Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CARACAS3598
2006-12-11 14:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:
VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS: ISSUES FOR FUTURE
VZCZCXRO1729 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHCV #3598/01 3451448 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 111448Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7272 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0674 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 003598
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2026
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS: ISSUES FOR FUTURE
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO WATCH
REF: A. CARACAS 03239
B. CARACAS 00873
C. 05 CARACAS 03596
CARACAS 00003598 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
-------
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 003598
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2026
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS: ISSUES FOR FUTURE
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO WATCH
REF: A. CARACAS 03239
B. CARACAS 00873
C. 05 CARACAS 03596
CARACAS 00003598 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) A comparison of the 2005 EU and OAS electoral
observation missions' (EOM) reports and the 2006 missions'
preliminary observations reveals the BRV has resolved less
than half of the issues singled out last year. Some of the
so-called improvements, such as the naming of a new National
Electoral Council and the audit of the electoral registry are
merely window dressing, since the board maintains its four to
one bias in the government's favor and no independent
organization has had full access to the registry for a
comprehensive audit. In other areas, such as respect for and
enforcement of campaign norms and generally accepted
principles against voter intimidation, government abuses
increased. Nevertheless, compared to the 2005 legislative
elections, the most recent EOMs agree that the political
atmosphere surrounding the presidential election had
substantially improved. While the opposition has signaled a
willingness to work on electoral issues, we doubt the BRV is
prepared to make meaningful changes to the electoral system.
End Summary.
--------------
CNE Considered More Sound
--------------
2. (SBU) In their 2005 reports, EU and OAS observers
declared that Venezuela suffered from a profound distrust of
the electoral system due in part to the National Electoral
Council (CNE),which was stacked four to one in the
government's favor and reflected that bias in many of its
decisions. In 2006, the EU saw the CNE in a new light:
--2005: In their 2005 final reports, the EU and OAS
recommended that the CNE be renovated given widespread voter
distrust and questions about its legitimacy. Both missions
suggested the BRV consult with the opposition in choosing a
new, impartial board consisting of representatives from
various social and political sectors.
--2006: Both missions considered the CNE a new entity,
centering on the fact that the previous, polemical CNE
President Jorge Rodriguez had been replaced and a new set of
directors had been appointed. This ignores the fact that
four of the five new CNE directors are generally considered
to be pro-Chavez and had either worked in the predecessor
board or one of it regional entities. In its preliminary
observation report, the EU acknowledges opposition concerns
about the CNE board's pro-government composition, but also
commends the CNE's efforts to improve their confidence.
--------------
Audit Recommendations Satisfied
--------------
3. (SBU) Audits of the technical aspects of the electoral
process actually appeared to have improved:
--2005: Observers called for more hands-on opposition
participation in the audits of the various phases of the
electoral process, particularly the voting system. They
suggested these audits start earlier with the rules set well
ahead of time.
--2006: EU observers were pleased with the audit schedule
and access granted to the opposition, which they said led to
a better understanding of the voting system. They noted
political party technical experts and observers were better
qualified and collaborated better than the year before. The
EU also viewed the CNE's implementation of software designed
to scramble the sequence of the vote and the increase in the
percentage of voting receipts counted on election day as
positive developments for increasing voter confidence (Ref
A). Still, they said CNE bureaucratic inefficiency
occasionally hindered timely responses to opposition
questions and concerns.
CARACAS 00003598 002.2 OF 004
-------------- ---
Electoral Registry Audit Considered a Done Deal
-------------- ---
4. (C) Unlike in previous elections, for the 2005 municipal
and legislative elections the CNE denied opposition political
parties access to a complete version of the electoral
registry (REP) with voter addresses, citing a controversial
Supreme Court ruling ordering the protection of voter data.
