UNSC DEFEAT: CHAVEZ TRYING TO SAVE FACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 003318 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV VE SUBJECT: UNSC DEFEAT: CHAVEZ TRYING TO SAVE FACE REF: A. CARACAS 003257 ¶B. CARACAS 003238 CARACAS 00003318 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. After publicly predicting that Venezuela would definitely win a rotational seat on the UN Security Council, President Chavez has been forced to backtrack systematically as Venezuela subsequently lost 46 (and tied one) UNGA ballots to Guatemala. Chavez and BRV officials are lamely spinning the compromise to support "free and Bolivarian" Panama as a consensus UNSC candidate as a "moral victory" over the United States. The defeat is widely perceived in Venezuela as a significant setback to Chavez' anti-U.S. activism and a reproach to his September 20 UNGA personal attack on President Bush. Unaccustomed to political failure, Chavez is now even more likely to make changes in senior foreign positions should he, as he likely will, win re-election on December 3. From our vantage point, Venezuela enjoys good relations with Panama without exercising undue influence there. End Summary. -------------- BRV Does Damage Control -------------- ¶2. (C) President Chavez made securing a two-year rotational seat on the UN Security Council his foremost foreign policy priority in 2006. Chavez personally supervised Venezuela's efforts to secure the seat, traveling extensively and engaging in dollar diplomacy around the globe in 2006 to promote Venezuela's candidacy (Ref A). Prior to the first day of UNGA balloting, Chavez (over)confidently told the media that Venezuela had the support of over two-thirds of the General Assembly and was going to the Security Council with its "bayonets ready." Venezuela's resounding defeat in the first round of UNGA balloting on October 16 and similar defeats in all but one of the subsequent 46 rounds of balloting forced Chavez and senior BRV foreign policy officials to redefine "success" in characteristic Bolivarian fashion. ¶3. (C) From the beginning, Chavez said Venezuela was competing against the United States (sic),not Guatemala, and he infamously railed against President Bush and U.S. foreign policy during his unbalanced September 20 UNGA stump speech. In that vein, Venezuelan officials initially reacted to defeat in the first days of UNGA voting first by accusing the United States of engaging in "blackmail" and "arm-twisting" to muster support for Guatemala. Using typically martial terminology notably out of place at the world's premier diplomatic forum, Chavez pledged to compete for the UNSC seat until "the end of the battle" and called on BRV officials to "dig in and fix bayonets" to prepare for "hand-to-hand combat." Spurring initial calls to withdraw or find a consensus candidate, Chavez "ordered" Foreign Minister Maduro and UN Ambassador Arias Cardenas to continue to promote Venezuela's candidacy even after it was obvious that Venezuela could not win. ¶4. (C) When Venezuela began to take international heat for its obstinance, the BRV tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a solution very much in its favor. Maduro first made an October 24 "offer" everyone could refuse: Venezuela would withdraw if Guatemala withdrew first, the U.S. apologized for its lobbying efforts, and further discussions would be made more "transparent." On October 26, Chavez recognized publicly for the first time that it would be "difficult" for Venezuela to win the UNSC seat, and he said he would accept Bolivia as an alternative candidate. The BRV also endorsed the possible selection of the Dominican Republic. When Bolivia and the Dominican Republic did not emerge as viable consensus candidates, Chavez sought to persuade Guatemala to split the two-year rotation, according to Chief of Staff to the Vice President Rene Arreaza (Ref B). ¶5. (C) Venezuela's decision to support Panama as a consensus candidate thus follows a long string of ill-fated and unrealistic BRV diplomatic efforts. After predicting a victory that it could not deliver, Chavez and other BRV officials insisted that they achieved a "moral victory" by preventing the United States from "imposing" Guatemala onto the UNSC. "The United States failed in its objective of humiliating Venezuela," Chavez told the media on November 3. Maduro told reporters November 2 that "sooner or later we are going to break the hegemony of the empire." The BRV's CARACAS 00003318 002.2 OF 003 face-saving spin also