SPANISH POLITICAL COUNSELOR REVIEWS VENEZUELAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 001402 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER FRC FT LAUDERDALE FOR CLAMBERT COPENHAGEN FOR DLAWTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: SPANISH POLITICAL COUNSELOR REVIEWS VENEZUELAN POLITICAL SCENE REF: A. CARACAS 01268 ¶B. CARACAS 00473 ¶C. 05 CARACAS 03596 ¶D. CARACAS 00744 Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARK A. WELLS FOR 1.4 (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Poloff met with Spanish Political Counselor Gonzalo Fournier May 12 to discuss Venezuelan political developments and Spanish-Venezuelan relations. Fournier told Poloff that Cuban diplomats had visited members of the electoral observer group Ojo Electoral and claimed that the USG was opposed to holding presidential elections this year. He also said that presidential aspirant Julio Borges had recently told EU Ambassadors that he expected the new National Electoral Council to be just as responsive to the BRV as the previous one, a view that Fournier shares. Fournier noted that the EU is divided on whether to send an observation mission and may instead consider funding a pool of domestic electoral NGOs including Ojo, Sumate, and Grupo La Colina. In terms of bilateral issues, Fournier did not think Spain's defense policy toward Venezuela would change. He also relayed his government's hope that the USG would take the lead in rallying support for opposition mayor Henrique Capriles, who is being tried on charges related to an incident at the Cuban Embassy in April 2002. Poloff suggested that Spain might be a more effective coordinator of an international response given its membership in the EU and its connections with the BRV and Capriles' party Primero Justicia. We will discreetly inquire whether Cuban officials have attempted to malign the USG with other NGOs. End Summary. -------------- Cuba Accuses USG of Interference -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff met with Spanish Political Counselor Gonzalo Fournier May 12 to discuss Venezuelan political developments and Spanish-Venezuelan relations. Fournier has been in Venezuela for almost four years and has close ties to several Primero Justicia, domestic electoral NGO Ojo Electoral, and Venezuelan political and economic analysts. Fournier started by asking about the USG's position on the December 3 presidential elections. He noted that Ojo Electoral board ;member Carlos Genatios told him he was recently visited by the Cuban first secretary, who asserted that the USG did not want elections, and is trying to delegitimize Chavez by encouraging the opposition to withdraw. The Cuban, Genatios told Fournier, was implying that the elections should therefore be delayed because "conditions were not right." Genatios also said Ojo founder Padre Jose Virtuoso was visited by the Cuban Ambassador, who presumably carried the same message. Poloff stressed to Fournier that the USG believes the elections are a Venezuelan issue and that it is up to individual political parties to decide whether or not CARACAS 00001402 002 OF 004 to participate. (Note: Genatios is currently unwilling to meet with poloff due to BRV surveillance and possibly other pressure. Fournier, who introduced us, occasionally serves as an unofficial intermediary.) -------------- Opposition Electoral Strategy -------------- ¶3. (C) Fournier told poloff that EU Ambassadors recently met with presidential candidate Julio Borges. Borges told the Ambassadors that he does not think the new National Electoral Council (CNE) differs from the previous board in its ideology or unquestioned loyalty to Chavez. Consequently, he expects the government will stall on granting the opposition's electoral conditions until the last minute, as they did during the 2005 legislative election season. Borges thought, for example, the CNE would eventually agree to remove the fingerprint machines, but not until the fall. He warned the Ambassadors, however, that if the CNE plays around for too long, the opposition will withdraw. Fournier suggested October might be their deadline. Fournier also said Borges' party, Primero Justicia (PJ),wants the opposition's electoral conditions in place by July, wants international observers to witness the process, and insists that addresses be released with the electoral registry. (Note: CNE President Tibisay Lucena ruled out the last request, but during a May 11 meeting with declared opposition candidates Borges and Teodoro Petkoff, and potential contender Zulia Governor Manuel Rosales, the CNE agreed to decide which conditions it would accept by the end of July.) ¶4. (C) Fournier also said that he had heard that Rosales will announce his candidacy soon. PJ Secretary General Gerardo Blyde and Genatios told Fournier they had heard rumors that Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel threatened to open several