digital scanning) machines
were the main cause for many initial delays in voting in the
morning, followed by broken machines and late openings.
Although technicians were on site to repair the voting
machines quickly, replacements, when necessary, took as many
as four hours to arrive at the centers. This frequently
frustrated voters, who demanded electoral officials adopt
manual voting, as required by law if machines are not
replaced. There were few incidents of voter intimidation
reported, but some observers saw pro-Chavez supporters near
some centers apparently keeping track of who had voted (and
presumably who had not).


7. (C) Observers in Barinas and Aragua states reported
seeing machines hooked up to transmit data before polls
closed in violation of the CNE's agreement with the
opposition. Some voters complained about blank voting
receipts and were allowed to vote again. To a lesser extent,
there were also reports of receipts listing a candidate name
other than that chosen by the voter. Neither discrepancy
interfered with the election's outcome. There were also
isolated incidents of poll workers or pro-government
supporters, mainly in Chavez' home state of Barinas,
assisting voters at the voting machine, potentially
compromising the secrecy of the vote. Emboffs noted
political party witnesses from both major candidates in
almost all centers, although the Rosales campaign did not
have witnesses in some barrios in western Caracas. Most
appeared to get along well, except in Chavez' home town of
Sabaneta, where an opposition witness told poloff he was
constantly overruled by his pro-Chavez counterparts and poll
workers.


8. (C) In many cases, electoral officials deferred to Plan
Republica participants to resolve problems, violating the
plan's rules restricting soldiers to guarding voting centers
and materials only. Emboffs reported variation and confusion
in closing practices as some centers apparently waited for
orders to close from the CNE instead of closing at 4 pm or
later if voters were in line, as stated in electoral law.
Like last year, and also in violation of election rules,
military officials had a larger role in determining when
polls close than they should have. Defense Minister Baduel
told the media in the days following the election that the
military is investigating complaints about Plan Republica
elements exceeding their legal role.

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Comment: Lesson Learned
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9. (C) Like last year's effort, Post found its informal
observation effort extremely useful as a tool to gauge
electoral developments. Embassy volunteers deepened their
Venezuela expertise. Post was able to indirectly support the
democratic process, a key objective of our Venezuela policy,
by providing another, though modest, check against potential
electoral day irregularities. The Embassy was also able to
provide detailed information on election irregularities to
the international observers and to the opposition as they
occurred. Post was also well-positioned to report on and
deal with election-related disturbances had any occurred.
Finally, Post's credibility when expressing concerns to other
electoral observation missions and diplomatic counterparts
was boosted by its detailed knowledge of developments.

BROWNFIELD