CHAVEZ' "BOLIVARIAN" BUSINESS MODELS: THE TRIUMPH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 001209 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON VE SUBJECT: CHAVEZ' "BOLIVARIAN" BUSINESS MODELS: THE TRIUMPH OF IDEOLOGY REF: A. CARACAS 944 ¶B. CARACAS 172 This message is sensitive but unclassified, please treat accordingly. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) As part of his "XXI-Century Socialism" project, President Chavez has chosen to reward business models that conform to his political vision via financial incentives and preferential treatment. The BRV has supported the creation of thousands of cooperatives, which have largely failed to revive the economy as promised. It has also "rescued" a handful of nearly-bankrupt companies by promoting the "Co-Management" model of buying out a majority of shares and leaving the rest to workers or the original owners. Chavez has fostered the creation of Social Production Enterprises (EPS),structured like cooperatives -- with a mandate to reinvest in surrounding communities -- but without a basis in law. PDVSA is requiring all contractors to become EPSs or pay a percentage of gross income for social programs. The BRV has touted "endogenous development" (development from within) as a guiding principle. However, rewarding business models based on ideology versus their productivity or financial health is economic folly, and predictably, the "Bolivarian" models are already showing signs of weakness. End Summary. -------------- Cooperatives -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Since Pres. Chavez took office, the BRV has actively promoted cooperatives, defined as structures where means of production and profits are distributed equally, and a lack of hierarchy guarantees all members have equal rights. By April, the Ministry of Popular Economy (MINEP) had over 107,000 registered cooperatives, 42,000 in 2005 alone. An estimated 4.6 percent of employed Venezuelans work in cooperatives, and setting up a cooperative takes little more than a willing group of five people and some minimal training. Mision Vuelvan Caras (Mission About Face) trains participants on how to form and operate a cooperative, with over 6,014 cooperatives created under this program in 2005. According to MINEP, 3,007 of these are producing and selling products, 800 are waiting for land to work on (Ref A),and the rest -- 37 percent -- are in the "planning stages." MINEP announced in April 2006 that it hoped to oversee the creation of 100,000 cooperatives in 2006, over 28,000 through 
Mision Vuelvan Caras. ¶3. (SBU) The infusion of new cooperatives into the economy is catalyzed by preferential financing from the BRV. Many existing companies are taking advantage of the situation and simply "re-structuring" their charters as cooperatives to obtain financial benefits. However, most keep their operating model intact. This same trend is occurring in all BRV-favored business models, though no figures are available to estimate how many cooperatives are "just for show." ¶4. (SBU) The financial probity of new cooperatives is questionable. Of 1,500 cooperatives audited by the National Superintendency of Cooperatives (SUNOOP) in 2005, 628 of them presented "irregularities" and are being sanctioned for a myriad of violations, ranging from denying partnership to employees after six months of employment (required by law) to incomplete or missing financial records. The National Assembly is launching a separate investigation to determine the extent of "irregularities." To get a handle on cooperatives, SUNOOP announced on April 11 that they planned to carry out a nationwide census to gather information. Some analysts believe that the cooperatives have largely "failed" -- high loan default rates and poor productivity have dampened the high hopes the BRV had for these production models. -------------- CARACAS 00001209 002 OF 004 Co-management -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Another favored business model is Co-Management ("Co-gestion"). Co-management is not a clearly defined term, even by the BRV. In most cases, co-management means worker involvement in management of a company, either through a worker's union taking over management decisions or a cooperative sitting on a company board. The model also requires investment in social programs that benefit the surrounding community. In all cases, the BRV comes to own a majority share in the company, while the minority is left to workers, original owners, or a combination of the two. According to legal experts, fewer than 260 co-management enterprises were formed in 2005 in all of Venezuela. ¶6. (SBU) Many co-managed companies are born out of near bankruptcy -- workers fear for their jobs and call on the government to intervene, either to buy out the company's majority shares (a de facto capital infusion),or to outright expropriate. (Note: in the last year, there have been less than 10 actual expropriations (Ref B). End Note.) Many companies which suffered financially from the 2002 general strikes turn to co-management. As with cooperatives, the BRV provides financial incentives to co-managed companies. The National Assembly (AN) approved USD 52.5 million in additional credits for use by MINEP's Program for Investment in Co-Management. The government doles out the credits on the condition that companies reinvest 10 percent of profits in social programs. SENIAT, the tax agency, also provides tax breaks to co-managed enterprises. On April 28, Chavez issued a presidential decree saying that companies that were going to fire workers due to "economic hardship" could be required to re-structure under the co-management model. ¶7. (SBU) The success of co-management schemes overall is difficult to gauge, given that their ownership structures vary greatly. Alcasa, a large aluminum processing plant (and landmark co-management enterprise) reported a USD 56.7 million loss in 2005, despite nearly USD 210 million of BRV investment. In Zulia state, Sideroca (a steel mill) was expropriated in September of 2005, yet administrative delays have prevented the