OAS EOM FINAL REPORT ON VENEZUELA ELECTIONS --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001231 SIPDIS SIPDIS USOAS FOR JMAISTO HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER FRC FT LAUDERDALE FOR CLAMBERT COPENHAGEN FOR DLAWTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM OAS VE SUBJECT: OAS EOM FINAL REPORT ON VENEZUELA ELECTIONS -- WEAKER STILL REF: A. 05 CARACAS 3681 ¶B. CARACAS 00719 ¶C. CARACAS 00903 ¶D. CARACAS 01152 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On April 25, the OAS electoral observation mission (EOM) quietly released its final report on the December 2005 legislative elections. The report, like the preliminary version, was less critical of the electoral process than the EU EOM (refs a and b). In general, most criticism of the government is buried in the body of the report, and some of the OAS EOM's recommendations for resolving problems do not effectively address the issues. There has been little reaction to the report, but the government did run full page ads in opposition papers May 7 highlighting the parts of the report that praised the automated voting system. If this does become a hot topic, it might be in the context of its formal presentation at the OAS ministerial meeting in Santo Domingo in June. End Summary. -------------- -------------- OAS EOM Views Similar, but Sometimes Weaker than EU -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The OAS electoral observation mission's (EOM) final report on the December 2005 legislative elections, like the preliminary version, is similar but less critical of the electoral process than the EU EOM (refs a and b). For example, the OAS EOM acknowledges that the opposition's distrust of the National Electoral Council (CNE) was rooted in its "origin, composition, and provisional status." Instead of recommending a new, more politically balanced CNE, however, the OAS simply recommends that the National Assembly name a permanent CNE by either ratifying in place or changing the current members, seemingly dismissing the opposition's concerns about the board's extremely biased composition. The EOM later notes that the government is responsible for including the opposition in formal and informal decisionmaking. However, the wording does not necessarily imply including people of diverse political views in the CNE or any government body. In addition, the OAS supports the opposition's demand that the CNE release the electoral registry with addresses, essential to verifying the accuracy of the rolls, but it does not use the existence of the Tascon or Maisanta lists as part of its argument. The lists, which essentially single out opposition supporters, are briefly mentioned as an opposition concern. The OAS EOM claimed it could not confirm their use as a tool of political discrimination, but were disturbed by the "possibility" that the lists could be used for political means. The lists are key to voter confidence in the even-handedness of the CNE, however, another point the EOM dodged. CARACAS 00001231 002 OF 003 ¶3. (C) The OAS report is closer to that of the EU on other issues and occasionally goes further in its critique and/or recommendations. For example, the OAS EOM agreed that legal loopholes, and inconsistent and, at times, contradictory applications of the Constitution and electoral laws led to decisions that violated the spirit and letter of the law, generating further suspicion of the electoral process. The OAS EOM specifically singles out the CNE for not protecting the principle of proportional representation as the Constitution calls on it to do. On the technical front, the OAS, like the EU, noted that the technological development of the voting system had surpassed what was envisioned and regulated in the electoral law. The OAS EOM also called for the opposition to be given a more active role in auditing the voting system, as the EU did. In its technical discussion the OAS went one step further calling on the CNE to develop a long-term strategic plan for future automation of the voting system. -------------- Some Recommendations Appear Inadequate -------------- ¶4. (C) Occasionally, the OAS EOM's recommendations for resolving problems do not appear to satisfactorily address them. Although it suggests rethinking the prohibition on public financing for political parties, the OAS EOM also recommends the CNE limit the time and extent of campaigning, as it is constitutionally authorized to do, as an alternative solution to balancing out the funding for campaigns and making it more transparent. Another recommendation states the CNE should regulate the internal elections of political parties to ensure that the constitutional requirements for such elections are met. This seems like an odd recommendation, since the CNE has been unable to fulfill its constitutional obligation to oversee the labor unions' internal elections and is widely accused of interfering for political reasons. As a result, these elections have been delayed by more than a year, triggering frustration of these unions and a citation by the International Labor Organization. Moreover, President Chavez used this legal provision in 2000 to try to get his supporters elected as leaders of the pro-opposition Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV),the country's largest union at the time. -------------- Reaction -------------- ¶5. (U) There has been little reaction to the report and all of it has been predictable. The CNE website has an article taken from the Communication Ministry's website that focuses on the OAS' approval of the automated voting system and strong condemnation of the opposition for pulling out despite the CNE's concession to withdraw the fingerprint machines. In addition, the government took out full page ads in the May 7 editions of pro-opposition newspapers El Universal and El Nacional highlighting excerpts that praised the automated voting system and the CNE's work. The opposition papers have CARACAS 00001231 003 OF 003 emphasized the OAS' usual call for dialogue and its recommendation to release the electoral registry with addresses to opposition and civil society organizations to ensure independent auditing and review. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) The quiet unveiling of the OAS report and the absence of any telling criticism of the CNE, compared to the EU's formal release via press conference in Caracas and up front, direct critiques, suggests the OAS is more concerned about sparking President Chavez' ire than providing a fully accurate and useful report. The OAS' feeble performance in this instance must be factored into a decision on whether to support future OAS observation missions in Venezuela. Having said that, as noted in ref c, leadership is key. Perina simply did not have the stature or the spine to stand up to the BRV. The report, like the appointment of the new CNE (ref d) appears to be a missed opportunity to suggest necessary improvements to the electoral process in Venezuela. While the murder of a prominent priest (septel) and the appointment of the CNE have overshadowed news of the report, if this does become a hot topic, it might be in the context of its formal presentation at the OAS ministerial meeting in Santo Domingo in June. BROWNFIELD