SPANISH POLITICAL COUNSELOR REVIEWS VENEZUELAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 001402

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
FRC FT LAUDERDALE FOR CLAMBERT
COPENHAGEN FOR DLAWTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: SPANISH POLITICAL COUNSELOR REVIEWS VENEZUELAN
POLITICAL SCENE

REF: A. CARACAS 01268

B. CARACAS 00473

C. 05 CARACAS 03596

D. CARACAS 00744

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARK A. WELLS FOR 1.4 (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) Poloff met with Spanish Political Counselor Gonzalo
Fournier May 12 to discuss Venezuelan political developments
and Spanish-Venezuelan relations. Fournier told Poloff that
Cuban diplomats had visited members of the electoral observer
group Ojo Electoral and claimed that the USG was opposed to
holding presidential elections this year. He also said that
presidential aspirant Julio Borges had recently told EU
Ambassadors that he expected the new National Electoral
Council to be just as responsive to the BRV as the previous
one, a view that Fournier shares. Fournier noted that the EU
is divided on whether to send an observation mission and may
instead consider funding a pool of domestic electoral NGOs
including Ojo, Sumate, and Grupo La Colina. In terms of
bilateral issues, Fournier did not think Spain's defense
policy toward Venezuela would change. He also relayed his
government's hope that the USG would take the lead in
rallying support for opposition mayor Henrique Capriles, who
is being tried on charges related to an incident at the Cuban
Embassy in April 2002. Poloff suggested that Spain might be
a more effective coordinator of an international response
given its membership in the EU and its connections with the
BRV and Capriles' party Primero Justicia. We will discreetly
inquire whether Cuban officials have attempted to malign the
USG with other NGOs. End Summary.

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Cuba Accuses USG of Interference
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2. (C) Poloff met with Spanish Political Counselor Gonzalo
Fournier May 12 to discuss Venezuelan political developments
and Spanish-Venezuelan relations. Fournier has been in
Venezuela for almost four years and has close ties to several
Primero Justicia, domestic electoral NGO Ojo Electoral, and
Venezuelan political and economic analysts. Fournier started
by asking about the USG's position on the December 3
presidential elections. He noted that Ojo Electoral board
member Carlos Genatios told him he was recently visited by
the Cuban first secretary, who asserted that the USG did not
want elections, and is trying to delegitimize Chavez by
encouraging the opposition to withdraw. The Cuban, Genatios
told Fournier, was implying that the elections should
therefore be delayed because "conditions were not right."
Genatios also said Ojo founder Padre Jose Virtuoso was
visited by the Cuban Ambassador, who presumably carried the
same message. Poloff stressed to Fournier that the USG
believes the elections are a Venezuelan issue and that it is
up to individual political parties to decide whether or not

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to participate. (Note: Genatios is currently unwilling to
meet with poloff due to BRV surveillance and possibly other
pressure. Fournier, who introduced us, occasionally serves
as an unofficial intermediary.)

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Opposition Electoral Strategy
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3. (C) Fournier told poloff that EU Ambassadors recently met
with presidential candidate Julio Borges. Borges told the
Ambassadors that he does not think the new National Electoral
Council (CNE) differs from the previous board in its ideology
or unquestioned loyalty to Chavez. Consequently, he expects
the government will stall on granting the opposition's
electoral conditions until the last minute, as they did
during the 2005 legislative election season. Borges thought,
for example, the CNE would eventually agree to remove the
fingerprint machines, but not until the fall. He warned the
Ambassadors, however, that if the CNE plays around for too
long, the opposition will withdraw. Fournier suggested
October might be their deadline. Fournier also said Borges'
party, Primero Justicia (PJ),wants the opposition's
electoral conditions in place by July, wants international
observers to witness the process, and insists that addresses
be released with the electoral registry. (Note: CNE
President Tibisay Lucena ruled out the last request, but
during a May 11 meeting with declared opposition candidates
Borges and Teodoro Petkoff, and potential contender Zulia
Governor Manuel Rosales, the CNE agreed to decide which
conditions it would accept by the end of July.)


