THE CHAVEZ CAMPAIGN: VICTORY, AT ANY COST?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 002845

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO AID/OTI (PORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM VE
SUBJECT: THE CHAVEZ CAMPAIGN: VICTORY, AT ANY COST?

REF: A. CARACAS 002685

B. CARACAS 002620

C. CARACAS 002827

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Classified By: COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ROBERT DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. President Hugo Chavez' re-election campaign
is a disturbing mix of retrograde authoritarian tactics and
creeping totalitarian tendencies. Chavez and his close
campaign team exercise tight control over a formidable,
country-wide grassroots electoral organization and an
administration that conflates public spending with
electioneering. At his September 9 mass rally in Caracas,
Chavez exhorted over 200,000 militants to deliver at the
polls -- or else. Consistently stressing a divisive,
confrontational campaign message, Chavez insists that he is
not running against surging opposition candidate Manuel
Rosales, but rather against President Bush and "lackeys" of
the American "empire" and "Venezuelan oligarchy." He and his
supporters also continue to deflect, re-direct, or distract
public attention from the opposition's discussion of the
Chavez administration's failings and its credible concerns
about the electoral system. Chavez' control over the CNE
also affords him an insurance policy against an opposition
victory, but it remains to be seen to what extent Chavez will
cheat or steal. Backed by so many electoral advantages,
Chavez appears to be already looking beyond December 3 and
laying the ground work for the accumulation of even more
personal power. End Summary.

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Control - We Have Your Phone Number
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2. (C) President Chavez is, for all intents and purposes, the
Chavez campaign. He is also his own campaign manager who is
directing his electoral efforts through mass rallies,
country-wide barnstorming, and extended television
appearances, including his weekly "Alo Presidente" program.
At the same time, Chavez also exercises direct control over a
small, central re-election committee consisting of ten
national coordinators and one campaign leader for all 24
states, most of them members of the National Assembly. He
named his "Miranda Campaign" team (named for the "precursor"
to Simon Bolivar's liberation campaign) on August 17 and has
charged them not just with securing victory on December 3,
but preparing the ground for the next phase of the Bolivarian
revolution (2007-2021).


3. (C) Francisco Ameliach Orta, perhaps Chavez' closest
supporter in the National Assembly, is Chavez' campaign
"boss." The bald-headed, barrel-chested 40-year-old former
Army major Ameliach has an impeccable Bolivarian resume:
participant in the failed 1992 coup, President of the
National Assembly from 2003 to 2005, and National Coordinator
of Chavez's Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) since 2002. Former
National Assembly Second Vice President Pedro Miguel Carreno
Escobar, also a participant in the failed 1992 coup attempt,
is campaign director for organization and propaganda. Prior
to being named the campaign's national liaison to unions,
Deputy Franciso Torrealba told POLOFF that he skipped
representing Venezuela at an international labor conference
in South Africa to avoid missing the chance to be on the
central campaign committee. "If I am not in Caracas and
waiting," Torrealba said, "the President could easily just
pick someone else."


4. (C) The ability of Chavez and his closest supporters to
organize grassroots cells throughout Venezuela gives him a
tremendous advantage in the upcoming presidential election.
At a September 9 campaign rally in Caracas, Chavez
administered an "oath of allegiance" to over 200,000 local
campaign leaders. PolCouns spoke informally with a number of
bused-in attendees who politely confirmed their commitment to
the Chavez campaign (as well as interest in the festive
atmosphere and free lunches and t-shirts). Chavez claimed at
the rally to have established over 11,000 "battalions," one
for each Venezuelan voting center. Each "battalion" consists
of six persons: an overall leader as well as persons
responsible for security, logistics, movements of voters, the
electoral list, and control. In addition, Chavez asserted
that these "battalions" are reinforced by over 44,000
"squadrons" consisting of the same six local positions.


5. (C) At the September 9 rally, Chavez dwelled on the

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responsibilities of the local leaders -- and the supervision
of their work. Exhorting the Chavista volunteers to work
"day and night," he noted that he and other party leaders
"have your telephone number" and plan to call local leaders
for campaign reports. To underscore this point, Chavez
called on stage and spoke via speaker phone with a number of
"battalion" and "squadron" leaders, ostensibly chosen at
random. Referring to circumstances that could hinder voting
(e.g. illness, travel),Chavez placed responsibility on the
newly sworn-in local leaders to ensure the 4 million
militants he claims to have registered, as well as an equal
number of "sympathizers," go to the polls -- no matter what!

