Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CARACAS259
2006-02-02 14:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

PRIMERO JUSTICA STRUGGLING TO STAY TOGETHER

Tags:  PGOV KDEM VE 
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VZCZCXRO0496
PP RUEHAO
DE RUEHCV #0259/01 0331440
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021440Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2995
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 5920
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 5126
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0366
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0983
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0015
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 1597
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 9800
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 1291
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0411
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 0926
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0315
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1669
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 0767
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 3232
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0784
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0558
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 0261
RUEHMI/USOFFICE FRC FT LAUDERDALE PRIORITY 2787
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0437
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000259 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
FRC FT LAUDERDALE FOR CLAMBERT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: PRIMERO JUSTICA STRUGGLING TO STAY TOGETHER

REF: A. CARACAS 00113

B. 05 CARACAS 02603

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)

---------
Summary
---------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000259 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER FRC FT LAUDERDALE FOR CLAMBERT E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: PRIMERO JUSTICA STRUGGLING TO STAY TOGETHER REF: A. CARACAS 00113 ¶B. 05 CARACAS 02603 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) A long-brewing rivalry is threatening to weaken Primero Justicia (PJ) as Secretary General Gerardo Blyde and Chacao Mayor Leopoldo Lopez fight party president and presidential candidate Julio Borges and Baruta Mayor Henrique Caprilles for control of the party. To keep the party together, PJ is focused on preparations for the December 3 presidential elections, including by working for a primary to select an opposition candidate. PJ is also developing substantive campaign issues, and seeking negotiations with President Hugo Chavez to improve electoral transparency. While PJ still has a ways to go, it has the potential to eventually become a significant opposition force, if it can weather its current storm. End Summary. -------------- Hang Together or Hang Separately -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 27, poloff met with Primero Justicia (PJ) Secretary General Gerardo Blyde to discuss rumors that an SIPDIS ongoing power struggle among PJ leaders--Blyde and Chacao Mayor Leopoldo Lopez against party president and presidential candidate Julio Borges and Baruta Mayor Henrique Caprilles--may lead to a split in the party (refs a and b). Tensions reached their height in the runup to the December 4 legislative election when, after bitter debate, the party decided to withdraw from the race. The decision angered Borges, who was concerned the withdrawal would damage his presidential campaign. He broke from the party's decision to boycott the election and voted, then, out of revenge, forced abstention advocates and former legislators Liliana Hernandez and Ramon Jose Medina off the PJ board of directors. Toward the end of December PJ announced plans to hold internal elections and tension was again renewed, this time over whether to hold a direct vote of party members or indirectly via delegates. The indirect option won by one vote, which was cast by Borges. ¶3. (C) Blyde admitted that he and Borges had not privately spoken for a month. Still, he emphasized that both sides recognized they could not survive
on their own and therefore neither have yet considered leaving the party. According to Blyde, Borges' group favors indirect elections because they only have a fraction of rank and file support. Blyde has proposed to Borges that Borges not run for party president in the election that will probably be held in mid-March, and focus on his candidacy in exchange for keeping a seat on PJ's board of directors. Blyde also plans to officially give up his post, but will retain power behind the scenes and position himself as a vice presidential candidate for either the 2006 or 2012 election. Lopez is Blyde,s choice to replace him as SecGen, while Borges, is former legislator Carlos Ocariz. At a minimum, Blyde expects Borges to rethink the decision to hold indirect elections due to pressure he has received from PJ's international partners, such as Spain's Partido Popular and Mexico,s National Action Party, whose Secretary General reportedly stopped in Caracas on his way back from Chile last week to convince Borges to change CARACAS 00000259 002 OF 003 his mind. ¶4. (C) PJ is also scheduled to hold a party conference in mid-April to fine-tune its ideological direction. Blyde downplayed any serious ideological differences within PJ--adding to our impression that the current conflict is personality based--and thought the event would lead to a more centrist party. He described current internal debates as policy differences. For example, Lopez believes PDVSA should be privatized, while Borges believes it should remain state-owned. -------------- Focus on December 3 -------------- ¶5. (C) To maintain unity, PJ is focusing on the one thing all can agree on: the December 3 presidential elections. In mid-January Borges initiated his fifth nationwide campaign tour in six months. Blyde has continued PJ's attacks on government policies, recently criticizing President Chavez for giving over USD 16 billion to other countries--a third of which went to Cuba alone--while the country's infrastructure decays. Blyde has spoken to several possible high profile presidential contenders, such as Teodoro Petkoff, Manuel Rosales, and Henrique Salas Feo, about forming a ticket with PJ. The party, in addition to the NGO Sumate, has also proposed holding a primary to choose an opposition candidate. ¶6. (C) During a breakfast meeting with the DCM on January 31, Hernandez, Ocariz, Medina, and Blyde explained that the opposition could beat Chavez if it unified and developed a plan. They were surprised and encouraged by the strong turnout for the January 23 march, but thought the opposition was risking supporters' patience by calling too many marches. The PJ leaders acknowledged that none of the other potential candidates want a primary, but Hernandez thought it was essential to providing a sole leader around which opposition supporters could rally. In addition, Medina and Ocariz said that a primary, using manual voting and domestic observers, would be the best way to contrast their transparent process with the chicanery of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and thereby build expectations among the electorate for a clean election. -------------- Talks with Chavez on the Horizon? -------------- ¶7. (C) Blyde told poloff that PJ approached Caracas Archbishop Jorge Urosa and the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference (CEV) about mediating talks between the government and the opposition on reforming the electoral system. President Chavez agreed to the proposed mediation during his January 25 meting with Urosa, according to Blyde. While Blyd did not think the government would change the CNE,the party planned to ask for the publication ofthe electoral registry with addresses, a manual ount of all paper voting receipts, and Chavez' pomise not to abuse state funds or "cadena" broadast privileges. Chavez reportedly wanted to add ther topics, but PJ is conditioning future talks o the success of the first discussion and the govrnment's ability to abide by any agreement that omes from it. Blyde is optimistic about securin a compromise because he thinks Chavez realizes tat he needs opposition participation to legitimie his victory and the electoral system. Separatel, Medina told the DCM that international support particularly CARACAS 00000259 003 OF 003 from the OAS and EU, was also necessary to persuade the government to abide by electoral laws. Now that Chavez is tentatively on board, Blyde is trying to convince Accion Democratica (AD) to participate to avoid the perception that PJ is selling out to Chavismo. Once AD accepts, they will ask other opposition parties, Blyde said. (Comment: AD is wary of PJ,s potential to overtake it as the single largest opposition force and may decline the invitation to prevent the initiative from succeeding.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) PJ is making a strong effort to overcome the intense rivalry of its leaders. Despite its internal troubles, it is trying to think ahead to the presidential race, where the issues of voter confidence and transparency remain key. Unfortunately, it is not finding much cooperation from other opposition groups. A primary, if respected, may be a good first step to establishing the credibility of an opposition candidate and exciting voters. That candidate is unlikely to be the uncharismatic Borges. The party is suffering a serious leadership crisis that, in worst case, could sink the party. Still, PJ has several young capable leaders and that potential appears to be drawing more international attention and assistance, particularly from Spain and possibly the EU. BROWNFIELD

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