The opposition balked saying independent review was necessary
given the addition of more than 2 million voters during the
BRV's registration drive in the months leading up to the 2004
presidential recall referendum:
--2005: Observers called for an independent review of the
electoral registry (REP) with academic and political party
participation. The OAS final report, which came out as the
Costa Rica-based Center for Electoral Assistance and
Promotion (CAPEL) concluded its BRV-funded private study of
the REP (Ref B) for the CNE, urged the CNE to publish CAPEL's
findings. Both missions also recommended the government and
opposition work to find a way to balance the need for an
audit with concerns about protecting voters' identities.
--2006: The CNE released the CAPEL report on its website.
Representatives of both EOMs told us that a subsequent
CNE-sanctioned audit also responded to their recommendations,
although it was conducted by seven BRV universities after the
three private universities pulled out of the process and only
allowed restricted access for opposition representatives.
They cite the opposition's acceptance of the REP as not
flawed enough to skew an election. This argument ignores the
fact, also raised by the opposition, that no independent
entity has had full access for an in-depth review of the
voter rolls. Such an audit is necessary to improve
confidence in the electoral system.
--------------
Training Has Improved, but Still Inadequate
--------------
5. (SBU) While not initially an important observer focus,
the significance of poll worker and voter training increased
following problems observed on election day:
--2005: OAS and EU EOMs cited voter and poll worker training
as woefully inadequate. They also suggested defining the
role of the CNE-created electoral coordinator position, which
is not in the law, and clarifying procedures, which were
often dictated by military soldiers guarding the centers
instead of CNE workers, as the law requires.
--2006: The EU EOM said training had improved considerably,
but noted that confusion still existed. They also repeated
their recommendation for codifying the CNE coordinator
position in law, although they acknowledged the CNE's
explanation of the coordinators' duties was better. The OAS'
preliminary statement still noted a need for better awareness
of closing procedures and there were isolated reports of the
military playing a larger role than authorized.
-------------- ---
Campaign Norm Violations Continued and Worsened
-------------- ---
6. (C) Some of the most egregious violations occurred during
the electoral campaign and were a principal focus of both
observation missions in 2005 and 2006:
--2005: EU and OAS observers were ver critical of BRV
violations of campaign regulatios prohibiting the use of
government funds and emloyees, voter intimidation, and
Chavez' use of mndatory national broadcasts (cadenas) to
indirecly campaign for pro-government candidates. They aso
faulted the CNE for not reining in these violaions and
suggested a law to regulate electoral cmpaigns. Public and
private media were also criicized for their lack of balanced
coverage of th campaign, which the EU said violated
internatioally-accepted principles of media conduct. The EU
suggested media outlets negotiate a campaign codeof conduct
among themselves.
--2006: None of hese issues was resolved and, in some cases,
thesituation worsened. The EU found, for example, tht of
the more than 1,100 violations of campaign nrms cited by CNE
CARACAS 00003598 003.2 OF 004
legal experts, only 61 went to the CNE board for action and
only five of these cases resulted in sanctions. The EU
recognized the suspension of Chavez' weekly "Alo Presidente"
television program, but noted that most abuses were committed
by Chavez' campaign followed "to a much lesser extent" by
Manuel Rosales' camp. Whereas in 2005 observers were
concerned about the use of the Maisanta program and some
election day statements from BRV officials to intimidate
voters, particularly civil servants, this year's assessments
suggest intimidation was more varied, blatant, persistent,
and systematic. Also, EU analysis indicates state television
station Venezuela de Television's (VTV) and private
television station Televen's campaign coverage was more
biased than in 2005.
--------------
Fingerprint Machines as Intimidation Issue
--------------
7. (C) Fingerprint (digital scanning) machines used for
voter identification also remained a polarizing issue and a
principle observer focus for both elections:
--2005: In the wake of the discovery that it was possible
(though difficult) to determine how electors voted (Ref C),
international observers successfully lobbied, at the
opposition's request, to have the machines removed from
voting centers. In its final report, the EU said the
machines were a potential guard against stacking the voter
registry with ghost voters, but ineffective as long as there
was not an adequate identification program in place.
