CHAVEZ AND THE RHETORIC OF HATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 CARACAS 001789 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2021 TAGS: PGOV PHUM ELAB KDEM SCUL VE SUBJECT: CHAVEZ AND THE RHETORIC OF HATE CARACAS 00001789 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor, for Reason 1.4(b). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) President Hugo Chavez has successfully filled the Venezuelan political lexicon with hate-inspiring concepts to create and enlarge fissures within Venezuelan society and cement his domestic support. Unfortunately, it is already changing the way average Venezuelans think and act. Since taking office in 1999, Chavez has perfected his propaganda of hate message, hitting on the broad themes of rich vs. poor, U.S. imperialism vs. Bolivarianism, and capitalism vs. socialism. Chavez' audiences are the upper, middle, and lower classes, though the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV) has over time extended these to international actors and the public at large as Chavez tries to make the leap to world figure. Typical messages are "the U.S. is an evil empire," "being rich is bad," "the opposition will never return." The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV) transmits its messages via its monopoly on all state media, rank and file proselytism physical and psychological intimidation, and the unmatched oratory skills of Chavez himself. Chavez' hate-sowing rhetoric forces everything into an us-or-them binary decision, leaving a frenzied and fearful, or at best intimidated, population incapable of resolving basic conflicts. End Summary. -------------- Watch What He Says -------------- ¶2. (C) President Chavez is all talk. Like many autocrats intent on maintaining power, he uses rhetoric as a blunt political weapon that seeks to vivisect society along class, political, social, and race lines. To outsiders, Chavez' long and rambling speeches are semi-coherent and at times laughable. To the average Venezuelan, however, Chavez' words have meaning, offering hope or fear, depending on the message. Chavez speaks as if his words will create the reality they are describing. For example, he recounted his distorted version of the events of April 2002 for years until prosecutors finally started filing charges against those Chavez labeled traitors. For Chavez, merely appearing at a construction site for future public housing and railing against the "oligarchy" for historically denying homes to the poor, as he did recently, is more politically valuable (or seemingly important) to Chavez than actually building the aforementioned houses. While it is tempting to chalk this up to Chavez' mastery of bovine scatology, we must concede that it has remarkable impact on Venezuelans. Moreover, Chavez is going full throttle to extend his hypnotic message around the world. -------------- Haves and Have Nots -------------- ¶3. (C) When Abraham Lincoln sought to unify the country to avoid the Civil War, he appealed to the "better angels of our natures." Chavez, however, consistently calls forth Venezuelans' "worse demons" with a simple divide-and-conquer strategy. There are many such divisions, but we chose three for this analysis. His first cut is between rich and poor. Admittedly, there were social rifts before Chavez, but the political system had as a characteristic two "poli-classist" parties that were socially inclusive. Chavez fanned the underlying resentment into flame, however, to propel his political movement. He continues to pick the scabs today. In Chavez' Us-vs.-Them thinking, Venezuelans are either poor or rich -- he all but ignores the middle class. The poor he calls "el pueblo," a word whose meaning ought to encompass all Venezuelans. Bolivarians like to interchange "el pueblo" with "el soberano," literally, "the Sovereign," to imply that only the poor have the right to speak in matters of public interest. The remaining Venezuelans (at least 40 percent of the population),meanwhile, are relegated to the well-known term, "escualido," a term meant to connote scarcity or thinness. Chavistas are now using the term as a verb; "escualidizarse" means to detour from the revolutionary path and seek a personal fortune (an emerging trend in the revolutionary vanguard). ¶4. (C) The second cut of hate rhetoric is between U.S. imperialism and Bolivarianism. "Imperialism" is a Chavez label meaning that all USG actions are motivated by the desire to dominate other countries. This harangue emerged after April 2002 when Chavez accused the United States of plotting a coup to oust him. Chavez regularly calls the United States an "evil empire," though he often adds that this is a recrimination of the USG and not of the American people per se. Of course, all Venezuelan "escualidos" are automatically tagged as lackeys of the empire. "Imperialist" is a Bolivarian term of disdain that is frequently punctuated with "fascist," "terrorist," and "coup-plotter." Chavez' tantrums against President Bush ("assassin," genocidal maniac," etc.) are now commonplace. This theme was put in stark relief when senior Chavista Eliecer Otaiza said in April 2005 that Venezuelans had to learn to hate Americans in anticipation of an eventual armed conflict. Hyperbole aside, INR studies in mid-2005 show a clearly declining trend in Venezuelans' perception of the United States. According to the studies, anti-U.S. sentiment increased markedly since early 2002 (up 27 points to 48 percent) and Venezuelans with positive views of the United States are down 29 points to 52 percent. While not all these changes can be attributed to Chavez and his rhetorical salvo -- the Iraq War is a significant intervening variable -- it is a safe bet that his fulminations against us are having an effect. Meanwhile, Chavez uses "Bolivarian" as a loose synonym for anti-imperialism. He paints his Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA),for example, as the morally pure version of the FTAA, which in Chavez' words is an attempt to colonize Venezuela. ¶5. (C) A third cut of divisive