ROSALES CAMPAIGN ON THE MARCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 003319

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ELAB VE
SUBJECT: ROSALES CAMPAIGN ON THE MARCH

REF: CARACAS 003069

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. While he still faces an uphill struggle to
defeat President Chavez' electoral machine, consensus
opposition candidate Manuel Rosales continues to campaign
hard and intelligently. Rosales' November 4 city-wide
Caracas march attracted several hundred thousand participants
and his November 5 rally in Barquisimeto attracted dozens of
thousands, according to local press reports -- both
impressive turnouts. Rosales is also capitalizing on the
opposition's November 2 release of a video showing Energy
Minister Rafael Ramirez telling a large group of PDVSA
managers that they would be fired if they did not support
President Chavez' re-election. Rosales appears to be
generating additional -- and much-needed -- political
momentum going into the final month of the presidential
campaign. End Summary.

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"We Are 26 Million"
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2. (SBU) Opposition candidate Manuel Rosales led a massive
November 4 march through major Caracas neighborhoods.
Estimates range from 300,000 to 700,000 marchers; certainly
there were several hundred thousand participants. Marchers
embarked from both the eastern (richer) and western (poorer)
sections of the Venezuelan capital and converged several
hours later in the eastern working class neighborhood of
Petare. Rosales both walked and rode in an open vehicle
during the festive "26 Kilometers for 26 million Venezuelans"
rally. Countering President Chavez' goal of garnering 10
million votes, participants chanted Rosales' unifying
message: "No somos diez, Somos veinti-seis!" ("We aren't 10,
We're 26!"). Local municipalities assigned some 3000
personnel to provide security for the march and there were no
reports of political violence. Rosales' supporters did
complain that the Petare Metro was mysteriously closed at the
end of the march, however.


3. (C) Baruta Mayor Henrique Capriles Radonski, of the
opposition Primero Justicia party, told PolCouns November 6
that he was very satisfied with Rosales' November 4 Caracas
march and increasingly optimistic about Rosales' electoral
prospects. Capriles said he believed the march was even
bigger than Rosales' October 7 "Avalanche" rally in central
Caracas (Reftel) and gives the Rosales campaign some
political momentum. Capriles also asserted that Chavez'
campaign appearances in Caracas are generating surprisingly
small crowds. Referring to some recent public opinion polls
that show Rosales still trailing Chavez by 15 to 20
percentage points, Chacao Mayor Leopoldo Lopez told reporters
that the Caracas march reflects a "real poll."


4. (SBU) Rosales reportedly spoke to approximately 70,000 at
a November 5 rally in Barquisimeto, Lara State. During his
stump speech, Rosales pitched his debit card ("Mi Negra")
scheme for redistribution of oil revenues and announced a
plan to guarantee broader access to universities ("Instead of
wars, computers"). Countering Chavez' December 4 accusations
that the opposition is preparing a "destabilization"
campaign, Rosales said "we do not have cards up our sleeves,
but if (the government) commits fraud, we will activate a
plan to put people in the streets." Rosales also told the
crowd that he has solicited a meeting with senior military
officials to discuss the upcoming election and the
"transition" (should he win).

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Appealing to Government Workers
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5. (SBU) Gerardo Blyde, a prominent Primero Justicia
politician on Rosales' central campaign committee, released
to the press on November 3 a video of Minister of Energy and
Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez, taken surreptitiously, telling a
large audience of state oil company PDVSA managers that the
"new PDVSA must be "red (i.e., pro-Chavez) from top to
bottom." Noting that PDVSA employees need to do "all that we
can" for "maximum leader of the revolution" Chavez, Ramirez
said that if anyone felt uncomfortable with that policy, then
that employee should give up his or her position to a
"bolivarian."


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6. (SBU) The Rosales campaign has forwarded the video to the
National Electoral Council and is asking that Ramirez be
sanctioned for politicizing PDVSA and using his position to
advance Chavez' re-election campaign. Blyde is also
preparing a complaint for the Attorney General's office.
Remarkably -- given this red-handed violation of legal and
constitutional prohibitions against politicizing state
employees -- President Chavez actually endorsed Ramirez'
intervention with the PDVSA workers, and called on him to
repeat it.


7. (SBU) On the margins of the November 4 Caracas march,
Rosales assured Venezuela's government workers that should he
be elected, he would issue a "no dismissal" order to protect
public employees and replace only the political leadership of
government ministries. Rosales reiterated the promise during
his November 5 campaign speech in Barquisimeto. He also
pledged to reinitiate a dialogue with unions to improve
working conditions and to address the ongoing problem of
collective bargaining agreements awaiting government approval
in both the public and private sectors.

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Comment
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8. (C) Rosales has been running a smart and credible
campaign, but even his campaign team privately concedes that
he has not yet reached an electoral "tipping point" against
President Chavez and his well-financed electoral machine.
Nevertheless, Rosales' and his team's ability to mobilize
impressively large numbers of supporters could help persuade
many potential Rosales supporters to vote on December 3,
rather than abstain. In addition, the Rosales' campaign team
believes that Rosales' growing "street power," combined with
an elaborate opposition ballot-watching program, is needed to
try to deter the Chavez government from committing electoral
fraud. While they are understandably loathe to discuss
defeat scenarios, Rosales' supporters also anticipate that
the Zulia governor's growing "street power" could serve as a
potential foundation for a more effective, country-wide
democratic opposition and a "brake" against Chavez, should
the Venezuelan president, as expected, win re-election.

BROWNFIELD