--2006: The observers' focus on the machines shifted slightly
from a technical concern about their potential to compromise
the secrecy of the vote to their political value as a
potential intimidation tool as many voters continued to
believe that the government would be able to track their
vote. The OAS EOM told us they had privately lobbied the CNE
not to use the machines, but were unsuccessful. In their
preliminary assessments, both missions strongly criticized
the use of the machines as an obstacle to voting that failed
to prevent voter fraud, contrary to CNE claims.
--------------
Legal Gaps Persist
--------------
8. (SBU) Because the legal guidelines for the legislative
and presidential elections differed, international observers
were not as focused on this issue. Still EU EOM leader
Monica Frassoni highlighted a couple of concerns based on the
2005 report:
-- 2005: Observers noted the variety of electoral laws, some
seemingly contradictory or outdated, governing the
legislative election and recommended they be harmonized into
one electoral law. They also suggested including updates to
the law that accounted for the advanced voting technology in
use. They criticized the use of the morochas device, which
they said violated the spirit of constitutional requirements
for proportional representation in the legislature. (Note: In
legislative elections, sixty percent of the candidates are
elected through a constituency-based, first-past-the-post
system while the rest are elected through party lists. A
morocha is an electoral device that allows a large party to
run its best-known candidates in single district races under
the colors of a clone party while putting its lesser known
candidates on its own party list, thus reducing the
possibility of minority party representation.)
-- 2006: The EU repeated its call to synthesize existing
legislation into one definitive electoral law emphasizing the
need for regulations on campaign limits and finance. As
mentioned previously, they also urged better enforcement of
existing electoral norms, particularly with respect to
campaign and closing rules.
--------------
Comment
--------------
9. (C) The BRV fulfilled less than half of the observers'
recommendations, particularly when it came to the electoral
campaign. While the recommended improvements would not have
led to a Rosales victory, many of the advantages that
CARACAS 00003598 004.2 OF 004
resulted from non-compliance certainly helped ensure Chavez'
wide margin of victory by shaving votes from the opposition.
The BRV has a chance to incorporate some of the observers'
recommendations when it takes up constitutional reform, and
the opposition has expressed interest post-election in
drafting proposals to address some of these issues. However,
given Chavez' determination to ensure his continuation in
power and to form a single revolutionary party, it is
doubtful whether any meaningful changes will be made to the
electoral system.
BROWNFIELD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2026
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS: ISSUES FOR FUTURE
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO WATCH
REF: A. CARACAS 03239
B. CARACAS 00873
C. 05 CARACAS 03596
CARACAS 00003598 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) A comparison of the 2005 EU and OAS electoral
observation missions' (EOM) reports and the 2006 missions'
preliminary observations reveals the BRV has resolved less
than half of the issues singled out last year. Some of the
so-called improvements, such as the naming of a new National
Electoral Council and the audit of the electoral registry are
merely window dressing, since the board maintains its four to
one bias in the government's favor and no independent
organization has had full access to the registry for a
comprehensive audit. In other areas, such as respect for and
enforcement of campaign norms and generally accepted
principles against voter intimidation, government abuses
increased. Nevertheless, compared to the 2005 legislative
elections, the most recent EOMs agree that the political
atmosphere surrounding the presidential election had
substantially improved. While the opposition has signaled a
willingness to work on electoral issues, we doubt the BRV is
prepared to make meaningful changes to the electoral system.
End Summary.
--------------
CNE Considered More Sound
--------------
2. (SBU) In their 2005 reports, EU and OAS observers
declared that Venezuela suffered from a profound distrust of
the electoral system due in part to the National Electoral
Council (CNE),which was stacked four to one in the
government's favor and reflected that bias in many of its
decisions. In 2006, the EU saw the CNE in a new light:
--2005: In their 2005 final reports, the EU and OAS
recommended that the CNE be renovated given widespread voter
distrust and questions about its legitimacy. Both missions
suggested the BRV consult with the opposition in choosing a
new, impartial board consisting of representatives from
various social and political sectors.
