BARINAS STATE: OPPOSITION UNABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 003462

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: BARINAS STATE: OPPOSITION UNABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON
CHAVISTA DIVISIONS

REF: CARACAS 002845

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Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. President Chavez' campaign team announced
that Chavez will hold one of his last major campaign rallies
in his native state of Barinas. Chavez is an odds-on
favorite to carry the western plains state of Barinas, but he
is not running as strong as might be expected in a state
where his father is the sitting governor. Chavez' campaign
team has set a goal of securing the support of only 55
percent of Barinas voters. A rift between Chavez' brother (a
key state official) and the Barinas City mayor, both members
of the ruling Fifth Republic Movement (MVR),has weakened
local pro-government parties and voter frustration with local
officials' corruption and inability to deliver appears to be
increasing there. The opposition, however, has so far been
unable to capitalize on Chavez' vulnerability as it struggles
to rebound from past defeats. End Summary.

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Is this the Revolution?
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2. (C) President Chavez is set to hold his final campaign
rally in his home state of Barinas on November 25. Poloff
visited Barinas in late September and met with a variety of
government, opposition, civil society, and business leaders.
Chavez' father, Hugo de los Reyes Chavez, has been the
Governor of this central plains state since 2000. Barinas
industry includes some oil and gas production, livestock,
agriculture, and a nascent ecotourism sector. It has a high
unemployment rate, despite several ongoing construction
projects, including a new Eurobuilding hotel, three shopping
centers, and road projects in preparation for the 2007 Copa
America Soccer Tournament.


3. (C) Like in most of Venezuela, Barinas has a steadily
increasing crime rate, few prospects for job growth, and a
significant housing shortage that has prompted several
squatters' invasions. Marcos Garrido, President of the
Barinas municipal legislature, an MVR official, admitted to
poloff that there was no money for projects as everything was
controlled by either the Governor or the Barinas City Mayor.
Cooperative and consejo comunal leaders complained of the
difficulties and excessive red tape they encounter when
trying to obtain funding for projects or basic services, like
trash collection. Medical workers told poloff the hospital
system has steadily declined and that most people generally
found local clinics more reliable than the Barrio Adentro
medical missions. A retired teacher, now a Sumate leader,
also noted that the school system from primary schools to
Bolivarian universities was also in shambles.

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Chavismo Divided and Debilitated. . .
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4. (C) An ongoing feud between Chavez' brother, Argenis, who
is Secretary of State for the Barinas Governor, and Barinas
City Mayor Julio Cesar Reyes is undermining the popular
appeal of Chavismo in Barinas. This split has reverberated
through all local pro-government political organizations,
including the local branches of ruling coalition parties
Podemos and Patria Para Todos (PPT). Chavez and Reyes'
constant positioning for influence also shut out would-be
Podemos and PPT candidates in the 2005 local and legislative
elections, adding to general friction between the three
blocs. Most political leaders spend their time shuffling
between the two sides in search of personal benefits and
profiting from their elected positions.


5. (C) The competition and resulting opportunism of local
leaders has left much of the Chavista base disillusioned with
local party representatives. Moreover, Chavista leaders,
including PPT Barinas State Secretary Elizabeth Henriquez,
said there was not much enthusiasm for this year's campaign,
particularly compared to the 2004 recall referendum, partly
because of poor community leadership. Garrido agreed and
said it was increasingly difficult to recruit people for
pro-government marches not featuring Chavez himself.
Similarly, MVR barrio organizer and community council leader
Natalio Realza told poloff he has had difficulty recruiting
people for the "batallones" and "pelotones" of Chavez'

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campaign structure (Ref A). Most people, tired of empty
campaign promises and the municipal government's failure to
deliver basic needs to the barrio, have told him they won't
participate without some compensation, and he claimed he's
been given nothing to offer them.

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. . . but Chavez still Strong
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6. (C) Despite the disappointment, Chavez is expected to win
in Barinas, as most supporters appear to maintain faith in
the "Bolivarian revolution" and the prospects for change it
seems to represent. This sentiment was probably best
portrayed by Ines, an unlikely but die-hard upper middle
class Chavez activist. Squatters (encouraged by Chavez'
rhetoric) invaded part of her land, and students at a
Bolivarian university she attends have accused her of not
being loyal enough to the revolution. She ran for a
municipal council seat on the MVR ticket advocating social
development, and lost to another cohort who sponsored a
subsidized grocery mart ("mercal") on election day. Like
many, she admits to being fed up with the party's
increasingly radical bent and corruption in mid-level
leadership, but still clings to hope that conditions will
change. When asked about opposition challenger Manuel
Rosales, Chavez supporters said they sensed little difference
between him and past "Fourth Republic" or pre-Chavez
governments. Few were enticed by his "Mi Negra" debit card
program for distributing oil revenues.

