THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY IN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 001635 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD FOR FRC LAMBERT E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2026 TAGS: PGOV MARR VE SUBJECT: THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY IN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY REF: 05 CARACAS 01283 CARACAS 00001635 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez continues to nominate military personnel to serve in the most senior elected and appointed positions of his administration. Although we lack precise numbers, Embassy contacts and research suggest the military's presence in civilian government continues to grow. Through its various non-traditional duties, the military plays a highly visible role in Venezuelan society. For example, military participation in social missions, law enforcement, and elections is prominent. Civilian Chavistas tend to act more "martial" than the soldiers themselves, according to political science professors. Opportunities for promotion and illicit enrichment afforded soldiers in government appear to be generating some resentment in the ranks. The BRV is a military regime with socialist rhetoric. Although the world's radical left portrays it as a communal paradise, Venezuela looks more like the preserve of a right-wing Latin American junta. End Summary. -------------- Soldiers in Government -------------- ¶2. (U) Active duty and retired military officers are omnipresent in President Hugo Chavez' administration and civil service. The most important military official in the Government is the President. The new Organic Law of the National Armed Forces (LOFAN) establishes that the President has the "military rank" of commander-in-chief. Chavez, a former army lieutenant colonel, occasionally appears in uniform to address his troops. Nine of Venezuela's 23 governors and six of its 25 cabinet ministers are ex-soldiers. Active duty and retired officers also have a strong presence in executive ministries, parastatal companies, diplomatic missions abroad, and some state governments (see annex paragraph 11 for a partial list). ¶3. (U) Over half of the military personnel nominated to serve in the public sector in 2006 hail from the Venezuelan Army. Dozens attended the military academy during Chavez' time there as a student and teacher. Some have ties to Chavez' attempted coup. Almost all soldiers in government are officers, ranging from lieutenant to three "sun" admiral Defense Minister Orlando Maniglia. (See REFTEL for a more detailed breakdown of these soldiers.) ¶4. (C) Post lacks exact data on the number of soldiers in civilian government positions, but Embassy contacts and research indicate that the military's presence may be growing. Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV) political science Professor Ricardo Sucre Heredia told poloff May 9 that as of 2003, 166 soldiers held civilian government posts. He said that his conversations with contacts led him to suspect that that number had since increased. To be sure, he asserted, one would have to sift through hundreds of BRV official gazettes. A DAO review of official gazettes and press reports also suggests the number has grown. Chavez has seconded roughly 60-100 officers to civilian positions each year since 2000. However, as the documents report nominations but not attrition, we cannot simply add up the soldiers currently in government. That said, it is safe to say that there are several hundred military personnel, active and retired, serving in civilian BRV positions today. CARACAS 00001635 002.2 OF 004 ¶5. (C) Chavez' management style also tends to increase the number of military officials in government. The President trusts his former military colleagues to manage senior civilian positions. By placing them in positions with opportunities for illicit enrichment, Chavez rewards his officers and keeps them beholden to him. Whether they are corrupt or not, officers in these posts draw both civilian and military salaries. According to DAO reporting, Chavez has made civilian government stints even more popular by having military rules weigh them more heavily in promotion considerations. -------------- Military Presence Throughout Society -------------- ¶6. (U) In addition to holding official government positions, soldiers figure prominently in the state's ever-expanding role in Venezuelan society. The military's mission statement in the LOFAN includes "active participation in national development." As such, many of Chavez' social missions showcase the military. (See SEPTEL on the military reserves' role in development.) Additional unconventional military duties abound. For instance, law enforcement has always been the National Guard's most prominent mission. Through "Plan Republica," the military safeguards voting receipts and provides security and crowd control during Venezuela's frequent