--2006: Both missions considered the CNE a new entity,
centering on the fact that the previous, polemical CNE
President Jorge Rodriguez had been replaced and a new set of
directors had been appointed. This ignores the fact that
four of the five new CNE directors are generally considered
to be pro-Chavez and had either worked in the predecessor
board or one of it regional entities. In its preliminary
observation report, the EU acknowledges opposition concerns
about the CNE board's pro-government composition, but also
commends the CNE's efforts to improve their confidence.
--------------
Audit Recommendations Satisfied
--------------
3. (SBU) Audits of the technical aspects of the electoral
process actually appeared to have improved:
--2005: Observers called for more hands-on opposition
participation in the audits of the various phases of the
electoral process, particularly the voting system. They
suggested these audits start earlier with the rules set well
ahead of time.
--2006: EU observers were pleased with the audit schedule
and access granted to the opposition, which they said led to
a better understanding of the voting system. They noted
political party technical experts and observers were better
qualified and collaborated better than the year before. The
EU also viewed the CNE's implementation of software designed
to scramble the sequence of the vote and the increase in the
percentage of voting receipts counted on election day as
positive developments for increasing voter confidence (Ref
A). Still, they said CNE bureaucratic inefficiency
occasionally hindered timely responses to opposition
questions and concerns.
CARACAS 00003598 002.2 OF 004
-------------- ---
Electoral Registry Audit Considered a Done Deal
-------------- ---
4. (C) Unlike in previous elections, for the 2005 municipal
and legislative elections the CNE denied opposition political
parties access to a complete version of the electoral
registry (REP) with voter addresses, citing a controversial
Supreme Court ruling ordering the protection of voter data.
The opposition balked saying independent review was necessary
given the addition of more than 2 million voters during the
BRV's registration drive in the months leading up to the 2004
presidential recall referendum:
--2005: Observers called for an independent review of the
electoral registry (REP) with academic and political party
participation. The OAS final report, which came out as the
Costa Rica-based Center for Electoral Assistance and
Promotion (CAPEL) concluded its BRV-funded private study of
the REP (Ref B) for the CNE, urged the CNE to publish CAPEL's
findings. Both missions also recommended the government and
opposition work to find a way to balance the need for an
audit with concerns about protecting voters' identities.
--2006: The CNE released the CAPEL report on its website.
Representatives of both EOMs told us that a subsequent
CNE-sanctioned audit also responded to their recommendations,
although it was conducted by seven BRV universities after the
three private universities pulled out of the process and only
allowed restricted access for opposition representatives.
They cite the opposition's acceptance of the REP as not
flawed enough to skew an election. This argument ignores the
fact, also raised by the opposition, that no independent
entity has had full access for an in-depth review of the
voter rolls. Such an audit is necessary to improve
confidence in the electoral system.
--------------
Training Has Improved, but Still Inadequate
--------------
5. (SBU) While not initially an important observer focus,
the significance of poll worker and voter training increased
following problems observed on election day:
--2005: OAS and EU EOMs cited voter and poll worker training
as woefully inadequate. They also suggested defining the
role of the CNE-created electoral coordinator position, which
is not in the law, and clarifying procedures, which were
often dictated by military soldiers guarding the centers
instead of CNE workers, as the law requires.
--2006: The EU EOM said training had improved considerably,
but noted that confusion still existed. They also repeated
their recommendation for codifying the CNE coordinator
position in law, although they acknowledged the CNE's
explanation of the coordinators' duties was better. The OAS'
preliminary statement still noted a need for better awareness
of closing procedures and there were isolated reports of the
military playing a larger role than authorized.
-------------- ---
Campaign Norm Violations Continued and Worsened
-------------- ---
6. (C) Some of the most egregious violations occurred during
the electoral campaign and were a principal focus of both
observation missions in 2005 and 2006:
--2005: EU and OAS observers were ver critical of BRV
violations of campaign regulatios prohibiting the use of
government funds and emloyees, voter intimidation, and
Chavez' use of mndatory national broadcasts (cadenas) to
indirecly campaign for pro-government candidates. They aso
faulted the CNE for not reining in these violaions and
suggested a law to regulate electoral cmpaigns. Public and
private media were also criicized for their lack of balanced
coverage of th campaign, which the EU said violated
internatioally-accepted principles of media conduct. The EU
suggested media outlets negotiate a campaign codeof conduct
among themselves.