hate rhetoric is between capitalism and socialism. Underpinned by a neo-Marxist interpretation of history, Chavez frequently attacks capitalism and neo-liberalism as a "savage" system that if left unchecked will end human life on Earth. Chavez puts his economic theory in religious terms, often referring to socialism as the way of Christ while capitalism is a "Judas system." He impugns capitalism for its emphasis on the individual and lack of "solidarity" and frequently speaks of the need for the emergence of a "new man" not motivated by consumption. For example, when three school children were brutally murdered in March, Chavez said the murderers were guilty of "extreme individualism" and had deviated from the tenets of socialism. Chavez offers socialism as an alternative, though Chavez seldom defines this beyond his populist spending programs (ironically fueled largely by the sale of petroleum to the United States). Chavez frequently blasts a capitalist "oligarchy" in Venezuela that seeks to undo the works of the Revolution (and cut off benefits to the poor). -------------- Target Audiences -------------- ¶6. (C) Chavez' strategic audiences are the majority pro-Chavez poor, the opposition (mainly the rich and middle class),and the international community. Despite a recent spate of international forays, Chavez still works his domestic base, the poor, regularly appearing on television distributing benefits to the red-clad masses. Polls suggest that about 20 percent of Venezuelans will support Chavez no matter what, but another 30-35 percent are only fair weather supporters. Of course, it is easier given Chavez' skill set to tear down and discredit the opposition rather than working to earn and maintain the support of the poor. Chavez instead uses his propaganda to stir up resentment against the political opposition, blaming them for the troubles of the country. The strategy appears to be working: a Consultores 21 study from April 2006 showed that 60 percent of Venezuelans do not hold Chavez responsible for the country's problems. At the same time, Chavez does not forget that the opposition is a critical audience. He frequently taunts them with outlandish remarks that usually draw asinine responses. For example, in February Chavez pushed through legislation to add an eighth star to Venezuela's flag (reportedly, because Bolivar had wanted it). Not 24 hours went by before a small opposition group held a rally to cut the star out of the national flag, opening them up to attacks by Chavistas. Finally, since winning the August 2004 referendum, which de-capitated the opposition, Chavez has been crafting his rhetoric of hate for international audiences. He never fails to hawk his anti-imperialist diatribe in international fora. -------------- The Messages -------------- ¶7. (C) Chavistas play on the fears and anxieties of both rich and poor. For the poor audience, Chavez casts his movement as a new evolutionary stage in world political thought that is opposed by the United States and the opposition. Chavez often swears on his life that the opposition "will never return" to power. Chavez and his supporters warn that their adversaries want to strip the poor of benefits such as the Cuban-run Barrio Adentro medical program and Mercal subsidized food markets. Chavez tells his followers that they must practice "solidarity" and "community living" before seeking personal wealth. He frequently tells his followers that "to be rich is bad." A priest from Barinas told poloff that school reading lessons in his state two years ago were teaching children phrases like, "I am poor because someone is rich." Chavez tells the poor audience that an oil-starved United States is preparing an invasion, that he will resist by blowing up the oil fields and converting the barrios into an Iraq-like insurgency war. To reinforce this, the Venezuelan military regularly publicizes its training exercises to repel invasions, including training the citizen-reservists in urban resistance. One press report had an officer throwing a rifle to a reservists and screaming, "The gringos are coming for your women. What are you going to do?" ¶8. (C) For the rich, Chavez heaps coals on their uncertainties. Rural and urban expropriations may be publicly touted as correcting an injustice to the poor, but it is actually a threat to Venezuela's property owners that nothing is safe for those who oppose Chavez. Caracas Mayor Juan Barreto put the elite in a tailspin late 2005 when he publicly toyed with the idea of expropriating the posh Caracas Country Club for low-rent government housing. Chavez warns the opposition constantly of a lower class uprising should something happen to his government, of the poor streaming down from the ramshackle neighborhoods that dot Caracas' hilly landscape to perpetrate violence on the rich. In electoral politics, Chavez describes everything in terms of a battle, so that his re-election bid in December will deliver a "knockout blow" to the opposition. If they refuse to fight by selecting a single candidate, he taunts them with the idea that he will convert the election to a referendum on his indefinite re-election. These messages are intended to keep opponents and would-be opponents subdued and unwilling to risk open conflict. ¶9. (C) Chavez continues to develop and target his international audience, though it is a trial-by-error process. In his early days in office, there was probably much more mainstream acceptance of his asystemic, anti-globalization message among the international community. After rounds of political successes in Venezuela, however, we suspect international actors are waking up to the dangers Chavez' power accumulation entails. His strongest audience, perhaps, is among radical leftists in the United States, Europe, and Latin America. While not in the mainstream, these dedicated groups present a ready crowd for Chavez' overseas events and can influence perceptions in their countries. -------------- With Enough Mice You Can Hide An Elephant -------------- ¶10. (C) As pollster Alfredo Keller pointed out