CARABOBO STATE: ROSALES AND CHAVEZ CAMPAIGNS SEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 003495 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2026 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: CARABOBO STATE: ROSALES AND CHAVEZ CAMPAIGNS SEE VICTORY CLOSE CARACAS 00003495 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Both the Chavez and Rosales campaigns claim they will win in the hotly-contested state of Carabobo, the state with the fourth largest number of voters. The Chavez campaign is focusing on its grassroots get-out-the-vote efforts to woo an estimated 30 percent of voters planning to abstain from the vote. The Rosales team, comprised of many political parties, is also courting potential supporters while trying to guard against possible manipulation of electoral conditions. Rosales seems positioned to make a strong showing in the state held not too long ago by the opposition. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Abstention, not Rosales, Biggest Challenge for Chavez -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff visited Valencia, Carabobo November 24 to meet with representatives from President Chavez' and opposition challenger Manuel Rosales' campaigns. Carabobo is the fourth largest voting state, with over 1.2 million registered voters. It had been an opposition stronghold until the October 2004 regional election, when Retired General Luis Acosta Carlez from Chavez' Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) party narrowly beat incumbent Henrique Salas Feo (Proyecto Venezuela). Since then, Acosta has been a polarizing figure in the local MVR party, prompting the national leadership to temporarily take over the state chapter last year. Still, National Assembly (AN) Deputy and MVR Carabobo campaign coordinator Saul Ortega predicted to poloff that those problems would not keep them from meeting their goal of winning 60 percent of the state. ¶3. (C) Ortega said the MVR campaign in Carabobo has focused on a door-to-door campaign effort, which began with a diagnostic of the area in which volunteers visited homes to inquire who planned to vote and reasons why the others would not. This was followed by a separate visit in which supporters tried to sell the accomplishments of the Chavez administration and convince potential abstentionists to vote. Ortega claimed Chavez himself was closely supervising the campaign, calling volunteers to see if they had received his latest instructions. If not, he would reprimand the campaign coordinators. Nonetheless, Ortega said abstention, which he estimated would be about 30 percent, remained their biggest obstacle. When poloff mentioned concern about the fingerprint (digital scanning) machines as a deterrent to voting, Ortega responded that the machines were really in the opposition's best interest since they provided a check against Chavista parties sending people to vote twice. Still, he thought there was a chance that the National Electoral Council (CNE) might withdraw the machines at the last minute. -------------- Opposition Confident and Busy . . . -------------- ¶4. (C) The opposition was also optimistic about their chances for victory, but on guard. Former AN Deputy and Carabobo campaign manager for Rosales Gabriela Mayaudon told poloff all opposition parties were working well together. After Rosales' early November visit to the state, former Governors and Proyecto Venezuela leaders Henrique Salas Romer and (his son) Salas Feo, agreed to join the campaign and focus on getting out the vote. Mayaudon said they had not made the MVR's troubles in the state a campaign issue, preferring to focus instead on what Rosales has to offer. She was confident that they had recruited sufficient electoral monitors for all Carabobo voting tables, and training sessions for them with Sumate. ¶5. (C) Mayaudon told poloff they had recently discovered that witnesses who had signed against Chavez in the 2004 presidential recall referendum were given electoral credentials without the official CNE stamp. Concerned that the CNE would try to disqualify these witnesses for not having the correct seal, they were in the process of petitioning the CNE for a list of accredited observers to try to circumvent this potential problem. CARACAS 00003495 002.2 OF 002 -------------- . . .But Not Necessarily United in Same Goal -------------- ¶6. (C) Although they are supporting Rosales, in a separate meeting with poloff the Salases openly admitted to tying their political comeback to Rosales' candidacy. Salas Feo has made impromptu visits to produce markets, shopping centers, and popular street corners touting the security and social aspects of the opposition platform, and claims to have helped reduce the gap between Chavez and Rosales. Yet, he has also been touting the return of "El Pollo" (Salas' nickname). While they thought Rosales could win in a fair fight, the ex-governors thought the use of the fingerprint machines would discourage many people -- particularly government employees -- from voting. They also claimed to have information from a high-level DISIP insider that the result of the election had been predetermined giving Chavez 60-plus percent and Rosales less than 40 percent. ¶7. (C) The ex-governors saw three bleak scenarios for the opposition: a last minute postponement of the election, if it looked like Rosales could win; Rosales accepts defeat and tries to lead a loyal opposition; or Rosales accepts defeat and agrees to negotiations with the government. No matter what, the Salases maintained that Rosales could never acknowledge defeat, even in a fair fight, because opposition supporters would never accept it and Rosales would lose credibility with the opposition. In the end they thought the opposition, specifically left-wing opposition leaders like Teodoro Petkoff, would probably advocate negotiation with the government to preserve their own, fading positions. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The energy and diligence poloff observed at Rosales' campaign headquarters suggests he is making a serious effort to win votes in Carabobo. In fact, Rosales' campaign center appeared to be much busier than its Chavista counterpart down the street. Still, Chavez maintains the upper hand, as he controls the state's resources and at least some potential opposition voters could be dissuaded by the prospects that their vote may not be secret. BROWNFIELD