CARABOBO STATE: ROSALES AND CHAVEZ CAMPAIGNS SEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 003495

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2026
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CARABOBO STATE: ROSALES AND CHAVEZ CAMPAIGNS SEE
VICTORY CLOSE


CARACAS 00003495 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) Both the Chavez and Rosales campaigns claim they will
win in the hotly-contested state of Carabobo, the state with
the fourth largest number of voters. The Chavez campaign is
focusing on its grassroots get-out-the-vote efforts to woo an
estimated 30 percent of voters planning to abstain from the
vote. The Rosales team, comprised of many political parties,
is also courting potential supporters while trying to guard
against possible manipulation of electoral conditions.
Rosales seems positioned to make a strong showing in the
state held not too long ago by the opposition. End Summary.

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Abstention, not Rosales, Biggest Challenge for Chavez
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2. (C) Poloff visited Valencia, Carabobo November 24 to meet
with representatives from President Chavez' and opposition
challenger Manuel Rosales' campaigns. Carabobo is the fourth
largest voting state, with over 1.2 million registered
voters. It had been an opposition stronghold until the
October 2004 regional election, when Retired General Luis
Acosta Carlez from Chavez' Fifth Republic Movement (MVR)
party narrowly beat incumbent Henrique Salas Feo (Proyecto
Venezuela). Since then, Acosta has been a polarizing figure
in the local MVR party, prompting the national leadership to
temporarily take over the state chapter last year. Still,
National Assembly (AN) Deputy and MVR Carabobo campaign
coordinator Saul Ortega predicted to poloff that those
problems would not keep them from meeting their goal of
winning 60 percent of the state.


3. (C) Ortega said the MVR campaign in Carabobo has focused
on a door-to-door campaign effort, which began with a
diagnostic of the area in which volunteers visited homes to
inquire who planned to vote and reasons why the others would
not. This was followed by a separate visit in which
supporters tried to sell the accomplishments of the Chavez
administration and convince potential abstentionists to vote.
Ortega claimed Chavez himself was closely supervising the
campaign, calling volunteers to see if they had received his
latest instructions. If not, he would reprimand the campaign
coordinators. Nonetheless, Ortega said abstention, which he
estimated would be about 30 percent, remained their biggest
obstacle. When poloff mentioned concern about the
fingerprint (digital scanning) machines as a deterrent to
voting, Ortega responded that the machines were really in the
opposition's best interest since they provided a check
against Chavista parties sending people to vote twice.
Still, he thought there was a chance that the National
Electoral Council (CNE) might withdraw the machines at the
last minute.

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Opposition Confident and Busy . . .
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4. (C) The opposition was also optimistic about their
chances for victory, but on guard. Former AN Deputy and
Carabobo campaign manager for Rosales Gabriela Mayaudon told
poloff all opposition parties were working well together.
After Rosales' early November visit to the state, former
Governors and Proyecto Venezuela leaders Henrique Salas Romer
and (his son) Salas Feo, agreed to join the campaign and
focus on getting out the vote. Mayaudon said they had not
made the MVR's troubles in the state a campaign issue,
preferring to focus instead on what Rosales has to offer.
She was confident that they had recruited sufficient
electoral monitors for all Carabobo voting tables, and
training sessions for them with Sumate.


5. (C) Mayaudon told poloff they had recently discovered
that witnesses who had signed against Chavez in the 2004
presidential recall referendum were given electoral
credentials without the official CNE stamp. Concerned that
the CNE would try to disqualify these witnesses for not
having the correct seal, they were in the process of
petitioning the CNE for a list of accredited observers to try
to circumvent this potential problem.


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. . .But Not Necessarily United in Same Goal
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6. (C) Although they are supporting Rosales, in a separate
meeting with poloff the Salases openly admitted to tying
their political comeback to Rosales' candidacy. Salas Feo
has made impromptu visits to produce markets, shopping
centers, and popular street corners touting the security and
social aspects of the opposition platform, and claims to have
helped reduce the gap between Chavez and Rosales. Yet, he
has also been touting the return of "El Pollo" (Salas'
nickname). While they thought Rosales could win in a fair
fight, the ex-governors thought the use of the fingerprint
machines would discourage many people -- particularly
government employees -- from voting. They also claimed to
have information from a high-level DISIP insider that the
result of the election had been predetermined giving Chavez
60-plus percent and Rosales less than 40 percent.


7. (C) The ex-governors saw three bleak scenarios for the
opposition: a last minute postponement of the election, if it
looked like Rosales could win; Rosales accepts defeat and
tries to lead a loyal opposition; or Rosales accepts defeat
and agrees to negotiations with the government. No matter
what, the Salases maintained that Rosales could never
acknowledge defeat, even in a fair fight, because opposition
supporters would never accept it and Rosales would lose
credibility with the opposition. In the end they thought the
opposition, specifically left-wing opposition leaders like
Teodoro Petkoff, would probably advocate negotiation with the
government to preserve their own, fading positions.

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Comment
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8. (C) The energy and diligence poloff observed at Rosales'
campaign headquarters suggests he is making a serious effort
to win votes in Carabobo. In fact, Rosales' campaign center
appeared to be much busier than its Chavista counterpart down
the street. Still, Chavez maintains the upper hand, as he
controls the state's resources and at least some potential
opposition voters could be dissuaded by the prospects that
their vote may not be secret.

BROWNFIELD