THE MILITARY'S INCREASINGLY RED ROLE IN THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 003448 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MARR VE SUBJECT: THE MILITARY'S INCREASINGLY RED ROLE IN THE ELECTION REF: A. CARACAS 3239 ¶B. CARACAS 3427 ¶C. IIR 6 902 0061 07 ¶D. TD-314/09338-06 CARACAS 00003448 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: A/POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON, REASAONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. President Chavez and his hand-picked military leaders are coordinating the armed forces' efforts to provide Election Day security in ways that are likely to intimidate some opposition voters. Under the auspices of "Plan Republica," the Venezuelan National Armed Forces (FAN) will mobilize 125,000 soldiers for the presidential elections on December 3, including a significant portion from the generally pro-Chavez Reserves. While BRV leaders assert that "Plan Republica" is designed to ensure security and assist with electoral logistics, Post understands that many of those deployed will wear red baseball caps and t-shirts under their uniforms (Note: Red is Chavez' campaign color). Consensus opposition candidate Manuel Rosales has been trying unsuccessfully since early November to meet with senior military leaders to prepare for a possible "transition" should he win an electoral upset. In the absence of such a meeting, Rosales continues to urge the military via his stump speeches to respect the "will of the people." End Summary. -------------- PLAN REPUBLICA -------------- ¶2. (C) The BRV plans to deploy over 125,000 soldiers on election day to ensure electoral security under the rubric of "Plan Republica". The upcoming presidential election marks the tenth occasion in which the Armed Forces have played a significant role in the Venezuelan electoral process, dating to 1986. "Plan Republica" is a three-stage process. The first, pre-electoral stage includes training, voting station preparations, and logistics, such as transporting the voting equipment. The second stage will cover election day as well as the days immediately before and after. During this stage, military workers will provide security at voting centers, starting on December 1, and will assist in the assembly of voting machines and the return of them to the National Electoral Council (CNE) following voting. Finally, in the days following the election, up to December 15, the military forces will assist in the shipment of voting materials to established depositories. ¶3. (C) CNE President Tibisay Lucena has said that the troops will not be allowed to review identity cards of voters before granting entry into to the polls, as has happened in the past. The EU exploratory observation mission told us that the CNE has pledged to post signs describing "Plan Republica" duties at the polls to inform voters, and that the CNE will be open to receive legitimate claims of abuses (Ref A). Furthermore, Lucena held a joint press conference with Defense Minister General Raul Baduel on November 16, in which both said that "Plan Republica" troops would not/not be authorized to coerce voters to submit to the fingerprinting (digital scanning) machines in Caracas and the eight states where they will be deployed. ¶4. (S/NF) According to government press accounts, the Ministry of Defense is expected to call on 18,900 reservists to supplement over 100,000 members of the armed forces to implement "Plan Republica." DAO estimates that there are far fewer than 100,000 soldiers on active duty, so the BRV will need to call on a considerably greater number of reservists to reach the stated goal of 125,000 soldiers. Military reservists are widely perceived to be generally pro-Chavez. Colonel (Army) Francisco Salcedo, commander of the Sixth Reserves Battalion, said November 18 that it remains to be seen whether the reserves will be armed with automatic rifles. Sensitive reporting indicates that Chavez has insisted that the reservists be so equipped on election day. Reservists did begin training exercises related to their election duties on November 18, including in some cases live fire target practice within earshot of some embassy residences. -------------- CARACAS 00003448 002.3 OF 003 RED - TOP TO BOTTOM - LITERALLY -------------- ¶5. (C) President Chavez has adopted the "rojo, rojito" ("red, very red") slogan as a campaign mantra in the wake of the leak of Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez's speech to PDVSA managers that they had better support Chavez's re-election or face dismissal. Chavez subsequently declared that the military is also "rojo, rojito," putting the military in a difficult position. The FAN is being pushed in two different directions with such a visible role in the election process. The Constitution demands military impartiality, but President Chavez openly demands unwavering -- and partisan -- loyalty. ¶6. (C) Defense Minister Baduel told the local media November 8 that the armed forces are patriotic and subordinate to political authority, but also an essentially "professional" institution. He emphasized that the Constitution prohibits the military from "participating in activities of