--2006: None of hese issues was resolved and, in some cases,
thesituation worsened. The EU found, for example, tht of
the more than 1,100 violations of campaign nrms cited by CNE
CARACAS 00003598 003.2 OF 004
legal experts, only 61 went to the CNE board for action and
only five of these cases resulted in sanctions. The EU
recognized the suspension of Chavez' weekly "Alo Presidente"
television program, but noted that most abuses were committed
by Chavez' campaign followed "to a much lesser extent" by
Manuel Rosales' camp. Whereas in 2005 observers were
concerned about the use of the Maisanta program and some
election day statements from BRV officials to intimidate
voters, particularly civil servants, this year's assessments
suggest intimidation was more varied, blatant, persistent,
and systematic. Also, EU analysis indicates state television
station Venezuela de Television's (VTV) and private
television station Televen's campaign coverage was more
biased than in 2005.
--------------
Fingerprint Machines as Intimidation Issue
--------------
7. (C) Fingerprint (digital scanning) machines used for
voter identification also remained a polarizing issue and a
principle observer focus for both elections:
--2005: In the wake of the discovery that it was possible
(though difficult) to determine how electors voted (Ref C),
international observers successfully lobbied, at the
opposition's request, to have the machines removed from
voting centers. In its final report, the EU said the
machines were a potential guard against stacking the voter
registry with ghost voters, but ineffective as long as there
was not an adequate identification program in place.
--2006: The observers' focus on the machines shifted slightly
from a technical concern about their potential to compromise
the secrecy of the vote to their political value as a
potential intimidation tool as many voters continued to
believe that the government would be able to track their
vote. The OAS EOM told us they had privately lobbied the CNE
not to use the machines, but were unsuccessful. In their
preliminary assessments, both missions strongly criticized
the use of the machines as an obstacle to voting that failed
to prevent voter fraud, contrary to CNE claims.
--------------
Legal Gaps Persist
--------------
8. (SBU) Because the legal guidelines for the legislative
and presidential elections differed, international observers
were not as focused on this issue. Still EU EOM leader
Monica Frassoni highlighted a couple of concerns based on the
2005 report:
-- 2005: Observers noted the variety of electoral laws, some
seemingly contradictory or outdated, governing the
legislative election and recommended they be harmonized into
one electoral law. They also suggested including updates to
the law that accounted for the advanced voting technology in
use. They criticized the use of the morochas device, which
they said violated the spirit of constitutional requirements
for proportional representation in the legislature. (Note: In
legislative elections, sixty percent of the candidates are
elected through a constituency-based, first-past-the-post
system while the rest are elected through party lists. A
morocha is an electoral device that allows a large party to
run its best-known candidates in single district races under
the colors of a clone party while putting its lesser known
candidates on its own party list, thus reducing the
possibility of minority party representation.)
-- 2006: The EU repeated its call to synthesize existing
legislation into one definitive electoral law emphasizing the
need for regulations on campaign limits and finance. As
mentioned previously, they also urged better enforcement of
existing electoral norms, particularly with respect to
campaign and closing rules.
--------------
Comment
--------------
9. (C) The BRV fulfilled less than half of the observers'
recommendations, particularly when it came to the electoral
campaign. While the recommended improvements would not have
led to a Rosales victory, many of the advantages that
CARACAS 00003598 004.2 OF 004
resulted from non-compliance certainly helped ensure Chavez'
wide margin of victory by shaving votes from the opposition.
The BRV has a chance to incorporate some of the observers'
recommendations when it takes up constitutional reform, and
the opposition has expressed interest post-election in
drafting proposals to address some of these issues. However,
given Chavez' determination to ensure his continuation in
power and to form a single revolutionary party, it is
doubtful whether any meaningful changes will be made to the
electoral system.
BROWNFIELD