investigations against Rosales if he did not/not run (ref a). If true, the Venezuelans thought this was a sign that President Chavez was worried about a potential opposition withdrawal, according to Fournier. Borges told the EU Ambassadors that Rosales and Petkoff still oppose primaries. He, however, sees them as a good way to empower opposition supporters and strengthen the winner against Chavez. Although Blyde told us earlier this year that Borges did not favor primaries, Fournier said PJ had since consulted with a Belarusian opposition political adviser who recounted their opposition's positive experience with primaries in the last presidential election. (Note: On May 16, Borges registered to participate in Sumate's primary.) ¶5. (C) Fournier agreed with the opposition's take on the CNE saying that someone had recently described Lucena to him as "(former CNE President) Jorge Rodriguez with gloves." Sandra Oblitas, the head of the Civil and Electoral Registry Committee, was characterized as "Rodriguez' mouthpiece." He was similarly pessimistic about the potential benefits of an opposition primary. Not only did he think the winner's faults would be exposed as a result of the opposition campaign, but he questioned whether supporters would fear the CARACAS 00001402 003 OF 004 creation of another Tascon list (ref b) and therefore not participate. -------------- EU Thinking on Election Monitoring -------------- ¶6. (C) Fournier explained that EU Ambassadors are divided over whether an observation mission should return for the presidential election. Those that favor a mission (France, Spain) have proposed that it be a continuation of last year's mission to follow up on CNE implementation of their recommendations. A compromise has also been proposed in which the EU would fund a pool of domestic NGO observers that would include Ojo Electoral, Sumate, and Grupo La Colina. (Grupo La Colina is a pro-opposition NGO. It was a technician from this NGO that revealed the possibility of linking voters to their votes (ref c).) -------------- No Change Expected in Defense Policy -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Turning to bilateral issues, Fournier said Spanish defense policy toward Venezuela would likely remain unchanged under new Defense Minister Jose Antonio Alonso. Regarding the failed CASA plane acquisition, Fournier pointed out that the company had killed the deal fearing that it might jeopardize their ability to get future (more lucrative) U.S. defense contracts. Fournier did not think Spanish Ambassador to Venezuela Raul Morodo, an irritating Chavez apologist, would be leaving until December, despite rumors of political ties to Bono. -------------- Zapatero-Chavez Meeting Unlikely -------------- ¶8. (C) Fournier noted that Chavez had asked for a private meeting with Zapatero on the margins of the EU-Latin American/Caribbean meeting. As far as Fournier knew, however, Zapatero had not granted the meeting. Fournier said the Spanish President called Chavez after the Bolivian nationalization announcement to see if he could mediate with President Evo Morales. Still, he thought Repsol would probably come to some modus vivendi with Bolivia like they had with Venezuela after the forced migration of the operating service agreements to joint ventures. -------------- Will US Take Lead on Capriles Trial? -------------- ¶9. (C) Poloff asked whether the Spanish were planning to attend the trial of Baruta Mayor Henrique Capriles scheduled to start June 9 (ref d). Fournier responded that his government had hoped the USG would take the lead in encouraging an international response to the trial as it had for the Sumate hearings. Poloff suggested that Spain as an CARACAS 00001402 004 OF 004 EU member and with its connections to the BRV and PJ might be a more likely coordinator as it would probably have more success rallying European partners and make a bigger impact on the BRV. Fournier was aware that the Department sent a request for Spanish representation at the trial through the Spanish Embassy in Washington and noted poloff's argument. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Fournier is usually well-informed and has been very helpful in the past. His account of the Cuban visit to Ojo Electoral is worrisome and we will discreetly inquire with NGO contacts to if they have received similar visits. Spain frequently claims to be working to encourage space for opposition development. Taking the lead in rallying international support for Capriles, an up and coming opposition politician who recently visited Madrid to lobby for support, is a concrete way to show that commitment and would make it clear to President Chavez that Venezuela's democratic health is an international concern, not solely a U.S. one. It may be useful to follow up with Madrid on the Capriles trial, as it starts on the same day as the World Cup and could easily get buried in the news. BROWNFIELD