asserts that Venezuela enjoyed the support of the majority of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) as well as from countries representing over two-thirds of the world's population (China supported Venezuela). -------------- Opposition Takes Aim -------------- ¶6. (C) Consensus opposition presidential candidate Manuel Rosales told the media October 16 that Venezuela's defeat on the first day of UNGA balloting was "punishment for the government's Castro-communist policies." In his stump speeches, Rosales continues to criticize Chavez' foreign aid initiatives, contrasting Chavez' largesse overseas with unaddressed needs at home. Rosales and his foreign policy advisors are also careful to frame the UNSC vote as a defeat for Chavez and not the Venezuelan people in order to counter government accusations that they are somehow celebrating Venezuela's loss. They note that Venezuela had no difficulty in winning a rotational seat on the Security Council four separate times under previous governments. Media criticism of Chavez' ad hominem theatrics at the UNGA also increased in the wake of Venezuela's defeat at the UN. -------------- Heads Will Roll -------------- ¶7. (C) It is not clear whether Chavez' premature claims of victory simply reflected his characteristic bluster or whether he was ill advised by Foreign Minister Maduro and other senior BRV officials. Chavez was noticeably and atypically silent after Venezuela lost successive ballots during the first few days of UNGA balloting, and he was slow to welcome the selection of Panama publicly. VP Chief of Staff Arreaza told the Ambassador and DCM October 27 that Chavez is likely to expel Foreign Minister Maduro and his team of Vice Ministers back to the National Assembly (although Vice Minister Valero could be tapped to be Foreign Minister) should Chavez win re-election on December 3. Arreaza also suggested that Chavez would tap UN PermRep Arias Cardenas for an unspecified ministerial post, despite the fact that former military officer Arias came back from this campaign on his shield, rather than carrying it. Former Foreign Minister Roy Chaderton, who was dispatched to New York to assist with the UNSC campaign, is rumored to be in the running as a possible new PermRep. -------------- Enter Panama -------------- ¶8. (C) The Venezuelan government is also trying to assert that Panama will be predisposed to oppose U.S. policy on the Security Council. The pro-government daily "Vea" ran a November 3 half-page ad claiming that "free and Bolivarian" (sic) Panama will be vigilant "against the Bush government's interests" on the UNSC. Venezuela enjoys good relations with Panama, but from our vantage point, does not appear to exercise exceptional influence there. Chavez visited Panama in June 2006 and offered to build a USD 400 million oil refinery there capable of processing 130,000 barrels a day. According to a former long-time Venezuelan Ambassador to Panama, Chavez put political conditions on the offer, and Panama rejected it. Venezuela has reportedly offered to contribute to the expansion of the Panama Canal, but like many BRV aid offers, it remains to be seen whether the BRV would actually deliver. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Venezuela's unsuccessful effort to secure a UNSC seat is a significant setback for Chavez's anti-American foreign policy and denies him the UN platform and international stature he covets so much. FM Maduro claims that the BRV learned many "lessons" in the race, but unfortunately Chavez or other BRV officials are not likely to accept the reality that their own extremism, especially Chavez' September 20 UNGA speech, undermined their UNSC campaign. Nevertheless, Chavez' decision to settle on Panama as a consensus candidate is illustrative of the extent to which the BRV will eventually cave when confronted by firm and united opposition. CARACAS 00003318 003.2 OF 003 10 (C) The domestic damage to Chavez is likely to be more limited in an electorate far more concerned with pressing domestic issues. Chavez' defeat at the UN, however, is another significant political defeat that directly undermines Chavez' personal credibility and leadership. One political columnist called it a "cold shower" for the Venezuelan president and his inner circle. Chavez' confident predictions that he will easily win the December 3 presidential election, although more grounded in reality, may ring a little more hollow in the wake of his misplaced confidence that Venezuela would win a UNSC seat. BROWNFIELD