elections. State governments and the National Land Institute use the armed forces to occupy rural land in "interventions" aimed at intimidating property owners. -------------- Military Views on Civilian Responsibilities -------------- ¶7. (C) Soldiers' differences of opinion about their involvement in politics are slowly becoming apparent. The Venezuelan Army submitted a report to the National Assembly that mentioned the excessive nomination of personnel to government ministries as a drain on its human resources in ¶2005. Resentment about the military's new roles also festers unexpressed among active duty personnel. According to DAO, officers become embittered when those lacking command experience are promoted ahead of them. In addition, some officers resent being left off of the civilian government gravy train ridden by their superiors, active duty and retired officers tell us. They add that the jealousy has led to back-stabbing within the services. Retired officers add that military officers resent civilian duties as a matter of pride. (Note: This latter view may be peculiar to the retired old guard, who have had less experience with the military's social responsibilities. New recruits are well aware their careers will have a large development component.) -------------- Why Make Money in the Civilian Government? -------------- ¶8. (C) Of course, opportunities for corruption in traditional military positions abound. As BRV military spending has increased, military contracts have grown in number and in size. As contracts have expanded, so have kickbacks. Still, for those soldiers stuck in less lucrative military jobs, the civilian public sector offers almost inexhaustible possibilities for illicit gain. Contracts are not the only source of corruption. Retired officers head ministries that have budgets but are obviously not doing much spending, such as the Tourism and Infrastructure Ministries. Such circumstances beg the question whether money is stolen CARACAS 00001635 003.2 OF 004 directly without resorting to bribes. Military personnel involved in the MERCAL mission, for instance, have stolen subsidized food and have sold it for profit. Similarly, involvement in the public banking and oil sectors affords military officials access to significant off-budget funds. Military encroachment in law enforcement (former army lieutenant Jesse Chacon is Interior Minister) presents new opportunities for shakedowns. -------------- Saluting Chavista Civilians -------------- ¶9. (U) During a May 9 conference hosted by the UCV political science department, several anti-Chavez professors argued that civilian supporters of the President were adopting military characteristics. According to Professor Domingo Irwin, the militaristic character of civilian government officials was not a new phenomenon; rather, it dated back to 18th century Venezuela. Professors Ricardo Sucre Heredia and Fernando Falcon--the latter a participant in Chavez' failed coup in 1992--held that Chavistas acted more "military" than the soldiers themselves. Pro-Chavez marches employing uniformed soldiers alongside civilians dressed in matching red attire reinforce the militaristic stereotype of the servants of the revolution. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (S) If a public sector filled with soldiers and "soldierly civilians" does not begin to militarize society, we are not sure what does. Although the armed forces' role in development gives militarization a distinctively Chavista flair, the BRV shares commonalities with the nationalist, right-wing military governments of Latin American history. This martial character of the BRV has gone largely unnoticed by the world's radical left. Ironically, Chavez has even hosted American anti-war activists to protest the "militarization" of the United States. Hugo Chavez has shown he is hypersensitive to criticism from the left and attempts to compare him with the right. Psyops planners, then, could find much potential in drawing the left's attention to Chavez' old-style military rule. -------------- -------------- Annex: Soldiers in Important Civilian Government Positions -------------- -------------- ¶11. (U) GOVERNORS Apure Governor Jesus Aguilarte Bolivar Governor Francisco Rangel Gomez Carabobo Governor Luis Felipe Acosta Carles Cojedes Goveror Johnny Yanez Rangel Lara Governor Luis Reyes Reyes Merida Governor Francisco Porras Miranda Governor Diosdado Cabello Tachira Governor Ronald Blanco La Cruz Vargas Governor Antonio Rodriguez MINISTERS Minister of Agriculture and Land Elias Jaua Minister of Defense Orlando Maniglia Minister of Infrastructure Ramon Carrizalez Rengifo Minister of Interior and Justice Jesse Chacon Minister of Social Development and Popular Participation Jorge Luis Garcia Carneiro CARACAS 00001635 004.2 OF 004 Minister of Tourism Wilmar Castro MISCELLANEOUS Permanent Representative to the US Francisco Javier Arias Cardenas Terrorism Czar Jesus Villegas Solarte WHITAKER