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Confront - My Country or Death
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6. (C) Chavez has made "Patria o Muerte" confrontation the
strategic and ideological basis for his re-election. He
divides Venezuelans -- and the world -- into us versus them
(Ref A) and creates imagined enemies and threats to combat.
Instead of a seven-year incumbent Goliath who possesses
considerable advantages in the upcoming election, Chavez
depicts himself as a David standing up to the "American
Empire." Chavez and his supporters claim that Chavez is
running not against Rosales, but against President Bush (whom
he usually refers to as "Mr Danger," or more recently, "Mr
Diablo."). Chavez' stump speeches regularly stress Chavez'
commitment to protect Venezuela from "re-colonization" by the
United States (sic).


7. (C) Chavez scrupulously avoids referring to consensus
opposition candidate Rosales by name, instead insisting that
he is running against U.S. "lackeys" and "pawns of the
Venezuelan oligarchy." Chavez has left it to others in his
camp to attack Rosales directly. Although MVR leaders were
ostensibly embarrassed by Caracas Metropolitan Mayor Juan
Barreto's invective-filled August 22 tirade against two
opposition mayors at a public meeting (Ref B),Barreto's
verbal assault on the "putrid middle class" was consistent
with Chavez' electoral strategy of pitting the "have nots"
against the "haves." Barreto's threat to expropriate private
golf courses in Caracas to make way for public housing also
conveniently distracted public attention away from Rosales,
and from Chavez' own inability to grapple with the serious
housing shortage in Caracas.


8. (C) Chavez' weaves an electoral argument that purposefully
looks beyond the presidential election, denying in a
back-handed way the possibility that Rosales could defeat him
at the polls. By this Bolivarian logic, the coming months
are not about choosing the best candidate to address
Venezuela's many political, economic, and social problems,
but rather consolidating the "revolution." Already early in
the campaign, Chavez has publicly highlighted ambitious
priorities for 2007: amending the Constitution, to permit
another, perhaps indefinite, re-election, as well as the
holding of a party conference to merge the MVR and its
coalition partners into a single "revolutionary" party
(Septel).


9. (C) Chavistas have also resorted to electoral violence
(Ref C). Chavistas pelted Rosales campaign marches with
stones September 5 in the state of Vargas and September 7 in
the poor Catia neighborhood of Caracas. According to members
of the Rosales campaign team, the National Guard and police
did not act to prevent either attack, and were complicit in
Catia. MVR Deputy and Chavez' Campaign Director in Maracaibo
Calixto Ortega told PolCouns September 8 that such attacks
are a "shame," but nonchalantly predicted more electoral
violence, particularly in Caracas. Cardinal Urosa Sabina
issued a September 10 public plea that such violence stop.

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Counterattack - It's Them, Not Us
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10. (C) Chavez' campaign team has been particularly adept --
as well as bald-faced and brazen -- at deflecting,
re-directing, and distracting attention from the opposition's
electoral conditions complaints. After opposition leaders
complained that Chavez is using government resources and
media in support of his re-election campaign, Ameliach filed
formal complaints August 28 with the National Electoral
Council (CNE) accusing Rosales of using Zulia state funds for
his campaign and of exceeding the allowable limit of TV air

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time. State media beginning-to-end coverage of Chavez'
hours-long September 1 and September 7 Caracas campaign
rallies aside, state regulators have begun a formal
investigation of Globovision for allegedly focusing too much
attention on Rosales. After Rosales held a press conference
to denounce the two separate Chavista attacks on his rallies,
pro-government daily "Vea" attributed the attacks to
"incitements" by the Rosales campaign and adeco
abstentionists.


11. (C) Chavistas discount the political importance on the
presence of tens of thousands of Cuban health and education
professionals engaged in "social missions" in Venezuela.
Instead, Chavistas routinely criticize the opposition for
meeting with U.S. embassy officials and receiving U.S.
support (sic). "Vea" exploited both Rosales' and Benjamin
Rausseo's visits to Miami in early September to reassert
Chavista anti-American conspiracy theories. The BRV
continues to exploit its own fabricated friction with the
United States over the diplomatic baggage search and seizure.
National Assembly Deputy and head of the Assembly's Foreign
Policy Commission Saul Ortega told the media September 7 that
he suspected that cargo contained arms, explosives, and cash
for opposition campaigns (sic).