4. (C) Fournier also said that he had heard that Rosales
will announce his candidacy soon. PJ Secretary General
Gerardo Blyde and Genatios told Fournier they had heard
rumors that Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel threatened to
open several investigations against Rosales if he did not/not
run (ref a). If true, the Venezuelans thought this was a
sign that President Chavez was worried about a potential
opposition withdrawal, according to Fournier. Borges told
the EU Ambassadors that Rosales and Petkoff still oppose
primaries. He, however, sees them as a good way to empower
opposition supporters and strengthen the winner against
Chavez. Although Blyde told us earlier this year that Borges
did not favor primaries, Fournier said PJ had since consulted
with a Belarusian opposition political adviser who recounted
their opposition's positive experience with primaries in the
last presidential election. (Note: On May 16, Borges
registered to participate in Sumate's primary.)


5. (C) Fournier agreed with the opposition's take on the CNE
saying that someone had recently described Lucena to him as
"(former CNE President) Jorge Rodriguez with gloves." Sandra
Oblitas, the head of the Civil and Electoral Registry
Committee, was characterized as "Rodriguez' mouthpiece." He
was similarly pessimistic about the potential benefits of an
opposition primary. Not only did he think the winner's
faults would be exposed as a result of the opposition
campaign, but he questioned whether supporters would fear the

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creation of another Tascon list (ref b) and therefore not
participate.

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EU Thinking on Election Monitoring
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6. (C) Fournier explained that EU Ambassadors are divided
over whether an observation mission should return for the
presidential election. Those that favor a mission (France,
Spain) have proposed that it be a continuation of last year's
mission to follow up on CNE implementation of their
recommendations. A compromise has also been proposed in
which the EU would fund a pool of domestic NGO observers that
would include Ojo Electoral, Sumate, and Grupo La Colina.
(Grupo La Colina is a pro-opposition NGO. It was a
technician from this NGO that revealed the possibility of
linking voters to their votes (ref c).)

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No Change Expected in Defense Policy
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7. (C/NF) Turning to bilateral issues, Fournier said Spanish
defense policy toward Venezuela would likely remain unchanged
under new Defense Minister Jose Antonio Alonso. Regarding
the failed CASA plane acquisition, Fournier pointed out that
the company had killed the deal fearing that it might
jeopardize their ability to get future (more lucrative) U.S.
defense contracts. Fournier did not think Spanish Ambassador
to Venezuela Raul Morodo, an irritating Chavez apologist,
would be leaving until December, despite rumors of political
ties to Bono.

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Zapatero-Chavez Meeting Unlikely
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8. (C) Fournier noted that Chavez had asked for a private
meeting with Zapatero on the margins of the EU-Latin
American/Caribbean meeting. As far as Fournier knew,
however, Zapatero had not granted the meeting. Fournier said
the Spanish President called Chavez after the Bolivian
nationalization announcement to see if he could mediate with
President Evo Morales. Still, he thought Repsol would
probably come to some modus vivendi with Bolivia like they
had with Venezuela after the forced migration of the
operating service agreements to joint ventures.

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Will US Take Lead on Capriles Trial?
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9. (C) Poloff asked whether the Spanish were planning to
attend the trial of Baruta Mayor Henrique Capriles scheduled
to start June 9 (ref d). Fournier responded that his
government had hoped the USG would take the lead in
encouraging an international response to the trial as it had
for the Sumate hearings. Poloff suggested that Spain as an

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EU member and with its connections to the BRV and PJ might be
a more likely coordinator as it would probably have more
success rallying European partners and make a bigger impact
on the BRV. Fournier was aware that the Department sent a
request for Spanish representation at the trial through the
Spanish Embassy in Washington and noted poloff's argument.

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Comment
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10. (C) Fournier is usually well-informed and has been very
helpful in the past. His account of the Cuban visit to Ojo
Electoral is worrisome and we will discreetly inquire with
NGO contacts to if they have received similar visits. Spain
frequently claims to be working to encourage space for
opposition development. Taking the lead in rallying
international support for Capriles, an up and coming
opposition politician who recently visited Madrid to lobby
for support, is a concrete way to show that commitment and
would make it clear to President Chavez that Venezuela's
democratic health is an international concern, not solely a
U.S. one. It may be useful to follow up with Madrid on the
Capriles trial, as it starts on the same day as the World Cup
and could easily get buried in the news.

BROWNFIELD