Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CARACAS3547
2006-12-05 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

TIME TO REDOUBLE OUR PRO-DEMOCRACY EFFORTS IN

Tags:  PREL EAID KDEM VE 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCV #3547/01 3391716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051716Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7209
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 003547 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA A/S SHANNON FROM AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD
DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
NSC FOR DFISK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2021
TAGS: PREL EAID KDEM VE
SUBJECT: TIME TO REDOUBLE OUR PRO-DEMOCRACY EFFORTS IN
VENEZUELA


Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM BROWNFIELD, REASON 1.4 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 003547

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA A/S SHANNON FROM AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD
DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
NSC FOR DFISK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2021
TAGS: PREL EAID KDEM VE
SUBJECT: TIME TO REDOUBLE OUR PRO-DEMOCRACY EFFORTS IN
VENEZUELA


Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM BROWNFIELD, REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary. We understand the Deputies Committee asked
in November whether Embassy has the needed resources to
promote our country team strategy. We waited until after the
Venezuelan presidential election to respond. The answer is
that we are grateful for all resources made available, but in
light of Chavez' triumph, his aggressive post-election
approach to the opposition, the incipient efforts of the
opposition to build long-term infrastructure, and Chavez' own
long-term vision, we need more. Embassy strategy is to
strengthen democratic institutions, penetrate and divide
Chavismo, and build independent society. It is working. But
we confront growing inflation and an unfavorable fixed
foreign exchange rate, and a systematic effort by the BRV to
close traditional doors to official USG activities in
Venezuela. With additional AID, military engagement, and
public diplomacy funding, we could be even more proactive in
promoting U.S. interests and values. The figures are not
large. We get good value for little investment of resources
in Venezuela. End Summary.

--------------
USAID
--------------


2. (C) Post has relied on USAID's Office of Transition
Initiatives as the primary funding source for democracy
programs for four years, but this funding continues to be
cut. The FY05 and FY06 budget for these programs was $6.5
million and $3.3 million, respectively. The projected budget
in FY07 is expected to be less than $3 million. We are
having a palpable impact around the country with existing
programs, but our impact will be significantly muted under
the projected budget. The Deputies Committee approved a
strategy in August 2005 that called for an additional $10
million to expand our pro-democracy efforts outside Caracas,
to promote citizen activism on national issues, and to forge
alliances between non-Chavistas and Chavistas. Those funds
would be welcomed.


3. (SBU) With additional resources above the $3 million
funding level in FY07, post could assist:

--- activities that foment citizen push-back to Chavez'
"Bolivarian revolution;"
--- NDI and IRI to expand their party-building efforts toward
2008 local and state races;
--- NDI to provide technical support to domestic electoral
observation;
--- Freedom House to conduct 12 human rights events a year;
and,
--- the Pan-American Development Foundation to help fund 15

local human rights and government accountability watchdog
organizations.

Without these additional funds, most of the aforementioned
groups will have to sharply curtail their work in Venezuela.
Civil society has been indispensable to the opposition's
courageous efforts to challenge the increasingly autocratic
Chavez government, but independent civil society is under
attack and needs support.

--------------
Military Engagement With Civil Society
--------------


4. (SBU) U.S. restrictions on military-to-military engagement
with the Venezuelan armed forces, as well as Venezuelan
reluctance to work with us, understandably limit our work in
those areas. Nevertheless, we have tapped "Minute Man Funds
(MMF)" via the State Partnership Program (SPP) with Florida
to facilitate civilian-to-civilian cooperation. In FY06 post
sponsored a subject matter exchange between officials from
the Venezuelan Civilian Defense Organization, a government
body that coordinates humanitarian and disaster response
activities, with state and local officials in Florida.
Embassy also supported Venezuelan officials' participation in
the annual U.S. hurricane conference. Embassy has also been
fostering cooperation with state and local police forces,
firefighters, and first responders.


5. (SBU) We understand that the Florida National Guard
received no direct DoD funding for civilian-to-civilian
cooperation for FY07. Embassy will have no opportunity to
engage the aforementioned non-traditional partners without
this funding source. More specifically, Embassy Military

Group has proposed six new, low-cost, high-impact cooperative
activities with willing Venezuelan civilian partners for FY07
that cannot be funded by any other military account. We urge
DoD to consider providing $100,000 for Minute Man funding for
Florida.

--------------
Public Diplomacy
--------------


6. (C) The Chavez administration is seeking to monopolize the
public sphere and is actively trying to restrict embassy
access to Venezuelan government and societal interlocutors.
Active public diplomacy is vital to contesting the Chavez'
government's well-funded efforts to demonize the United
States. The cost of doing business in Venezuela is high, and
an enhanced U.S. profile would require enhanced resources.
Embassy,s Public Affairs Section (PAS) is best placed to
raise the profile of U.S. activities, including bolstering
our network of American Corners and Binational Centers. With
additional resources, it can also more fully engage
universities, broaden our appeal to young audiences, and more
actively counter Bolivarian misrepresentation of U.S.
policies and values.


7. (SBU) PAS Caracas, estimated FY 2007 program budget is
$150,000. Post seeks an additional $375,000 to fund the
following activities to reach national audiences and invest
in youth while at the same time boosting ongoing outreach and
cultural programs (individual estimated costs are in
parentheses):

-- An expansion of American Corners from the current 4 to 8,
and fund the teaching of English for underprivileged
elementary students at the Corners ($50,000);
-- To establish a fourth Binational Center ($100,000);
-- Organize visit by major U.S. contemporary art exhibit,
prominent U.S. music figure, and/or dance company: Estimated
cost ($75,000);
-- Develop television and radio programming highlighting
U.S.-Venezuelan ties ($30,000);
-- Fund five additional International Visitor grants per year
($35,000);
-- Broaden funding for English-language scholarships for high
school youth ($25,000):
-- Create an undergraduate Fulbright scholarship program for
minority and underprivileged students ($40,000).

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) Although Chavez is crowing about launching the "next
phase of the Bolivarian Revolution" from 2007 to 2021, he
understands the resonance of civil society and pro-democracy
forces in Venezuela. Chavez is moving directly to restrict
and intimidate civil society. This is a winnable battle;
with far fewer resources and competing on a precipitously
uneven playing field, Zulia Governor Rosales gave Chavez a
serious challenge. Chavez also fumbled his bid to win a UN
Security Council seat and he had the touch of lead in 2007
elections in Peru and Mexico. With the timely injection of
the right resources, the USG has a real opportunity to do
even more to help Venezuelan civil society confront and
counter his anti-American axis.

BROWNFIELD

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