ROSALES ADVISOR: "WE'RE PULLING EVEN"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 003214

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OIT (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL VE
SUBJECT: ROSALES ADVISOR: "WE'RE PULLING EVEN"

REF: CARACAS 003175

CARACAS 00003214 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary. Angel Emiro Vera, close advisor to consensus
opposition candidate Manuel Rosales, told the DCM October 24
that the Rosales campaign is gaining momentum and could
defeat President Chavez in a free and fair election. The
Rosales campaign is focused on trying to win the December 3
presidential election and has not yet developed a political
strategy for dealing with potential defeat. At the same
time, Vera and other opposition activists conceded that at
this point the campaign can mount poll watching teams in only
two-thirds of polling stations. Moreover, the campaign's
get-out-the-vote phone tree is projected to reach less than
one-third of the electorate. Interestingly, Vera reported
that resident Cuban officials have approached the Rosales
campaign to clarify what Rosales' policy would be toward the
tens of thousands of Cubans participating in the BRV's social
programs, should he win. Despite considerable electoral
disadvantages, the Rosales campaign continues to make a
credible and determined effort to upset Chavez at the polls.
End Summary.


2. (SBU) DCM and Poloff met October 24 with key Rosales
advisor Angel Emiro Vera (reftel) at a private breakfast
hosted by former CNE Director and opposition activist Alberto
Lopez Oliver. Vera and Oliver were joined by three other
Rosales supporters: former Sucre Governor Ivan Esquerre
Izaguirre, electoral conditions adviser Roberto Chang, and
political broker Daniel Thimann.

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Opposition Upbeat
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3. (C) Angel Emiro Vera expressed confidence that the Rosales
campaign is gaining ground with President Chavez' re-election
campaign. Vera stressed that support for Rosales grows by as
much as 12 percent in polls that allow respondents to
register their preference confidentially. He said support
for Rosales now exceeds 40% of registered voters and insisted
that, given the margin of polling error, Rosales is "pulling
even" with Chavez. Vera, Oliver, and Esquerre discounted
other recent polls that gave Chavez a considerable lead.
They said the "fear factor" skewed polling results in Chavez'
favor and alleged that some local polling firms have been
"bought" by the Chavez campaign.


4. (C) Vera said the Rosales campaign will continue to focus
on issues, not electoral conditions. The Rosales camp
believes the CNE will eventually announce the withdrawal of
the controversial fingerprint (digital scanning) machines due
to an inability to deploy a sufficient number to voting
stations. Vera said the campaign believes the CNE has only
5000 fingerprint machines ready to go and will be in a
position to cover only about 40% of polling stations by
December 3. Asked about Rosales' October 23 public challenge
to debate Chavez "anytime, anywhere," Vera said the Rosales
camp did not expect Chavez to accept, but does hope to score
political points as a result of Chavez' refusal.

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Preparing for Election Day
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5. (C) Vera reported that Rosales' campaign will work closely
with electoral NGO Sumate to train party election observers.
He said the Rosales campaign currently could cover only about
two-thirds of all polling stations with campaign observation
teams, each made up of three volunteers. The Rosales
campaign's "One-to-Ten" voter mobilization program gives
campaign volunteers responsibility for reaching out to at
least ten registered voters. The goal of this Rosales phone
tree is to engage at least 4.5 million registered voters (a
little over 25% of the electorate) before December 3. So
far, the phone tree has reached approximately 1.7 million
voters.


6. (C) Asked about the campaign's relationship with the
military, Vera replied that the Rosales campaign has no
formal institutional contact with the armed forces, but does
maintain informal contacts with military officials. Rosales
will continue to issue public appeals to the military to
"fulfill their constitutional duties" in ensuring that
electoral results are respected. In addition, the Rosales

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campaign intends to send volunteers to polling stations to
apply public pressure on election officials to render a
transparent accounting of local results. The Rosales camp is
also contracting polling firms to provide exit polling data
on election day and plans to share that information with
independent media.


7. (C) Oliver said the Rosales campaign is in close touch
with the European Union regarding its prospective electoral
observation mission (EOM) and aware of the CNE's efforts to
try to impose unacceptable conditions on international
observers. He and Esquerre expressed concern that
international observers would be unable to detect
sophisticated electronic fraud. Based on previous
experience, the opposition has little confidence in the
willingness of an OAS EOM to confront Chavez and mistrusts
the Carter Center. Vera said the Rosales campaign is
actively trying to recruit a few hundred volunteers from
other Latin American countries, such as Mexico and Peru, to
reinforce the Rosales campaign's observation efforts.
Rosales will meet OAS SecGen in Caracas on October 26.

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The Day After Election Day
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8. (C) Vera and the other opposition activists made clear
that they are still focusing on trying to win the
presidential election. They scrupulously avoided the specter
of defeat and did not raise any "Plan B" strategy for
opposing Chavez. Vera noted that prior to running for
president, Rosales had resisted the idea of trying to extend
the political reach of his Un Nuevo Tiempo ("A New Time")
party beyond his home state of Zulia. Noting that he
retained good contacts among Chavistas from his previous
experience in the National Assembly, Vera said he anticipated
meeting with members of the Chavez campaign soon in an effort
to promote democratic "coexistence."

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Cubans Hedging Their Bets
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9. (C) Vera reported that unspecified Cuban government
representatives have approached the Rosales campaign to
ascertain what policy a Rosales government would put in place
regarding the tens of thousands of Cubans working on
Venezuelan social "missions" and in other government jobs.
Vera said the Rosales campaign continues to debate internally
how to handle these social "missions." On the stump, Rosales
continues to say he would open these programs up to all
eligible participants (not just Chavez supporters) as well as
make them more effective. Vera said some Rosales campaign
advisors believe that Rosales' tacit endorsement of Chavez'
"misiones" is undermining Rosales' ability to project himself
as a distinct alternative to Chavez. Oliver said that after
a Rosales victory, many Cubans might wish to leave Venezuela.
In that event, a Rosales government would be disposed to
deal with the Cubans "democratically," including facilitating
their voluntary resettlement to third countries.

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Comment
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10. (C) The Rosales campaign has gained political ground and
for the first time is actually forcing President Chavez to
react. Nevertheless, Venezuela's opposition still faces an
extremely difficult challenge to convert its current
political base into an actual electoral majority. Opposition
bravado aside, we understand from other campaign sources that
Rosales has tasked his advisors to put together scenario
papers in the next two weeks that recommend strategies for
dealing with many potential outcomes, including three defeat
possibilities: a Chavez landslide, a narrow loss, a
fraudulent Chavez victory. To encourage opposition voter
turn-out, Rosales is wisely focusing his campaign on issues
and deliberately downplaying electoral conditions that
strongly favor Chavez. At some point, however, the Rosales
campaign must try to address the very uneven electoral
playing field on which they are competing (septel).

BROWNFIELD