ELECTION RUMOR MILL IN HIGH GEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 003412 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL VE SUBJECT: ELECTION RUMOR MILL IN HIGH GEAR REF: CARACAS 003248 CARACAS 00003412 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Venezuela, a country with a tradition of conspiracy theories, is rife with election rumors. At least five different major themes are circulating in the rumor mill in Venezuela right now suggesting that President Chavez, opposition candidate Manuel Rosales, or the military will disrupt the electoral process with political violence or coups. Rather than reassure Venezuelan voters, Chavez, his supporters, and the government media are fueling rumors of political instability in what appears to be a purposeful effort to make voters fearful of political change. We note that although a number of credible embassy contacts fear a "November surprise," they generally do so based on speculation about the "other guys," rather than based on hard, inside sources. While we do not find any of these rumors credible at this time, we convey them to underscore that mutual recriminations and growing political tension constitute a very real backdrop to the December 3 presidential election that favor the Chavez campaign. End Summary. -------------- Opposition Takes to the Streets -------------- ¶2. (C) Rumor Number One: Chavez, his supporters, and government media outlets allege without presenting any evidence that the opposition knows it cannot win the December 3 presidential election and therefore intends to disrupt the electoral process through political violence. President Chavez continues to warn of opposition "destabilization" plans hatched in concert with the United States (Reftel). Political leader of the militant pro-Chavez party Popular Venezuelan Union Lina Ron alleged to reporters November 7 that the U.S. Embassy is hatching with the opposition an election day plan ("Plan Hemoglobin") to commit widespread election day violence (sic). The pro-government daily "Vea" and Venezuela state television daily remind voters of the confrontations associated with the short-lived 2002 coup and the 2002-2003 national strike and issue general warnings of U.S.-backed opposition "destabilization" plans (sic). ¶3. (C) This government-backed rumor conveniently reinforces key Chavez campaign strategies. By continually repeating that the U.S. and opposition are conspiring against a certain Chavez electoral victory, Chavez and his supporters are engaging in their tried-and-true tactic of seeking to motivate Chavistas by alleging an artificial external enemy. The rumor reinforces Chavez' campaign theme that he is running against "President Bush and his lackeys" and not consensus opposition candidate Manuel Rosales (sic). Moreover, in an electoral climate in which potential Rosales supporters or undecided voters fear reprisals for voting against Chavez, this rumor strengthens their incentives to abstain. The Chavez machine is working hard to link the opposition to political instability in the public's mind and make Venezuelan voters think long and hard before voting for political change. -------------- Chavez Owns Rosales -------------- ¶4. (C) Rumor Number Two: Some of our contacts genuinely believe that Zulia governor Rosales is actually a Chavez strawman to ensure that the opposition participates in the December 3 presidential election and does not pull out at the eleventh hour as it did in the December 2005 parliamentary elections. According to this conspiracy theory, Chavez pressed Rosales into the campaign to give the campaign international legitimacy, but not to actually vie for power. These contacts argue that Rosales has scrupulously avoided criticizing Chavez personally before and during the campaign, an observation distinctly at odds with reality. They also believe it is suspicious that the National Electoral Council (CNE) allowed Rosales to run for president without having to relinquish his governorship in Zulia (he is on leave). 5 (C) In addition, some of our contacts also contend that the government successfully intimidated Rosales with potential charges related to the 2002 short-live coup and/or suspended an investigation into alleged or fabricated corruption charges related to his governorship. Adherents to this CARACAS 00003412 002.2 OF 003 conspiracy theory perversely argue that Francisco Arias Cardenas was a more vocal opponent of Chavez in the 2000 presidential election, but Chavez later selected him to be the BRV's Ambassador to the United Nations, "proving" that Chavez opponents actually can be Chavez allies. Proponents of the "Chavez-owns-Rosales" theory tend to be hard-core opposition abstentionists who are predisposed to criticize not only the electoral process, but the main contenders. They also tend to dismiss the extent to which Rosales has mounted a credible campaign that is now bigger than the sum of the opposition. ¶6. (C) Rumor Number Three: A variant of the "Chavez-owns-Rosales" theory is that Chavez and Rosales will conspire to force political clashes that will justify Chavez suspending the electoral process and imposing a "socialist revolution" on