ELECTION RUMOR MILL IN HIGH GEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 003412

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL VE
SUBJECT: ELECTION RUMOR MILL IN HIGH GEAR

REF: CARACAS 003248

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. Venezuela, a country with a tradition of
conspiracy theories, is rife with election rumors. At least
five different major themes are circulating in the rumor mill
in Venezuela right now suggesting that President Chavez,
opposition candidate Manuel Rosales, or the military will
disrupt the electoral process with political violence or
coups. Rather than reassure Venezuelan voters, Chavez, his
supporters, and the government media are fueling rumors of
political instability in what appears to be a purposeful
effort to make voters fearful of political change. We note
that although a number of credible embassy contacts fear a
"November surprise," they generally do so based on
speculation about the "other guys," rather than based on
hard, inside sources. While we do not find any of these
rumors credible at this time, we convey them to underscore
that mutual recriminations and growing political tension
constitute a very real backdrop to the December 3
presidential election that favor the Chavez campaign. End
Summary.

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Opposition Takes to the Streets
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2. (C) Rumor Number One: Chavez, his supporters, and
government media outlets allege without presenting any
evidence that the opposition knows it cannot win the December
3 presidential election and therefore intends to disrupt the
electoral process through political violence. President
Chavez continues to warn of opposition "destabilization"
plans hatched in concert with the United States (Reftel).
Political leader of the militant pro-Chavez party Popular
Venezuelan Union Lina Ron alleged to reporters November 7
that the U.S. Embassy is hatching with the opposition an
election day plan ("Plan Hemoglobin") to commit widespread
election day violence (sic). The pro-government daily "Vea"
and Venezuela state television daily remind voters of the
confrontations associated with the short-lived 2002 coup and
the 2002-2003 national strike and issue general warnings of
U.S.-backed opposition "destabilization" plans (sic).


3. (C) This government-backed rumor conveniently reinforces
key Chavez campaign strategies. By continually repeating
that the U.S. and opposition are conspiring against a certain
Chavez electoral victory, Chavez and his supporters are
engaging in their tried-and-true tactic of seeking to
motivate Chavistas by alleging an artificial external enemy.
The rumor reinforces Chavez' campaign theme that he is
running against "President Bush and his lackeys" and not
consensus opposition candidate Manuel Rosales (sic).
Moreover, in an electoral climate in which potential Rosales
supporters or undecided voters fear reprisals for voting
against Chavez, this rumor strengthens their incentives to
abstain. The Chavez machine is working hard to link the
opposition to political instability in the public's mind and
make Venezuelan voters think long and hard before voting for
political change.

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Chavez Owns Rosales
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4. (C) Rumor Number Two: Some of our contacts genuinely
believe that Zulia governor Rosales is actually a Chavez
strawman to ensure that the opposition participates in the
December 3 presidential election and does not pull out at the
eleventh hour as it did in the December 2005 parliamentary
elections. According to this conspiracy theory, Chavez
pressed Rosales into the campaign to give the campaign
international legitimacy, but not to actually vie for power.
These contacts argue that Rosales has scrupulously avoided
criticizing Chavez personally before and during the campaign,
an observation distinctly at odds with reality. They also
believe it is suspicious that the National Electoral Council
(CNE) allowed Rosales to run for president without having to
relinquish his governorship in Zulia (he is on leave).

5 (C) In addition, some of our contacts also contend that the
government successfully intimidated Rosales with potential
charges related to the 2002 short-live coup and/or suspended
an investigation into alleged or fabricated corruption
charges related to his governorship. Adherents to this

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conspiracy theory perversely argue that Francisco Arias
Cardenas was a more vocal opponent of Chavez in the 2000
presidential election, but Chavez later selected him to be
the BRV's Ambassador to the United Nations, "proving" that
Chavez opponents actually can be Chavez allies. Proponents
of the "Chavez-owns-Rosales" theory tend to be hard-core
opposition abstentionists who are predisposed to criticize
not only the electoral process, but the main contenders.
They also tend to dismiss the extent to which Rosales has
mounted a credible campaign that is now bigger than the sum
of the opposition.


