US SUPPORT REQUESTED FOR VENEZUELAN DISASTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000220 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD FOR FRC LAMBERT E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2021 TAGS: PGOV MASS VE SUBJECT: US SUPPORT REQUESTED FOR VENEZUELAN DISASTER MANAGEMENT Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Post strongly endorses the fulfillment of a Venezuelan Government request for Southcom to help update its disaster prevention operations center, a project that would cost about USD 170,000. In addition to its value in humanitarian terms, the project would serve as a timely contrast of U.S. initiative and GOV failures to manage emergencies, including the recent closure of the Caracas-La Guaira bridge. It also would help undermine President Hugo Chavez' wild claims of U.S. subversion in Venezuela. Any GOV refusal of the assistance would highlight the GOV's inability to manage disasters on its own. -------------- The Plan -------------- ¶2. (C) Civil Protection and Disaster Administration (PC), Venezuela's FEMA equivalent, requested assistance from the MILGROUP in refurbishing its operations and communications control center. (PC is a dependency of the Ministry of Interior, although its head is an active-duty army colonel.) PC and an official from Southcom's Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP) initially discussed the possibility of updating the control center in October 2005. In a November 2, 2005 letter to MILGROUP, PC's national director, army colonel Antonio Jose Rivero, officially requested roughly USD 170,000 for the project from the USG. HAP is able to fund the refurbishment almost entirely from funds it allocated to spend on Venezuela projects during previous fiscal years. -------------- Low Risk, High Reward -------------- ¶3. (C) Supporting the refurbishment of the control center would promote U.S. interests at little cost. The expense would not be subject to sanctions. A humanitarian assistance exception exists for trafficking in persons sanctions. Southcom reports that Article 98 (American Servicemembers Protection Act) sanctions are not applicable, either. There are at least three benefits to funding such a project: -- Venezuela needs an effective clearinghouse for information on natural disasters. A refurbished control center would help the GOV monitor ongoing disasters and keep it abreast of information on threatening weather patterns. It would also help link hospitals, emergency telecommunications systems, rescue services, and local governments during natural and man-made disasters. -- The timing is opportune. The closure of the Caracas-La Guaira bridge has become the talk of the town. The GOV's recent push to expropriate urban housing (SEPTEL) reminds the public that the GOV has also failed to rebuild after the landslide disaster in Vargas State left thousands homeless in ¶1999. U.S. involvement with disaster relief and prevention in Venezuela would highlight our humanitarian concern for the Venezuelan people and would stand as a stark counterpoint to a Venezuelan Government that has failed to prevent the deterioration of Venezuelan infrastructure. CARACAS 00000220 002 OF 002 -- The offer would reinforce Post's public diplomacy. US public statements cannot counter all of the President Hugo Chavez' outrageous accusations against the United States. USG assistance in facilitating Venezuela's response to emergencies, however, would help undercut Chavez' repeated claims that the USG is plotting to invade Venezuela. ¶4. (C) The risks of funding such a project are minimal. Although PC falls institutionally under the interior ministry, the equipment to be provided would be of little use for monitoring the domestic opposition. According to PC's proposal, the operations center is requesting projectors, screens, digital chalkboards, audio-visual equipment, computers, and computer accessories. Luis Diaz, an anti-Chavez PC deputy director, told poloff January 12 that the equipment could not be used for nefarious ends and stressed its importance for monitoring highway crashes and other incidents in real time. -------------- We Win If They Refuse -------------- ¶5. (C) Given its record, the GOV may refuse the assistance. Not only did the GOV refuse U.S. help in the Vargas disaster, but it also failed to respond to requests for U.S. Air Force WC-130 aircraft to track hurricanes over Venezuelan airspace in 2005. An ardent Chavez supporter, PC national director Rivero has been communicating with MILGROUP through intermediaries, presumably so he can avoid association with U.S. officials. ¶6. (C) A refusal, however, would play to Washington's advantage. The GOV would appear to be frustrating disaster recovery efforts as its own efforts are exposed as insufficient. The USG would appear to be only trying to help. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Again, this is a win-win proposal for the U.S. Government. Post's public affairs section could publicize the assistance with some fanfare. It could also easily leak any GOV refusal. BROWNFIELD