completion of the legal process required to operate under a co-management model, prompting worker protests and illegal occupation of the plant. (Note: Chavista workers blame Zulia state's opposition governor for stalling the company's transformation. End Note). Since co-management is largely born out of failing companies, the BRV argues that its intervention keeps them operational, which is true. However, these "rescues" in turn prompt other workers to mobilize and seek government intervention. Selfex, an underwear and bathing suit manufacturing plant, was taken over by workers in March 2006 and is awaiting BRV funding to continue operating. -------------- Social Production Enterprises (EPS) -------------- ¶8. (SBU) A third business model favored by the BRV is the Social Production Enterprise (Empresas de Produccion Social, EPS). There is no legislation that defines EPS structure, and only two documents (a September 2005 BRV decree and a November 2005 PDVSA document) shed any light on what an EPS should achieve (but not its structure). According to this guidance, EPS management is non-hierarchical and property is collective (like a cooperative). Its objectives should include generating goods and services that satisfy the needs of the community, employing the "men and women of the missions," and holding values of "solidarity" and "cooperation." It should keep an "economic balance" that allows continued re-investment of profits into social programs. The Minister of Mining and Basic Industry (MIBAM), Victor Alvarez, failed to clarify the picture when he stated that EPSs "will not be classic mercantile companies, nor will they have collective contracts and a predatory effect on the environment." ¶9. (SBU) The BRV is encouraging the creation of EPSs via direct investment. In November 2005, PDVSA pledged USD 100 CARACAS 00001209 003 OF 004 million to "promote socialism" via EPSs. In February 2006 the BRV created CONIBA (National Company for Basic Industries),a holding unit for state-owned companies in this sector, including a steel mill, a tubing manufacturer, a cement plant, a cotton processing plant, a rail manufacturer, a pulp and paper processing company, a mining enterprise and a construction materials manufacturer. The BRV owns 51 percent of the companies and private or public foreign entities own the rest. As EPSs, companies are expected to re-invest in the community -- CONIBA has already allocated USD 2.8 million of investment toward badly-needed housing construction. So far, the BRV has allocated USD 1.39 billion for EPSs from FONDEN (National Development Fund),and will provide preferential loans for these companies via the Foreign Commerce Bank of Venezuela (Bancoex). SENIAT, as with other favored business models, offers tax breaks to EPSs. ¶10. (SBU) The private sector is alarmed about BRV backing of EPS enterprises, especially in relation to PDVSA. PDVSA has traditionally had a contractor registry (RAC),but now has created a parallel registry only for EPSs (REPS). Rumors abound that they've dropped the RAC altogether, though PDVSA hasn't issued an official statement confirming this. PDVSA is already unofficially requiring all contractors to adopt the EPS business model or pay a percentage of profits (1-2 percent of gross income) for social programs. As a result, non-EPS companies are adjusting their bids to account for what amounts to an extra-legal "social tax" and PDVSA's costs are being inflated artificially. In some areas of the country PDVSA is requiring that companies include a social project proposal in contract bids. ¶11. (SBU) Though the EPS movement is relatively new, already some weak spots are showing. In the case of CVG Venalum, a state-owned aluminum processor, 14 of their subcontracted EPSs are protesting because they haven't been paid in over 18 months, despite the preferential treatment they're supposed to receive as EPSs. -------------- Endogenous Development Nuclei -------------- ¶12. (SBU) As an overall economic concept, Chavez has often referred to "Nuclei of Endogenous Development" (Nucleos de Desarrollo Endogeno),but a concrete and coherent definition is hard to come by. Official BRV websites explain that endogenous development is "development from within -- by the community and for the community" and represents a more "human economy," but has no objective standards on what a "nucleus" looks like or how it operates (Note: given the randomness of the projects approved under this model, it is likely there is no set definition. End Note.) The BRV has awarded grants for everything from chicken farming projects by high schoolers, to tropical fruit processing plants, to housing repair programs in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Endogenous development is more of a concept than a business model. If anything, it's become an umbrella justification for BRV support of ad hoc -- and politically correct -- projects that don't fit easily into other models. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Rewarding business models based on their ideology versus their productivity or financial solvency is economic folly. In fact, many companies are taking advantage and simply "re-structuring" themselves to obtain BRV benefits while keeping operations unchanged. For Chavez, however, it's a way to play to his voter base and direct funds toward businesses that align to his political vision. Of the three business models discussed (Cooperatives, Co-Management, and EPS),the future of co-management is the most uncertain, since too many variables in ownership structure preclude a sensible prediction. EPSs, however, will likely go down the same familiar path that cooperatives have traveled by virtue of their non-hierarchical, not-for-profit structures. The fact that EPSs are not rooted in law may be intentional -- it CARACAS 00001209 004 OF 004 provides a quiet exit in case the model fails. For now, poor economic decisions are sustainable only with high oil windfall revenue. When that inflow slows down, the consequences of favoring ineffective business models will become all too apparent. End Comment. BROWNFIELD