Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CARACAS1262
2006-05-10 19:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

ALIANZA POPULAR TOUTS ABSTENTION MESSAGE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM VE 
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PP RUEHAG
DE RUEHCV #1262/01 1301912
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P 101912Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4425
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6428
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 5445
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 1973
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0203
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 1190
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 3741
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0700
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2053
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0935
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0173
RUEHMI/USOFFICE FRC FT LAUDERDALE PRIORITY 3060
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0691
RUCNMEM/EU MEM COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001262 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2031
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: ALIANZA POPULAR TOUTS ABSTENTION MESSAGE

REF: A. 05 CARACAS 1913

B. CARACAS 718

CARACAS 00001262 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor,
for Reason 1.4(b).

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001262 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2031 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE SUBJECT: ALIANZA POPULAR TOUTS ABSTENTION MESSAGE REF: A. 05 CARACAS 1913 ¶B. CARACAS 718 CARACAS 00001262 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor, for Reason 1.4(b). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Veteran Christian Democrat politician Oswaldo Alvarez Paz has just completed his first year building his "Alianza Popular," a center-right micro-party that prefers to throw rocks at the 2006 presidential elections rather than participate with other opposition groups. Alvarez Paz denies he advocates abstentionism, but rather has serious doubts that the government will grant the necessary conditions for fair elections, as outlined in the "4-D" manifesto he and other opposition figures recently issued. Of the serious opposition candidates, Alvarez Paz believes Zulia Governor Manuel Rosales stands the best chance, despite his inability to confront President Hugo Chavez head on. Teodoro Petkoff, he alleged, is soft on Cuba and possibly even being financed by the Chavez administration. A political has-been, Alvarez Paz, like many in the opposition, is waiting for some unforeseen "manna from heaven" development that might resuscitate the moribund opposition. End summary. -------------- Ex-Copeyano Starts Over -------------- ¶2. (C) Oswaldo Alvarez Paz founded Alianza Popular (Popular Alliance) in May 2005 with the objective of building a new center-right party (ref a). Alvarez Paz described his party as one of "cadres," a popular label for parties consisting of mostly leaders. He declared that the new political movement would not immediately participate in elections, but rather would organize itself for the medium-term. Alvarez Paz told Poloff May 3 that the fledgling party advocates clean elections, which has translated into overt calls to boycott elections until the National Electoral Council (CNE) grants adequate conditions (e.g., no fingerprint machines, manual vote count, a transparent registry, and international observation). Alianza Popular, he said, continues to hold party-building events throughout Venezuela and hopes to register officially with the CNE next year. ¶3. (C) Alvarez Paz is a former leader of the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI) that served as the junior partner in the "Punto Fijo" era of the latter half of the 20th Century. Alvar
ez Paz won the first election for the Governor of Zulia in 1989 and later became COPEI's presidential candidate in the 1993 race. Alvarez Paz related that COPEI held an historic primary to select the copeyano candidate, pitting him against party rival Eduardo Fernandez. At least two million voters participated in that open primary, but Alvarez Paz said it had the effect of polarizing the party. Ultimately, the party's paralysis opened cleared the way for party founder and former president Rafael Caldera to form a breakaway party and win the presidency. (An embittered Alvarez Paz subsequently withdrew from COPEI in 2000.) Based on his experience with Venezuelan politics, Alvarez Paz warned that the modern-day opposition's flirtation with a primary to pick a candidate to run against President Hugo Chavez may not be the unifying factor many are counting on. -------------- 4-D Movement: A Kodak Moment -------------- ¶4. (C) In March, Alvarez Paz and other opposition personalities, including RCTV television director general Marcel Granier and Sumate leader Maria Corina Machado, signed a manifesto denouncing the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV) for failing to deliver after seven years of government CARACAS 00001262 002.2 OF 003 (ref b). The group, calling itself "4-D" after the December 4 legislative elections which saw a 75-percent abstention rate, blasted the CNE for being the "political arm of the regime" run by BRV lackeys. Asked how the 4-D movement was progressing, Alvarez Paz said "the most important part of 4-D was the photograph" of the prominent opposition figures at the manifesto's public release. Alvarez Paz said there was never much intention to launch a new movement, just to make the argument that the Venezuelan public (including significant numbers of Chavistas) had essentially signaled their dissatisfaction with Chavez' rule. -------------- Presidential Candidates: No Clear Winners -------------- ¶5. (C) Asked about the current slate of serious opposition challengers to Chavez, Alvarez Paz thought that Zulia Governor Manuel Rosales would make the best choice. He added, however, that Rosales lacked the stomach to confront Chavez directly, which Alvarez thought would be a serious weakness once the campaign started. He noted, too, that Rosales is stuck between the proverbial rock and a hard place, having to govern within the Chavista world while not being seen as a collaborator by the opposition. Rosales also has a possible prosecution hanging over his head for his involvement in the April 2002 coup, Alvarez Paz observed, pointing out that Rosales signed the Carmona Decree that temporarily dissolved Venezuela's constitutional government. He said that Primero Justicia presidential candidate Julio Borges lacks the passion to beat Chavez and is plagued by internal party problems. He lamented that Borges had "fallen into the temptation of presidential elections" when his party could have continued to grow into a respectable opposition force. ¶6. (C) Alvarez Paz reserved his toughest criticism, however, for newspaper editor Teodoro Petkoff, who declared his candidacy in April. Alvarez Paz challenged Poloff to search the pages of Petkoff's Tal Cual newspaper and come up with a single Petkoff criticism of Fidel Castro or the FARC (especially the Rodrigo Granda affair). Aside from these allegations of being a communist sympathizer, Alvarez Paz noted that Pekoff had never questioned the results of the recall referendum despite multiple fraud allegations. Alvarez Paz suspected, too, that Petkoff might be receiving financing from the BRV by way of his old colleague Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel. (Note: Separately, Poloffs met with Alvarez Paz aides, who claimed that Petkoff made a stop in Havana after attending the inauguration of Chilean President Michele Bachelet. Petkoff, allegedly escorted by Venezuelan Fonmin Rodriguez, met with Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Foreign Minister Perez Roque. Petkoff publicly denied the charges after Alvarez Paz supposedly leaked the allegations.) -------------- Elections Not A Sure Thing -------------- ¶7. (C) Alvarez Paz said he doubted that the CNE would grant the minimum conditions for the opposition to compete fairly in December. Poor voting conditions would, he supposed, drive up abstention rates and even force opposition candidates to back out of the race, potentially leaving Chavez alone on the ballot. In that case, he said he could foresee a new, non-electoral conflict emerging that would force a crisis in 2007. While his contacts in the military (he has many from his days as Governor of Zulia, where a key garrison is located) express increasing discontent with Chavez, he said he is not aware of any plans to oust him. However, in the event of a crisis, Alvarez Paz asserted, the military would probably be tempted to step in. -------------- Comment CARACAS 00001262 003.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶8. (C) Alianza Popular is stuck in the catch-22 of opposition politics: attacking the skewed electoral system mostly drives away potential opposition voters. Alvarez Paz, though an astute political observer, is a has-been trying to maintain some semblance of a political organization. Like surfers in calm seas waiting for that big wave, opposition groups like Alianza are biding their time in hopes that some external factor -- a drop in oil prices, a popular uprising, invasion, etc. -- will trip up Chavez and open a space for them. It is a strategy to survive, but not to win. BROWNFIELD

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