MANUEL ROSALES: CREDIBLE CANDIDATE, UNLIKELY WINNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 002392

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: MANUEL ROSALES: CREDIBLE CANDIDATE, UNLIKELY WINNER

REF: CARACAS 001662

CARACAS 00002392 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA KEVIN WHITAKER, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. Zulia Governor Manuel Rosales was named the
opposition unity candidate for the December 3 election on
August 9. Rosales is an experienced and tested politician
who has secured the broad support of a significant portion of
Venezuela's fractious opposition, is a serious presidential
candidate and the opposition's best political hope for a
future. Nevertheless, in the near term, Rosales is a bigger
threat to President Chavez's goal of polling 10 million votes
than he is to actually winning the December 3 vote. Chavez
begins the election campaign with a considerably stronger
following in the polls. He also will continue to make his
administration an effective extension of his campaign. For
the moment, Rosales's candidacy ironically lends some
credibility to an uneven electoral playing field. The BRV,
however, is unlikely to allow Rosales to gather too much
strength and may readily squander such credibility in favor
of electoral certainty via the judicial and administrative
tools at its disposal. End Summary.

--------------
Rosales to the Fore
--------------


2. (C) The August 9 announcement by most of Venezuela's
opposition camps to support Zulia Governor Manuel Rosales as
the opposition's consensus presidential candidate was a rare,
but significant, showing of opposition unity. Flanked by
former competitors Julio Borges and Teodoro Petkoff, as well
as some minor candidates, Rosales launched his campaign with
an acceptance speech focused on national reconciliation.
Rather than attack the Chavez government directly or harp of
electoral problems, the Zulia governor outlined his own
political program, including an unemployment compensation
plan, a scheme for sharing oil revenues with needy
Venezuelans, and the de-politicization of the BRV's social
missions. On foreign policy, Rosales merely mentioned his
commitment to promoting peace and also added that he would
not spend money arming for "invented" threats.


3. (C) As one of only two opposition governors in Venezuela,
Rosales brings considerable political experience and
credibility to the campaign. Recent polls consistently
supported the Rosales camp's claim that the Zulia governor
enjoyed the most public support of any opposition candidate
and helped convince both Petkoff and Borges to withdraw
before the (now canceled) August 13 opposition primary.
Borges is expected to be named Rosales' vice-presidential
candidate and Petkoff will actively campaign on behalf of
Rosales. A Borges campaign manager told poloffs that Rosales
and Borges have complementary demographic strengths: Rosales
runs strong in the west and among older voters; Borges runs
strong in the east and among younger voters. Rosales is
widely considered smooth and charismatic, but he is nowhere
near as effective a speaker as Chavez.

--------------
An Uphill, Uneven Battle
--------------


4. (C) Despite the decent start, Rosales faces a number of
serious obstacles in the run-up to the December 3
presidential election, including Chavez's continued political
dominance. According to an early August national DATOS poll
commissioned by the opposition, 47 percent of voters intend
to vote for President Chavez. Rosales polled only 17
percent. Asked to respond to the phrase "Rosales would
govern better than Chavez," 56 percent disagreed, and only 29
percent concurred. Opposition strategists are already

CARACAS 00002392 002.2 OF 003


assuming that most public support for Chavez is fragile, not
firm. They are also betting that Rosales can pick up the
lion's share of Venezuela's still large undecided vote (more
than 20 percent in the DATOS poll).


5. (C) Chavez enjoys all the advantages of the state
machinery and can be expected to continue to blur the lines
that should separate his administration from the campaign
(reftel). More specifically, Chavez will:
-- use public officials to muster the pro-Chavez vote;
-- continue to spend public moneys liberally to court likely
supporters;
-- exploit free air-time on both state and private media
outlets;
-- enjoy the advantages of a stacked electoral registry; and,
-- call on the politicized electoral commission (CNE),as
needed.
Chavez also benefits from the widespread impression that
one's vote is not secret, and that the BRV will exact
retribution against those who oppose it. The campaign
organization efforts of the Rosales camp to date have been,
by comparison, unimpressive.


6. (C) Although even a relatively united opposition cannot
hope to match the formidable Chavez vote machine, it can be
expected to continue to try to expose government abuses
during the campaign. Most significantly, the CNE has not yet
ruled on whether voters will have to submit to a fingerprint
scanning, a measure that fosters public doubt about the
secrecy of balloting. The CNE also has only agreed to count
manually roughly 53 percent of the ballots. The CNE recently
ruled that there will be no overall campaign limits, but may
seek to enforce other election campaign regulations. These
regulations exempt Chavez from any limits on his weekly "Alo
Presidente" broadcasts. Criticism of the government's
undermining of democratic institutions may not, however,
resonate more broadly among an electorate that consistently
lists crime, unemployment, housing, and other economic
problems as their biggest concerns.


7. (C) Looking internally, Rosales's consensus candidacy is a
patchwork of instinctively fractious political camps with a
longer track record of political mistakes than much tangible
success. The opposition unity achieved this week was not
easily achieved and will not easily be maintained. Moreover,
Rosales still needs to convince the leaders and rank-and-file
of Venezuela's Accion Democratica Party to abandon its
absentionism policy in favor of his candidacy. Additionally,
comedian/politician Benjamin Rausseo ("El Conde de Huachero")
remains a maverick in the race who continues to attract a
small, but not insignificant, group of potential voters.
Rausseo says he will support Rosales if he still trails him
in the polls in November. Other minor candidates, such as
Roberto Smith, also continue to run and may distract from
Rosales's message.

--------------
Rosales's Vulnerabilities
--------------


8. (C) For the moment, the Chavez camp has refrained from
lashing out against Rosales and may be focusing instead on
Chavez's launch of his own re-election campaign in the coming
days. One pro-Chavez National Assembly member told poloff
confidently that the Chavez camp welcomes Rosales'
participation, noting that the government wants a credible
election with good voter turnout. In that context, it is not
surprising that the CNE ruled initially that Rosales could
take a leave of absence from the governorship of Zulia to run
for office. Nevertheless, as the campaign heats up in the
coming months, the Chavez campaign can be expected to turn up
the heat significantly, particularly if Rosales proves to be

CARACAS 00002392 003.2 OF 003


"too credible" a candidate. The CNE could, for example,
review its ambiguous, initial decision allowing Rosales to
run for president without giving up the governorship of Zulia.


9. (C) The Chavez government already has a history of
targeting Rosales, even before he was a presidential
candidate. In March, the Attorney General suggested he might
pursue formal accusations against the Zulia governor for his
involvement in the short-lived Pedro Carmona government. If
the Supreme Court were to lift Rosales's immunity as
governor, the government could pursue politically motivated
charges during the election campaign. Earlier the same
month, Chavez publicly accused Rosales of conspiring with the
USG to foment a Zulia "separatist movement." In January,
Maracaibo Mayor Gian Carlo Di Martino accused Rosales of
traveling to Bogota to plot a coup.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) The decision of most opposition parties to support
Manuel Rosales as the consensus candidate was their best
possible option, but was never a foregone conclusion among
the divided opposition. Rosales now has a real opportunity
to capitalize on this rare unity to mount a meaningful
presidential campaign. Even while opposition insiders are
predicting Rosales's almost certain defeat, they at the same
time preserve the (forlorn) hope that a more effective
opposition before December 3 can also be a more effective
check and balance on the Chavez government after Chavez's
re-election. A strong Rosales campaign can also test and
expose the authoritarian nature of the Chavez government.

WHITAKER