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Opposition Frustrated, Fractured, and Resigned
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7. (C) Opposition contacts viewed Rosales' campaign as a good
springboard for them to rebuild in the future, but saw little
hope for December, partly because they are still struggling
to overcome their discredited past. During a roundtable
discussion with poloff, representatives from Copei, Accion
Democratica, Teodoro Petkoff's defunct campaign, and Movement
Toward Socialism noted widespread voter apathy, while a young
Primero Justicia leader blamed stale local leadership. One
participant interjected that the opposition "could plan all
they wanted to, but wouldn't be able to do anything until
Chavez was gone." Poloff asked what issues the parties had
honed in on to animate supporters, but received few
responses.


8. (C) The local head of Rosales' Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT)
party, who had recently converted from another opposition
party, said UNT had experienced steady growth in its first
few months in the state. Interestingly, he and the Zulian
leader of Rosales' campaign in Barinas quickly lost interest
in the roundtable meeting and abruptly left shortly after the
discussion started, suggesting a certain disunity among the
opposition. Poloff noted that a Rosales march a few days
before her visit had seemed pretty well attended, but someone
later claimed that former presidential pre-candidate Sergio
Omar "Cura" Calderon had bussed people in from nearby Tachira
State.


9. (C) Poloff found a little more hope among civil society
members. A Sumate representative told poloff the local
chapter was preparing to train opposition supporters as
polling station witnesses. A local minister, who is also a
labor leader, said many of his parishioners and fellow union
members were fed up with the government's failure to improve
infrastructure and living standards and have talked about
supporting Rosales. Still, all expected Chavez to carry the
state as people tend to vote with their stomachs and would be
loath to risk their government jobs, Mercals, and mission
benefits on a candidate they weren't sure would win.

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Business Sector Trying to Hold On
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10. (C) Poloff met separately with the Barinas Chamber of
Commerce (CoC) and Edith Mora, a representative from an
organization of small business owners. CoC President Rafael
Clarencio Gonzalez, an Argenis Chavez supporter, said
business was good. However, the private sector was
frustrated with the local government's economic policy,
specifically the lack of a development strategy, and

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concerned about the rapid growth of the informal sector
compared to the formal side. Gonzalez said the lack of a
sound court system, recent expropriations, and the missions
-- which he described as a disincentive to work -- were major
barriers to economic development. Gonzalez also said he had
repeatedly raised these issues with the Governor's office,
but his appeals had fallen on deaf ears. Separately, Mora
said most small business proprietors are scared of potential
retribution should they be caught supporting the opposition
and are thus keeping their heads down.

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USAID Having An Impact
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11. (C) In contrast to the opposition, a local USAID partner
has capitalized on the splits in Chavismo, incorporating
government and pro-Chavez party leaders into democracy
promotion programs. Most of the people poloff met with,
including Chavistas, were participants in these programs and
were grateful for the opportunity. Several had successfully
gone on to create their own NGOs, draft laws that were
eventually approved, or organize their communities to carry
out social impact projects. Chavez supporters also expressed
concern about radical Chavistas' attempts to expose their
programs and approved of USAID's attempts to conceal their
identities.

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Comment
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12. (C) Barinas voters' resilient faith in Chavez and his
revolution despite the state's steady economic, political,
and social decline, corruption, and concerns about Chavez'
radicalism suggests Rosales still faces a difficult task in
winning over the "Chavista-lite" voters needed to defeat
Chavez. Fear within the private sector and lack of political
direction among provincial opposition leaders is not helping
either. The complaints of Chavez supporters nevertheless
substantiate conventional wisdom that Chavez is not as
popular as he once was and offer a glimpse into issues that
could eventually erode Chavez' legitimacy. The Barinas
experience also shows the potential of USAID programs to
expose the shortfalls of the revolution and, if expanded
could, over time, cultivate new civil society leadership
essential to a vibrant and authentic Venezuelan democracy.
Post will deploy two officers to Barinas as part of its
informal election observation effort.

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