earlier this year, Chavez controls Venezuela's public political dialogue on a ratio of 20,000 to 1. Of course, much of the private media is bitterly critical of Chavez and is able to counteract some of the BRV's propaganda despite a severe media content law. Chavez' most powerful weapon in the public arena, of course, is himself. He appears on television and radio for hours a week, sometimes in compulsory broadcasts on all stations ("cadenas"),delivering his message in a variety of ways. One survey put Chavez' obligatory broadcasts during his seven-plus years in power at 836 hours, with 57 hours of that in the first quarter of ¶2006. The Sunday "Alo, Presidente" is his flagship propaganda product, and it reportedly has his hard core followers glued to the set each week for five to seven hours to receive guidance and inspiration. Practically everyone talks for the rest of the week about the latest Chavez rant, stealing momentum from all other issues in the public arena. Thus, an opposition group that wants to talk about fundamental issues like unemployment or crime will find itself consistently drowned out by Chavez noise, like courting Bolivia's Evo Morales or buying Russian fighters or having Iranians building low-cost housing in Venezuela. Chavez only has to promise something for people to think he has delivered it. ¶11. (C) The official media can deliver Chavez' divisive message with a programmatic array of subtlety. There are currently four principal 24-hour government television stations: VTV (the principal news and opinion outlet); Vive (targeting poor communities); ANTV (the National Assembly's station); and Telesur (Chavez' version of CNN to an international audience). VTV has shock talk shows like La Hojilla, whose moderator lampoons the opposition and USG on a nightly basis. VTV also airs the cynically titled "Contact with Reality" spots that portray opposition figures in the worst possible light. At times of heightened political unrest the station runs cartoon spots depicting hideous caricatures of key USG figures throwing bombs, supporting terrorists, and handing cash to opposition members. ANTV has a morning show in which an analyst tears apart the United States over every news item from the war on terror. Telesur, autonomous in name only from the BRV, runs more sophisticated news stories that hammer on Chavez' international agenda points, such as post-electoral stories from Peru in which analysts predict failure for winner Alan Garcia, who clashed with Chavez repeatedly during the campaign. ¶12. (S/NF) Of course, subtlety has its limits. The BRV brazenly preaches its messages to its rank and file via the missions and other public programs. Participants in the job-creation mission, Vuelvan Caras, for example, receive a comic book that describes the concept of "endogenous development," re-educating them about how capitalism had nearly depleted Venezuela of its resources and human capital until the arrival of Chavez. The newspaper "VEA," fast becoming the "Granma" of the Bolivarian Revolution, contains a daily opinion column which ends, "Only socialism can save the world! Chavez is socialism!" The education missions -- Robinson, Ribas, and Sucre -- and to a lesser extent public school texts all contain distorted versions of history, including a reference to how the United States became an empire after forgetting that it was once subjugated by Great Britain. When that fails to convince, the BRV also has shock troops such as the Tupamaros and various "motorizado" motorcycle gangs to deliver the message. Sending armed thugs to threaten and sometimes commit violence against opposition figures was a prevailing practice during the era of mass opposition protests in 2003-2004. It is still present in today's Chavista toolkit, as seen in April when the Ambassador's motorcade was menaced by egg-throwing motorcyclists. Chavistas also dabble increasingly in psychological operations, such as staging an apparent terrorist act of blowing up a pipeline during the parliamentary elections to suggest an international conspiracy against the BRV. -------------- The Fear Factor -------------- ¶13. (C) The effect of Chavez' rhetorical onslaught is a frenzied populace afraid to express anything other than support, genuine or not, for the BRV. A recent focus group study by the think tank Cedice Libertad reported that residents of the barrio are fearful for their lives, mostly because of the out of control crime rate. However, some government supporters added fears for their children in the event of a U.S. invasion "as the president constantly announces." Many expressed fears of a subsequent civil war in the event that Chavez were to be removed from office. Others said they are awaiting an opposition figure who will guarantee that were Chavez to leave office the opposition would not exact revenge on them. Chavez opponents in the barrio fear losing their employment or other benefits if their political affiliation is discovered. Many said they had ceased to vote or sign petitions because it would have consequences for them and their families. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) The Chavez regime is predicated on making Chavez supporters hate the opposition and vice versa. It is a problem that worsens with time, as a new generation grows up in this warped environment. Chavez is in this sense a follower of Che Guevara, who said in stark terms, "Hatred is a factor in the struggle: intransigent hatred of the enemy pushes humans beyond their limits, and converts them into an effective, violent, selective, and cold killing machine." In Venzuela, therefore, to call for dialogue or consensus in even basic public policy questions ignores the thousands of hours Chavistas put in weekly to keep both sides agitated. It also means that Chavistas will not likely let up in their assault on the United States any time soon. We have to maintain our careful restraint to the rhetorical provocations as well as a steady public diplomacy effort to offset Chavez' insidious effort to teach Venezuelans to hate us. WHITAKER