proselytism or political militancy." Baduel made a call for "good sense," saying that it is not "healthy for the Armed Forces to engage in a political diatribe." Baduel also reportedly met with all colonels of the FAN and stressed that the FAN is apolitical and will not engage in politics for either side. Presidential Staff Member Admiral Luis Cabrera Aguirre, however, affirmed Chavez's statement, telling the media that all the organizations of the government, including the armed forces, need to be "rojo, rojito" because that is the color of the "Venezuelan revolution" (Ref B). ¶7. (C) The military's ostensible impartiality notwithstanding, DAO has interviewed military visa applicants wearing red t-shirts underneath their uniforms, a departure from the standard uniform that is identified with Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution. ONE DAO source indicated that soldiers would be instructed to wear red ball caps (not berets) and t-shirts under their duty uniforms on election day, the trademark color of the Chavez campaign. When ONE soldier pointed out to his supervisor that the caps and shirts were not part of official military regulations, he was rebuffed and told to follow orders. The same soldier also indicated that he was asked to play a role of a polling worker during a voting simulation and was told he would be asked to do the same on election day (Ref C). "Plan Republica" includes no element to allow for soldiers to function as polling station workers, and CNE regulations prohibit them from acting in that capacity. -------------- FRENTE FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) The BRV may tap the Frente Francisco de Miranda (FFM) youth movement to fill out its reserve forces. The FFM describes itself as a "disciplined, dynamic, and organized anti-imperialist force based on the fight to eradicate poverty in all of its manifestations and to achieve social equality in Venezuela." In reality, the FFM is a quasi-military, Chavez-affiliated youth movement, noted for serving as a political and military training school for radicalized Venezuelan youths seeking careers in the FAN, security services, or Chavez-sponsored political movements. Many youths have attended "ideological training" in Cuba. Thousands of the just-arrived Russian AK-103 rifles have reportedly been earmarked for FFM members. The FFM provided many of the workers the CNE employed as part of its 2006 voter registration drive (Ref D). -------------- ROSALES SNUBBED BY MILITARY HIGH COMMAND -------------- ¶9. (C) At a November 5 rally in Barquisimeto, Manuel Rosales made a seemingly innocuous request for a meeting with the BRV Military High Command, to discuss the possibility of preparing for a democratic "transition." BRV military officials promptly and publicly rebuffed Rosales. Defense Minister Baduel dismissed Rosales' request on November 7, saying that the FAN holds no such meetings on an individual basis. Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel said that Rosales's request "does not make any sense," but the final decision on such a meeting would rest with President Chavez. CARACAS 00003448 003.3 OF 003 The senior military commander in Zulia state, General Juan Vicente Paredes, announced November 7 that he would be open to a meeting with Rosales, or any other presidential candidate, but only to discuss "Plan Republica." ¶10. (C) Rosales continues to reach out to the military indirectly. In his stump speeches, Rosales habitually praises the institutional role of the military and urges the armed forces to respect -- and safeguard -- the "will of the people" in the upcoming presidential election. Rosales's advisors also tell us that they have had some "informal" contacts with unspecified military officers. Rosales's efforts to engage military leaders has successfully put Chavez on the defensive. Not only has the Chavez government declined such a meeting, but Chavez himself continues to try to tar Rosales's overtures to the military as part of an opposition "destabilization" plan (sic). -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The pressure on the military to abandon its constitutional obligation to remain apolitical and to conform to the new Chavista "rojo, rojito" mantra is yet another electoral advantage for Chavez (or conversely, another obstacle for the opposition). While Defense Minister Baduel appears to be playing the straight guy, proclaiming the professionalism and impartiality of the Armed Forces, it remains to be seen how dutiful his subordinates will be (to him and to the Constitution). "Plan Republica" ensures that the over 100,000 soldiers Chavez is trying to identify closely with his government will be in the middle of election day activity. It also ensure the presence of tens of thousands of more openly pro-Chavez reservists. To the extent that soldiers do wear Chavez's red campaign color on election day, the message to voters will be clear. Moreover, the soldiers themselves, acting in their capacities as "protectors" of the polls, may also feel inherent pressure to vote for Chavez. On the other hand, despite his disadvantages, Rosales's appeals to the military have typically been politically adept. BROWNFIELD