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Co-opt - Spend Now, Spend Later
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12. (C) Awash with oil revenues, Chavez manages enormous
government resources with a notable lack of transparency. He
has at his disposable a ready war chest to finance everything
from populist give-aways to campaign ads and events (Ref A).
Election year government spending is already well under way:
government spending in June 2006 jumped a staggering 97
percent over the same period in June 2005, according to the
Central Bank. January to June spending in 2006 grew by 83.5
percent compared to the same period last year. In what
appears to be a well-timed campaign move, the BRV announced
the pay out on September 6 of overdue pension payments to
over 200,000 Venezuelans at a total expenditure of $125
million (the government printed the identity numbers of all
the recipients in a daily newspaper insert). The BRV is
reportedly also considering reducing the 14 percent
value-added sales tax prior to the election.


13. (C) The BRV also continues to make little, if any,
distinction between public administration and the Chavez
campaign. Chavez relies on government resources, including
the military, to bus his militants to mass rallies. The same
has to be expected when it comes to moving his supporters to
the polls on December 3. So far in 2006, spending on "social
missions" is reportedly eight times what the BRV budgeted
for. Government-owned media outlets are essentially
extensions of Chavez' campaign team. And government
employees, including from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
have formed Chavista banner-waving groups visibly linking
their government offices to the Chavez campaign.

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Cheat - As Necessary
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14. (C) Chavez' domination, and politicization, of the
National Electoral Council (CNE),is his electoral insurance
policy. The fully one-half of the Venezuelan electorate who
distrust the CNE are suspicious with good reason. Chavez'
control over four out of five voting members of this
nominally independent body provides him with an opportunity
to make Rosales' uphill campaign even more difficult in the
run-up to December 3. The big unknown is the extent to which
Chavez will rely -- or feel compelled to rely -- to secure
the electoral "knock-out" he is promising his supporters.


15. (C) Electoral problems already abound. The CNE's
preliminary ruling to retain digital fingerprinting as part
of the voting process casts considerable public doubt on the
secrecy of the ballot and could deter an appreciable number
of potential Rosales voters. Moreover, it is widely believed
that Chavez has the ability to manipulate electoral results.
The CNE's reluctance to match any more than about half of all
paper receipts with voting results reinforces this concern.
Moreover, the CNE will soon announce that there are now well
over 16 million registered voters in Venezuela, a
considerable increase over the number of registered voters in
less than one year. There has not been, nor is there time

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enough for, a comprehensive, independent audit of the
electoral rolls.

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Comment
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16. (C) Despite so many advantages, Chavez is not entirely
invincible electorally. Chavistas and opposition pollsters
alike believe Chavez can count on approximately 30-35 percent
of the electorate as "core" voters, but he still needs to woo
(or coerce) around 20 percent or so of the electorate to
secure victory on December 3 (and more if he is going to
claim a "knock-out"). Two members of Chavez's re-election
campaign conceded to us that their biggest electoral fear is
abstentionism among likely Chavez voters (the "Chavez lite")
and the neither/nor ("ni-ni") voters. One Chavista
strategist noted that even during the referendum,
abstentionism reached 35 percent. Pro-government daily "Vea"
regularly urges Chavistas to avoid "triumphalism" and
stresses getting out the Chavista vote. One reason the
Chavista camp fears a low voter turnout is because it would
undermine the international acceptance of a Chavez victory,
as it did in the December 2005 parliamentary elections.
Moreover, Chavez needs a big, convincing win in order to
undertake the constitutional reforms he is reportedly
planning. It is not surprising then that Rosales has been
greeted with violence during recent campaign stops in
traditional Chavez strongholds.


17. (C) Moreover, Chavez' divisive "anti-Empire" campaign
message does not necessarily resonate with an electorate
which, according to the polls, is more concerned about
domestic issues and is favorably disposed to improving
relations with the United States. Chavez still possesses an
extraordinary charismatic, popular touch, but the more he
radicalizes his campaign, and the more time he devotes to
foreign adventures, instead of domestic problems, the more he
may be perceived as "out of touch" by Venezuelan voters. His
great strength has been his ability to organize, intimidate,
and co-opt voters, but after seven years in office, voters
are also more likely to demand results, and not just
promises. This is still Chavez' election to win or lose (or
steal). Nevertheless, the opposition has a real opportunity
to demonstrate nationally and internationally that Chavez
represents only roughly half of a deeply divided and
polarized electorate and that at least forty percent or more
of Venezuelans stand ready to try to safeguard democracy
against Chavez' increasingly radical Bolivarian revolution.

BROWNFIELD