Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CARACAS2527
2006-08-23 20:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

HUGO CASTRO?: THE TORCH PASSING VIEWED FROM

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM VE 
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VZCZCXRO9101
PP RUEHAG
DE RUEHCV #2527/01 2352040
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 232040Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5972
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0980
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 0618
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0953
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0468
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 002527 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM VE
SUBJECT: HUGO CASTRO?: THE TORCH PASSING VIEWED FROM
VENEZUELA (NOT VENECUBA, YET)

REF: A. HAVANA 016136


B. CARACAS 002367

CARACAS 00002527 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DAN LAWTON,
REASONS 1.4 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 002527 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM VE SUBJECT: HUGO CASTRO?: THE TORCH PASSING VIEWED FROM VENEZUELA (NOT VENECUBA, YET) REF: A. HAVANA 016136 ¶B. CARACAS 002367 CARACAS 00002527 001.3 OF 002 Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DAN LAWTON, REASONS 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. The media images of President Chavez's August 13 visit with the ailing Fidel Castro have received wide press play in Venezuela. For many Venezuelans, they confirmed that Chavez aspires to succeed Fidel as the leader of the international socialist movement. Key Embassy contacts believe Chavez will make keeping a hard-line government in Cuba a self-preserving priority. These same contacts also believe that when Castro dies, Chavez will lose a vital mentor and crisis manager. While also clearly intended to intimidate his domestic opponents, the "passing of the torch" images may provide Venezuela's opposition with even more incentive to manage their internal differences. The bedside Chavez-Castro meeting has also provided post with valuable opportunities to disseminate the USG's post-Castro transition policy message. End Summary. -------------- Pictures Worth Ten Million Words... -------------- ¶2. (C) The Cuban state media images of President Hugo Chavez's August 13 bedside visit with Fidel Castro (Ref A) received wide distribution and comment throughout the Venezuelan media over the last several days. The pictures have been widely interpreted in Venezuela as visual confirmation that President Chavez is posturing to succeed the ailing Castro as the leader of the international socialist movement. The images are charged with blunt, symbolic meaning in support of the idea that Castro has anointed Chavez to be his heir apparent on the world stage. ¶3. (C) Local attention has focused particularly on the pictures of: -- Chavez standing next to a portrait of a young Castro, showing a direct linkage between the two; -- A smiling Raul Castro looking on appears to be blessing the passing of the torch; -- Fidel clad in Chavez's trademark red shirt (complete with interlocking Venezuelan and Cuban flags); -- Both leaders grasping Chavez's 80th birthday gift to Castro - an ivory-sheathed dagger that reportedly belonged to Simon Bolivar. ¶4. (SBU) Chavez's bedside visit with Castro h
as provided an ideal opportunity to underscore the U.S. message on a post-Castro transition. Charge' hosted an August 16 lunch for senior journalists and former Venezuelan Ambassador to the UN Milos Alcalay to reinforce with key opinion-makers our support for a future of freedom for Cuba that will be defined by the Cuban people, as well as our willingness to provide humanitarian assistance to a democratic transition government. Alcalay is arranging a follow-on August 25 discussion with other well-informed and influential Venezuelans interested in Venezuela's relationship with Cuba. -------------- ...But Not Necessarily Votes -------------- ¶5. (C) The Castro-Chavez images from Havana have reinforced the opposition's worst fears that Chavez intends to steer his government in an even more radical direction after securing victory in the upcoming December 3 presidential elections. To many, they have visually substantiated the increasingly prevalent idea that Chavez would like to transform the BRV into "Venecuba" or "Cubazuela." They have also reminded Venezuela's opposition, recently emboldened by its nomination of Zulia Governor Manuel Rosales as a consensus presidential candidate, that Castro remains Chavez's mentor and role model. ¶6. (C) The images could help unite Rosales's fractious camp, particularly as they plan beyond the presidential election. Opposition strategists frequently note that they are trying to build a meaningful domestic political bloc that can CARACAS 00002527 002.3 OF 002 "contain" Chavez's radicalism after his almost certain December 3 re-election. At his August 17 press conference to announce his campaign team, Rosales used the occasion to distance himself from Chavez's hero-worship of Castro, noting that his government would not support either "imperialists or the Bearded One" and would not align with "the terrorist bloc." -------------- No Domestic Brakes -------------- ¶7. (C) Senior journalists and former Ambassador to the UN Milos Alcalay told the Charge August 16 that they did not believe Chavez faced any domestic restraints right now with respect to the internal Cuban succession process. Indeed, all stressed that given the significant ongoing, close "resources-for-advisors" relationship, the BRV and Cuban governments are mutually dependent. Chavez's motivation to support a hard-line successor to Castro, they said, would be motivated not just by a ideological desire to promote socialism in Cuba, but also a determination to perpetuate Chavez's "Bolivarian revolution" in Venezuela. They also noted that Chavez's closest advisors, including new Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro, would be inclined to support Venezuelan adventurism in Cuba. In terms of tools, all alluded to the BRV's ability to provide petroleum support and cash, but did not rule out the possibility of the BRV providing material military support. -------------- Chavez's Dependency -------------- ¶8. (C) These same senior journalists and Alcalay opined that Castro's death would be a significant loss to Chavez, particularly during crises. They noted that it was Castro that persuaded Chavez to resist the short-lived 2002 coup and Castro who steered Chavez to victory in the 2004 recall referendum by helping him launch the social missions programs (Ref B). Referring to one of Chavez's first meetings with Castro at an international gathering at which he was present, Alcalay described an over-eager Chavez as tamely accepting the brusque criticism by Castro. Alcalay noted that Cuban diplomats independently generated and distributed -- on behalf of the Venezuelan government -- distinctly anti-American talking points (in several languages) to the attendees of the NAM conference that followed the short-lived 2002 coup. The Venezuelan NAM delegation was still waiting for guidance from Caracas, Alcalay said. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Chavez continues to play up his close relationship to Cuban leader Fidel Castro, most recently engaging in a lengthy, sentimental tribute to Castro during his August 20 televised "Alo Presidente" broadcast. Chavez's efforts to assume Fidel's "anti-imperialist" position internationally certainly received a boost from Castro's not-quite-deathbed endorsement. Chavez certainly has both the ambition -- and the ego -- to try to assume that mantle. Domestically, Chavez's very public hero-worship of Fidel serves as one of his most pointed domestic warnings -- and potential wake-up calls -- to his political opponents. WHITAKER

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