STATE MACHINERY DRIVING CHAVEZ' CAMPAIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 001662

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2026
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: STATE MACHINERY DRIVING CHAVEZ' CAMPAIGN

REF: A. CARACAS 01067

B. CARACAS 00943

C. CARACAS 00473

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT RICHARD DOWNES FOR REASON 1.4
(D)

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Summary
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1. (C) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez abuses state power
and the public purse to benefit his reelection campaign. He
has ordered public officials to get out the pro-Chavez vote,
and his administration has forced them to participate in
Chavista rallies. Through his control over off-budget
expenditures and legislative appropriations, he spends
billions of USD on grants and development programs for likely
supporters. He makes massive use of both state and private
media outlets to promote his administration without paying
for airtime. Chavez continues stacking the electoral
registry, although he is running out of real supporters to
add to it. The BRV has bungled attempts to respond to
criticism of its campaign abuses, but it appears to matter
little; Chavez has already bought or extorted the votes he
needs. End Summary.

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Hatch Act Nightmare
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2. (U) Article 145 of the Venezuelan constitution
establishes that public officials must be "impartial" and
cannot be nominated or removed because of their political
affiliation. Still, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has
ordered government and military officials of all stripes to
help him reach his goal of 10 million votes, according to
press reports. In particular, he told them in early-February
2006 to organize one electoral "patrol" to get out the
Chavista vote for every 100 voters on the rolls. These
government personnel are apparently already hard at work.
Although CNE rules passed March 2 prohibit propaganda
encouraging votes for specific officials, government and
ruling party-endorsed banners and flyers touting the "10
million" slogan fly throughout Caracas. National Assembly
deputies have spent one or two weekends on the road each
month this year conducting "street parliamentarism," that is,
stumping opportunities disguised as efforts to involve the
public in the legislative process. (Note: As elected
officials, National Assembly deputies are permitted to
campaign, but only after election season starts on August 1.)


3. (C) The BRV also forces public servants to participate
in campaign activities and to vote pro-Chavez. State oil
company PDVSA has bussed its workers to rallies, an private
oil company executive told poloff. On election day in
December 2005, a Chavista National Assembly deputy publicly
threatened that government workers who did not vote (by then
nearly all candidates were pro-Chavez) would not get paid.
Retired Vice Admiral Rafael Huizi told us that the new
anti-Chavez CNE rector, Vicente Diaz (please protect),had
told him that managers in BRV agencies ascertained in real
time whether their employees had voted and then phoned
abstainers to order them to the polls.

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Grey Areas: Government Handouts Legal?
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4. (U) Government social programs appear to be one of Hugo
Chavez' favorite means of buying votes. Fueled by hugely
inflated petroleum receipts, which average at USD 150 million

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a day (gross),the BRV is spending USD billions on large
infrastructure projects, entitlement programs, and other
handouts aimed to boost Chavez' popularity this year. While
such spending is commonplace, even in well established
democracies, Chavez' control of all branches of government
makes it look questionable. For example, the 100 percent
pro-Chavez National Assembly is appropriating hundreds of
billions of bolivars (USD tens of millions) in additional
credits to the budgets of various ministries and development
projects each week, according its website. On April 8, the
National Assembly passed a law setting up loosely defined
"community councils," which would skirt traditional local
government structures and disburse funds directly to the
people (REF A). Chavez has announced federal funding of over
USD 1.1 billion for the new local bureaucracies. During his
April 9 "Alo Presidente" show, Chavez inaugurated the first
six red-clad councils. On the May 7 broadcast, Housing
Minister Luis Figueroa said the community councils would
disburse 600 billion bolivars (roughly USD 275 million) in a
"shacks for houses" exchange program.


5. (U) Chavez offers other major handouts without bothering
to seek legislative approval. In February, the President
announced several new social programs that would be funded by
"excess international reserves" and by FONDEN, an off-budget
fund created in July 2005 that has amassed around USD 13
billion since its creation (REF B). Chavez also told Alo
Presidente listeners May 7 that he would use part of the
extraction tax on strategic associations to construct
housing.

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Use of Media
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6. (C) Chavez' abuse of public and private broadcasting to
tout his social programs and badger his opposition gives his
campaign perhaps its most unusual (in a democracy) advantage.
According to the Inter-American Press Association, for each
minute of airtime that the opposition buys, Chavez gets
20,000 minutes free, mainly through use of "cadenas
nacionales," broadcasts local stations are required to carry.
A recent study by the opposition TV channel RCTV of
presidential broadcasts would seem to support this
conclusion. According to the study, Chavez to date has spent
more than one month of his time in office appearing on
cadenas. REF C reported in January that Chavez was on track
this year to break an annual record for airtime spent "en
cadena." Despite extensive international travel in early
2006, Chavez is keeping up his pace. While the number of
cadenas he has held through April 16 is slightly below
average, Chavez has more than compensated with time on air.
The average cadena in 2006 has lasted a record 1:02 hours.
At the current rate, Chavez will register over 172 hours on
air this year, breaking the 2003 record of 168.