6. (C) Rumor Number Three: A variant of the
"Chavez-owns-Rosales" theory is that Chavez and Rosales will
conspire to force political clashes that will justify Chavez
suspending the electoral process and imposing a "socialist
revolution" on Venezuela. Adherents to this theory assert
without proof that the Chavez government's intention, with
the collusion of Rosales, is to identify key opposition
activists and round them up for political persecution or
"disappear" them. Proponents of this theory tend to be found
among people in the opposition who are certain that Chavez is
determined to impose his "Bolivarian revolution" by any means
possible. They believe Chavez favors ostensibly democratic
processes when convenient, but will support violent means, as
necessary.

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The Chavez Auto-Coup
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7. (C) Rumor Number Four: Some of our opposition contacts
believe Chavez has no intention of holding presidential
elections on December 3. According to this rumor, Chavez
realizes that he no longer enjoys the support of the majority
of Venezuelans and fears he would lose at the ballot box.
Adherents to this theory discount public opinion polls that
consistently show Chavez with at least a double-digit lead
over Rosales and insist that the "fear factor" skews polling
data in politically polarized Venezuela. Instead, they point
to Rosales' growing success in mobilizing mass rallies and
contrast those events with what they consider poor public
turn-outs for Chavez rallies. Chavez, they argue, has used
the electoral process only when he was certain that he could
win, but remains as hostile to the democratic process as he
was in 1992 when he led an attempted coup.


8. (C) Proponent of the "auto-coup" theory also argue that
Chavez and his supporters are purveying the opposition
"destabilization" rumors to justify preemptive measures
against the electoral process and prominent members of the
opposition. They argue that despite enjoying the support of
the entire National Assembly and having stacked the National
Electoral Council and judiciary, Chavez needs to implement a
dramatic "auto-coup" in order to impose socialism -- Chavez'
"next phase" of the Bolivarian revolution -- on Venezuela.
Chavez can ill afford to permit an electoral process go
forward, so this argument goes, if the election would concede
to the opposition a good chance to win, and failing that, a
real opportunity to demonstrate the depth and breadth of
opposition to Chavez. According to this theory, Chavez will
institute the "auto-coup" on or about November 20.

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A Military Coup
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9. (C) Rumor Number Five: Another unsubstantiated rumor
circulating in Caracas is that the military plans to launch a
coup against the Chavez government independently. Adherents
to this theory attribute varying motivations to the military
for toppling Chavez. Some argue that the military, while
loyal to Chavez' political program, are wary of Chavez'
accumulation of personal power and his stated intention to
govern until at least 2021. According to this conspiracy
theory, the military would move against Chavez with the
support of unspecified "Chavismo without Chavez" politicians
within the BRV. Others believe that key military leaders
will move against Chavez because they believe he is
undermining the military's ostensible independence and
excessively politicizing the armed forces.


10. (C) Our contacts who support this theory point to a range
of circumstantial factors to make their case. They remind
that Venezuela's most prominent political prisoner,
Confederation of Venezuelan Workers President Carlos Ortega,
managed to escape from a military prison in August. They

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believe the reaction of senior military officers to Chavez'
televised October 31 speech to them (Reftel) was
significantly cool and unresponsive. Others cite what they
believe to be seeds of military discontent with Chavez'
recent arms acquisitions and efforts to forge closer ties
with countries like Cuba, Iran, and Syria.

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Comment
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11. (C) Embassy has little evidence, credible or otherwise,
to support any of the aforementioned scenarios in which
President Chavez, opposition candidate Rosales, or the
military disrupt the electoral process. Some of them are
admittedly nutty. We note that election-related political
violence to date has been confined to periodic Chavista
rock-and-bottle attacks on Rosales campaign events, and such
attacks do not suggest that political violence is about to
spiral out of control. That said, the political polarization
plaguing Venezuela is palpable; you can't go anywhere in
Caracas without feeling or seeing evidence of it. The
election-related rumors are a genuine reflection of the
tremendous mistrust between Chavistas and the opposition.
Moreover, Venezuelans are understandably wary of Chavez'
history of bold -- and seemingly irrational -- political (and
extraconstitutional) moves based on twisted, internal
Bolivarian logic. So far, the Venezuelan rumor mill appears
to be helping Chavez more than Rosales. The
government-amplified rumors conveniently reinforce Chavez'
election strategies to motivate his supporters and intimidate
potential Rosales voters. Meanwhile, rumors among the
opposition tend to support abstentionism based on cynicism
toward Rosales or passivity based on wishful thinking about
the military.

BROWNFIELD