CHAVEZ CAMPAIGN TACTICS: MORE VIOLENCE, MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 003018

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2021
TAGS: PGOV ELAB VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ CAMPAIGN TACTICS: MORE VIOLENCE, MORE
INTIMIDATION

REF: CARACAS 002827

CARACAS 00003018 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. President Chavez and his supporters continue
to use coercive tools in the run-up to the December 3
presidential election. Chavistas attacked consensus
opposition candidate Rosales' campaign events three times in
the last two weeks of September, in addition to two
previously reported attacks earlier in September (Reftel).
The Chavez campaign continues to dismiss complaints of
electoral violence and is countering with spurious
accusations that the United States is trying to overthrow
Chavez and the opposition is preparing "street agitation."
The politicization of BRV public ministries also continues.
According to a former employee, the Labor Ministry pressured
employees to vote last December and has been using ministry
programs designed to assist undocumented workers to co-opt
and incorporate new pro-Chavez voters instead. End Summary.

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More Election Violence
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2. (SBU) Consensus opposition candidate Manuel Rosales was
forced to suspend his campaign march in the Urdaneta
municipality in Valles del Tuy, Miranda State (not far from
Caracas) on September 16 after small groups of Chavez
supporters threw rocks and debris at his car caravan.
Rosales' campaign coordinator in Urdaneta told the media that
municipal employees and policemen were among the group of 50
persons who launched the attack on the Rosales march. On
September 19, a small group of Chavistas threw debris at
Rosales supporters outside the Carapita Metro station in
Caracas, prompting Rosales to accuse the BRV publicly of
trying to "sabotage" his campaign activities.


3. (SBU) In addition, Chavez supporters on September 30
struck a Globovision reporter covering Rosales' campaign in
Valera, Trujillo State and forced the reporter to surrender
her videotape, according to reporters on the scene. A small
group of Chavistas appeared ready to lash out at Rosales and
his supporters as they drove through the poor Cantarrana
neighborhood of Valera, but waited instead to attack members
of the press corps at the end of the car caravan. The
Chavistas reportedly damaged, but failed to take, the
Globovision press truck. Rosales' October 7 "Avalanche"
rally in central Caracas will be the next big test of his
ability to campaign freely (poloffs will monitor from a safe
distance).

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BRV Dismisses Incidents
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4. (SBU) The BRV continues to dismiss and discount Chavista
electoral violence. After the September 16 and 19 incidents
of electoral violence, President Chavez suggested that
Rosales was "provoking" the attacks by visiting poor barrios,
where support for Chavez has traditionally been strongest.
The pro-government daily "Vea" also ran an apologist
editorial on the heels of those incidents, arguing that
confrontation is inevitable when taking on "American
imperialism" and the "oligarchy subordinate to imperialism
(sic)". The Vea editorial states that at some times the
Bolivarian revolution is waged by "peaceful and electoral
struggles" and at other times, it can assume "violent forms,
such as military intervention and armed struggle."


5. (SBU) At the same time, the Chavez campaign is
counterattacking with spurious accusations. During his
October 1 campaign rally in Santa Ines de Barinas, Chavez
alleged that President Bush gave an order to overthrow or
assassinate him before 2008. He also told the media that a
Zulian policeman had planned to assassinate him during his
September 29 visit to Maracaibo, but was thwarted and yet
somehow fled to Colombia. At an October 2 press conference,
Hector Navarro, a member of Chavez's national campaign
committee, accused Rosales of planning to withdraw from the
presidential race in order to launch widespread "street
agitation" with unspecified, but "important," sectors of
society.

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Politicization of the Labor Ministry

CARACAS 00003018 002.2 OF 002


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6. (C) EU Election Observer Mission local contractor Ismary
Trejo told poloff October 2 that she left her Labor Ministry
job earlier this year after experiencing first hand what she
considered the excessive politicization within the ministry.
She noted that she was working on Labor Ministry programs to
assist undocumented workers in Venezuela, but said more
senior officials re-focused the program to assist illegal
immigrants to obtain Venezuelan nationality in exchange for
their political support for Chavez. She said the Labor
Ministry was organizing the beneficiaries of its national ID
and citizenship programs into pro-Chavez groups.


7. (C) Trejo also noted that ministry employees were asked to
show the indelible voting ink on their fingers after they
voted in the December 2005 parliamentary elections. Trejo
said the clear implication to all ministry employees was that
their jobs at the time depended on voting, and not heeding
the opposition's eleventh hour appeal to voters to abstain to
protest electoral conditions. Trejo also commented that
there were four "domestic spies" placed in the ministry who
tried to gauge employees' political leanings. She said these
four special employees all had offices, but did not have any
real line responsibilities within the ministry and were only
know by their nicknames.

BROWNFIELD