7. (U) An analysis of Chavez' near-weekly Alo Presidente
program shows similar trends. Chavez is on track to film 34
shows this year, slightly lower than the 2002 record of 42.
Still, with an 2006 average program length of almost six
hours, he is paced to break his record of most Alo Presidente
airtime in one year. Including reruns and condensed
versions, Alo Presidente is on track to rack up over 300
hours of programming by the year's end. Chavez has even
begun to film Alo Presidente abroad. He drew criticism from
the opposition for broadcasting five hours via satellite from
Bolivia on May 28.


8. (U) The RCTV study indicates that as Chavez' media
appearances have become more common, their popularity has
fallen. In 2006, 50 percent fewer people watched cadenas
than in 2000, the year the broadcasts' popularity crested.

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More people have tuned out than have tuned in during 2006
cadenas except in a few instances when Chavez has interrupted
the week's most popular programming. (Note: RCTV's
methodology is unknown, so we cannot vouch for the ratings'
accuracy. At the very least, however, these ratings probably
do not reflect political biases, as RCTV uses them for
internal business planning.)


9. (C) Most cadenas fall during the prime viewing hours of
afternoon and night. Television stations suffer the most
from Chavez' usurpation of the airwaves because they are
required to refund advertisers if they do not run their
commercials at the promised time. Radio stations fare better
because they can adjust time slots for advertisements.

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Inflating the Registry
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10. (U) Chavez uses public funds to register millions of
voters. Most of the new voters are sympathetic to Chavez.
The BRV has sponsored registration programs that double as
pro-government rallies. Numerous anecdotal reports,
including those published in the press and related to
emboffs, indicate that the national identification office
(ONIDEX) requires people to promise to vote for Chavez before
grQting identification. It also refuses to document those
viewed as Chavez opponents, according to Embassy FSNs and
some apolitical Venezuelan contacts. According to a report
posted to an anti-Chavez website in late-April 2006,
14,849,127 voters were on the rolls. This figure would
represent a 23 percent increase in voters since 2003 and a
2.6 percent increase since the December 4, 2005 National
Assembly elections.


11. (C) The electoral registry is likely to grow at a
slower pace this year, barring the BRV invention of millions
of fictitious voters. (Embassy note: we cannot rule such
invention out. Indeed, they may just try it: for Chavez to
reach his goal of 10 million votes, he would have to capture
68 percent of currently registered voters, which would be
extremely difficult.) Chavista rallies aimed at
nationalizing foreigners resident here--such as those in the
run-up to the August 2004 recall referendum--are likely to
yield diminishing returns because they have already
registered hundreds of thousands. Citing BRV statistics, a
local UNHCR official told us the government nationalized
almost 300,000 Colombians in 2003-04 alone. Furthermore,
voter apathy is likely to keep even Chavez supporters from
signing up. While poloff spent several hours over several
days at the metropolitan mayor of Caracas's registry office
in March 2006, he never saw anyone signing up at the CNE
registration booth.

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Marches Slacken...For Now
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12. (U) We predicted in late-February (REF C) that
government-financed marches would increase in number and
intensity as election day approached. Marches appear to have
diminished over the past month or two, but they are likely to
pick up again once Chavez' pace of international travel
slackens.

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Lame BRV Excuses for Campaign Spending
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13. (U) The BRV has rejected accusations that it has used
public spending in Chavez' campaign. Its denials, however,
have rung hollow. In the May 7 Alo Presidente broadcast,

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Chavez said it was a "coincidence" that the BRV was
introducing so many "achievements" this year. Communications
Minister Willian Lara said that "not one cent" of the
national budget went towards Chavez' reelection, according to
press reports. In a notable non sequitur, Lara attempted to
counter opposition charges that civil servants worked on
Chavez' campaign by accusing Zulia Governor Manuel Rosales of
involvement in his own campaign.

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Comment
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14. (C) The opposition is finally starting to focus
attention on the more obvious electoral abuses, such as
Chavez' violation of campaign finance rules and his padding
of the electoral registry. The BRV's clumsy reaction shows
the new approach has been effective. Hugo Chavez is on his
way to his goal of bribing or extorting the votes he needs.
His plans to build housing are especially politically savvy.
He is way behind schedule on his promise to deliver 150,000
units in 2006, but by the time he can be called on it, he
will be looking at another six years in office.

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