UNSC DEFEAT: CHAVEZ TRYING TO SAVE FACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 003318

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV VE
SUBJECT: UNSC DEFEAT: CHAVEZ TRYING TO SAVE FACE

REF: A. CARACAS 003257

B. CARACAS 003238

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. After publicly predicting that Venezuela
would definitely win a rotational seat on the UN Security
Council, President Chavez has been forced to backtrack
systematically as Venezuela subsequently lost 46 (and tied
one) UNGA ballots to Guatemala. Chavez and BRV officials are
lamely spinning the compromise to support "free and
Bolivarian" Panama as a consensus UNSC candidate as a "moral
victory" over the United States. The defeat is widely
perceived in Venezuela as a significant setback to Chavez'
anti-U.S. activism and a reproach to his September 20 UNGA
personal attack on President Bush. Unaccustomed to political
failure, Chavez is now even more likely to make changes in
senior foreign positions should he, as he likely will, win
re-election on December 3. From our vantage point, Venezuela
enjoys good relations with Panama without exercising undue
influence there. End Summary.

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BRV Does Damage Control
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2. (C) President Chavez made securing a two-year rotational
seat on the UN Security Council his foremost foreign policy
priority in 2006. Chavez personally supervised Venezuela's
efforts to secure the seat, traveling extensively and
engaging in dollar diplomacy around the globe in 2006 to
promote Venezuela's candidacy (Ref A). Prior to the first
day of UNGA balloting, Chavez (over)confidently told the
media that Venezuela had the support of over two-thirds of
the General Assembly and was going to the Security Council
with its "bayonets ready." Venezuela's resounding defeat in
the first round of UNGA balloting on October 16 and similar
defeats in all but one of the subsequent 46 rounds of
balloting forced Chavez and senior BRV foreign policy
officials to redefine "success" in characteristic Bolivarian
fashion.


3. (C) From the beginning, Chavez said Venezuela was
competing against the United States (sic),not Guatemala, and
he infamously railed against President Bush and U.S. foreign
policy during his unbalanced September 20 UNGA stump speech.
In that vein, Venezuelan officials initially reacted to
defeat in the first days of UNGA voting first by accusing the
United States of engaging in "blackmail" and "arm-twisting"
to muster support for Guatemala. Using typically martial
terminology notably out of place at the world's premier
diplomatic forum, Chavez pledged to compete for the UNSC seat
until "the end of the battle" and called on BRV officials to
"dig in and fix bayonets" to prepare for "hand-to-hand
combat." Spurring initial calls to withdraw or find a
consensus candidate, Chavez "ordered" Foreign Minister Maduro
and UN Ambassador Arias Cardenas to continue to promote
Venezuela's candidacy even after it was obvious that
Venezuela could not win.


4. (C) When Venezuela began to take international heat for
its obstinance, the BRV tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a
solution very much in its favor. Maduro first made an
October 24 "offer" everyone could refuse: Venezuela would
withdraw if Guatemala withdrew first, the U.S. apologized for
its lobbying efforts, and further discussions would be made
more "transparent." On October 26, Chavez recognized
publicly for the first time that it would be "difficult" for
Venezuela to win the UNSC seat, and he said he would accept
Bolivia as an alternative candidate. The BRV also endorsed
the possible selection of the Dominican Republic. When
Bolivia and the Dominican Republic did not emerge as viable
consensus candidates, Chavez sought to persuade Guatemala to
split the two-year rotation, according to Chief of Staff to
the Vice President Rene Arreaza (Ref B).


5. (C) Venezuela's decision to support Panama as a consensus
candidate thus follows a long string of ill-fated and
unrealistic BRV diplomatic efforts. After predicting a
victory that it could not deliver, Chavez and other BRV
officials insisted that they achieved a "moral victory" by
preventing the United States from "imposing" Guatemala onto
the UNSC. "The United States failed in its objective of
humiliating Venezuela," Chavez told the media on November 3.
Maduro told reporters November 2 that "sooner or later we are
going to break the hegemony of the empire." The BRV's

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face-saving spin also asserts that Venezuela enjoyed the
support of the majority of countries in the Latin American
and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) as well as from countries
representing over two-thirds of the world's population (China
supported Venezuela).

