CHAVEZ ANNOUNCES INTENTION TO CREATE A SINGLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 003068

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ ANNOUNCES INTENTION TO CREATE A SINGLE
REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

REF: CARACAS 003038

CARACAS 00003068 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. During his September 9 campaign rally in
Caracas, President Chavez announced his intention to hold a
party conference in early 2007 to create a unified
revolutionary party. Chavez has reiterated the need for such
a single party at more recent campaign events. Leaders of
parties allied to Chavez' Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) party
publicly welcomed the surprise announcement, but privately
are criticizing the idea. Most local observers believe that
should Chavez win the December 3 presidential election as
expected, smaller coalition parties, already marginalized to
a considerable degree by Chavez, will have little choice but
to accept merging into a single pro-government party.
Opposition leaders warn that Chavez' long-term intention is
to create a one-party political system along Cuban lines.
End Summary.

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One Single Revolutionary Party
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2. (SBU) Addressing a Caracas crowd of over 200,000 at a
September 9 campaign rally, President Chavez chided his
supporters for continued squabbling among and between
pro-government parties and announced his intention to hold a
party congress in early 2007 to form a single revolutionary
party. Urging his followers to work together, he asked that
they focus first on securing his victory in the December 3
presidential election. During the same speech, Chavez also
announced his intention to amend the constitution so that he
could run for a third term, or more. More recently, Chavez
told an October 1 campaign rally in Barinas State that he
planned to lead a second phase of the Bolivarian revolution
starting on February 2, 2007, until at least 2021.


3. (SBU) During an October 3 rally, Chavez blamed President
Lula's failure to secure an absolute majority of votes in the
first round of balloting in Brazil on competition from
third-party candidates. He then reiterated the need to
establish "a more solid union" among the MVR and its
coalition partners." Chavez has avoided providing any
further details and remarked that even the name of such a
party is still to be determined. Pro-Chavez columnists are
filling the void via the government news agency "apporea."
These columnists have suggested, among other ideas, that a
single party must "convert Chavistas into revolutionaries"
and bring together the persons with the "greatest social
conscience" to "elevate the social consciousness" of all
other Venezuelans. Chavistas are also preparing "ideological
conferences" to "homogenize revolutionary thought."

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Minor Coalition Parties Squirming
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4. (C) A wide spectrum of minor pro-government parties, from
Patria Para Todos to Podemos to the Communist Party, quickly
welcomed Chavez' proposal to create a single revolutionary
party in 2007. Monagas Governor Jose Greogorio Briceno,
leader of his own pro-government "My Cat" party, told the
media September 11 that he is in "full accord" with forming a
single revolutionary party and claimed that he suggested the
idea to Chavez in 2004. At the same time, minor parties put
down markers that this idea needed much more discussion and
debate. Patra Para Todos Secretary General Jose Albornoz,
for example, told a September 11 press conference that Chavez
"proposed a single party, but did not decree it."


5. (C) Privately, Chavez' allies have been much more critical
of the idea of forging a single revolutionary party. The PPT
Chairperson in Barinas State, Elizabeth Henriquez, told
poloff September 27 that she believes the creation of one
pro-Chavez party would make the Bolivarian revolution far too
dependent on Chavez. PPT Secretary General Albornoz told
PolCouns September 26 that he considers the idea
"undemocratic" and "unworkable" (reftel). He added Podemos
Secretary General Ismael Garcia also shares Albornoz's views

SIPDIS
and opposes the idea. Albornoz said Chavez took to heart
Fidel Castro's advice that he needs to form a single
revolutionary party to ensure the continuity of the
Bolivarian revolution. According to Albornoz, Chavez intends
to set up a unitary party structure along Cuban lines.

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Already Diminishing Influence
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6. (C) MVR's coalition partners attained disproportionate
representation in the National Assembly as a result of the
opposition's boycott of the December 2005 parliamentary
elections. To date, they have neither demonstrated the will
nor the ability to flex independent muscle within the Chavez
administration. Local political observers believe that if
Chavez vigorously pursues the creation of a single
revolutionary party in 2007, none of his coalition partners
will be able or even willing to try to stop that process, and
instead, will readily fall in line. PPT Secretary General
Albornoz and Podemos Secretary General Ismael Garcia have
burnished their MVR credentials in 2006 by leading the
National Assembly's investigation of electoral NGO Sumate and
sponsoring the anti-NGO law, respectively.


7. (SBU) MVR has 115 National Assembly seats in the 165-seat
unicameral legislature; Podemos has only 18 seats, the PPT 9,
and the Communist Party 7, with the rest divided among small
regional pro-Chavez parties. PPT and Podemos are reportedly
considering merging, presumably as a means to give them more
leverage with the MVR. The MVR overwhelmingly dominates
Chavez' re-election central committees and list of state
coordinators. MVR also dominates Chavez' cabinet. Education
Minister Aristbulo Isturiz Almeida, Labor Minister Ricardo
Durado, and Light Industry and Commerce Minister Maria
Cristina Iglesias hail from the PPT are among the few non-MVR
cabinet members. Venezuela's Ambassador to the United
States, Bernardo Alvarez, is also a PPT member.

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Moving Toward a One-Party System?
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8. (SBU) Opposition politicians are understandably concerned
that Chavez' ultimate intention is to move Venezuela toward a
one-party political system, eliminating not just his
coalition partners, but the numerous opposition parties as
well. In a September 11 "Tal Cual" editorial, former
presidential candidate Teodoro Petkoff called the single
revolutionary party idea the "waiting room" for a
single-party political system. He predicted that Chavistas
will eventually argue that a single revolutionary party best
represents the nation's interests and categorize opposition
parties as "Trojan horses of imperialism" that must be
outlawed. Interestingly, during a September 21 speech to
Chavistas, National Assembly President Cilia Flores
reportedly underscored the need to attribute "constitutional
rank" to a reconstituted (but as yet undefined) "popular
power" branch of government.


9. (C) Citing Chavez' rhetoric in which the Venezuelan
president consistently claims to be the sole voice of the
"people," and demonizes his political opponents as
"oligarchs," "pawns of the Empire," and "the squalid ones",
opposition activists argue that Chavez is already preparing
the justification for excluding the meaningful political
participation of opposition parties. Former OAS Ambassador
Virginia Contreras told PolCouns that Chavez would eventually
try to institute new candidate nominating procedures akin to
those in place in Cuba. She predicted that Chavez would not
outlaw opposition parties, but rather Bolivarian popular
councils would be given exclusive nominating authorities. In
her view, opposition candidates would not be banned, they
would just never be able to get on a ballot.

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Comment
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10. (C) Although he has kept his plans for instituting
"Socialism in the 21st Century" deliberately vague, Chavez'
determination to forge a single revolutionary party in 2007,
at this stage, appears serious and attainable. Some of his
coalition partners may balk, but like other Chavez allies in
the past, they will likely be confronted with a
take-it-or-leave it proposition after some pro forma
discussion. The extent to which Chavez can subsequently take
aim against Venezuela's opposition parties will depend in
large part on consensus opposition candidate Manuel Rosales'
showing in the December 3 election and the opposition's
ability, absent winning a major electoral upset, to stay

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together and mobilize after another electoral defeat. In
that sense, the Rosales candidacy is more than a long-shot
electoral challenge. It may also prove to be a bellwether of
the long-term future of Venezuela's already attenuated
democracy.

BROWNFIELD