Venezuela. Adherents to this theory assert without proof that the Chavez government's intention, with the collusion of Rosales, is to identify key opposition activists and round them up for political persecution or "disappear" them. Proponents of this theory tend to be found among people in the opposition who are certain that Chavez is determined to impose his "Bolivarian revolution" by any means possible. They believe Chavez favors ostensibly democratic processes when convenient, but will support violent means, as necessary. -------------- The Chavez Auto-Coup -------------- ¶7. (C) Rumor Number Four: Some of our opposition contacts believe Chavez has no intention of holding presidential elections on December 3. According to this rumor, Chavez realizes that he no longer enjoys the support of the majority of Venezuelans and fears he would lose at the ballot box. Adherents to this theory discount public opinion polls that consistently show Chavez with at least a double-digit lead over Rosales and insist that the "fear factor" skews polling data in politically polarized Venezuela. Instead, they point to Rosales' growing success in mobilizing mass rallies and contrast those events with what they consider poor public turn-outs for Chavez rallies. Chavez, they argue, has used the electoral process only when he was certain that he could win, but remains as hostile to the democratic process as he was in 1992 when he led an attempted coup. ¶8. (C) Proponent of the "auto-coup" theory also argue that Chavez and his supporters are purveying the opposition "destabilization" rumors to justify preemptive measures against the electoral process and prominent members of the opposition. They argue that despite enjoying the support of the entire National Assembly and having stacked the National Electoral Council and judiciary, Chavez needs to implement a dramatic "auto-coup" in order to impose socialism -- Chavez' "next phase" of the Bolivarian revolution -- on Venezuela. Chavez can ill afford to permit an electoral process go forward, so this argument goes, if the election would concede to the opposition a good chance to win, and failing that, a real opportunity to demonstrate the depth and breadth of opposition to Chavez. According to this theory, Chavez will institute the "auto-coup" on or about November 20. -------------- A Military Coup -------------- ¶9. (C) Rumor Number Five: Another unsubstantiated rumor circulating in Caracas is that the military plans to launch a coup against the Chavez government independently. Adherents to this theory attribute varying motivations to the military for toppling Chavez. Some argue that the military, while loyal to Chavez' political program, are wary of Chavez' accumulation of personal power and his stated intention to govern until at least 2021. According to this conspiracy theory, the military would move against Chavez with the support of unspecified "Chavismo without Chavez" politicians within the BRV. Others believe that key military leaders will move against Chavez because they believe he is undermining the military's ostensible independence and excessively politicizing the armed forces. ¶10. (C) Our contacts who support this theory point to a range of circumstantial factors to make their case. They remind that Venezuela's most prominent political prisoner, Confederation of Venezuelan Workers President Carlos Ortega, managed to escape from a military prison in August. They CARACAS 00003412 003.2 OF 003 believe the reaction of senior military officers to Chavez' televised October 31 speech to them (Reftel) was significantly cool and unresponsive. Others cite what they believe to be seeds of military discontent with Chavez' recent arms acquisitions and efforts to forge closer ties with countries like Cuba, Iran, and Syria. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Embassy has little evidence, credible or otherwise, to support any of the aforementioned scenarios in which President Chavez, opposition candidate Rosales, or the military disrupt the electoral process. Some of them are admittedly nutty. We note that election-related political violence to date has been confined to periodic Chavista rock-and-bottle attacks on Rosales campaign events, and such attacks do not suggest that political violence is about to spiral out of control. That said, the political polarization plaguing Venezuela is palpable; you can't go anywhere in Caracas without feeling or seeing evidence of it. The election-related rumors are a genuine reflection of the tremendous mistrust between Chavistas and the opposition. Moreover, Venezuelans are understandably wary of Chavez' history of bold -- and seemingly irrational -- political (and extraconstitutional) moves based on twisted, internal Bolivarian logic. So far, the Venezuelan rumor mill appears to be helping Chavez more than Rosales. The government-amplified rumors conveniently reinforce Chavez' election strategies to motivate his supporters and intimidate potential Rosales voters. Meanwhile, rumors among the opposition tend to support abstentionism based on cynicism toward Rosales or passivity based on wishful thinking about the military. BROWNFIELD