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Opposition Takes Aim
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6. (C) Consensus opposition presidential candidate Manuel
Rosales told the media October 16 that Venezuela's defeat on
the first day of UNGA balloting was "punishment for the
government's Castro-communist policies." In his stump
speeches, Rosales continues to criticize Chavez' foreign aid
initiatives, contrasting Chavez' largesse overseas with
unaddressed needs at home. Rosales and his foreign policy
advisors are also careful to frame the UNSC vote as a defeat
for Chavez and not the Venezuelan people in order to counter
government accusations that they are somehow celebrating
Venezuela's loss. They note that Venezuela had no difficulty
in winning a rotational seat on the Security Council four
separate times under previous governments. Media criticism
of Chavez' ad hominem theatrics at the UNGA also increased in
the wake of Venezuela's defeat at the UN.

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Heads Will Roll
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7. (C) It is not clear whether Chavez' premature claims of
victory simply reflected his characteristic bluster or
whether he was ill advised by Foreign Minister Maduro and
other senior BRV officials. Chavez was noticeably and
atypically silent after Venezuela lost successive ballots
during the first few days of UNGA balloting, and he was slow
to welcome the selection of Panama publicly. VP Chief of
Staff Arreaza told the Ambassador and DCM October 27 that
Chavez is likely to expel Foreign Minister Maduro and his
team of Vice Ministers back to the National Assembly
(although Vice Minister Valero could be tapped to be Foreign
Minister) should Chavez win re-election on December 3.
Arreaza also suggested that Chavez would tap UN PermRep Arias
Cardenas for an unspecified ministerial post, despite the
fact that former military officer Arias came back from this
campaign on his shield, rather than carrying it. Former
Foreign Minister Roy Chaderton, who was dispatched to New
York to assist with the UNSC campaign, is rumored to be in
the running as a possible new PermRep.

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Enter Panama
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8. (C) The Venezuelan government is also trying to assert
that Panama will be predisposed to oppose U.S. policy on the
Security Council. The pro-government daily "Vea" ran a
November 3 half-page ad claiming that "free and Bolivarian"
(sic) Panama will be vigilant "against the Bush government's
interests" on the UNSC. Venezuela enjoys good relations with
Panama, but from our vantage point, does not appear to
exercise exceptional influence there. Chavez visited Panama
in June 2006 and offered to build a USD 400 million oil
refinery there capable of processing 130,000 barrels a day.
According to a former long-time Venezuelan Ambassador to
Panama, Chavez put political conditions on the offer, and
Panama rejected it. Venezuela has reportedly offered to
contribute to the expansion of the Panama Canal, but like
many BRV aid offers, it remains to be seen whether the BRV
would actually deliver.

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Comment
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9. (C) Venezuela's unsuccessful effort to secure a UNSC seat
is a significant setback for Chavez's anti-American foreign
policy and denies him the UN platform and international
stature he covets so much. FM Maduro claims that the BRV
learned many "lessons" in the race, but unfortunately Chavez
or other BRV officials are not likely to accept the reality
that their own extremism, especially Chavez' September 20
UNGA speech, undermined their UNSC campaign. Nevertheless,
Chavez' decision to settle on Panama as a consensus candidate
is illustrative of the extent to which the BRV will
eventually cave when confronted by firm and united
opposition.

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10 (C) The domestic damage to Chavez is likely to be more
limited in an electorate far more concerned with pressing
domestic issues. Chavez' defeat at the UN, however, is
another significant political defeat that directly undermines
Chavez' personal credibility and leadership. One political
columnist called it a "cold shower" for the Venezuelan
president and his inner circle. Chavez' confident
predictions that he will easily win the December 3
presidential election, although more grounded in reality, may
ring a little more hollow in the wake of his misplaced
confidence that Venezuela would win a UNSC seat.

BROWNFIELD