AUSTRALIA DECLINES FIJI'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CANBERRA 001940 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP, EB, CA, P AND IO E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS AS FJ NZ SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA DECLINES FIJI'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION; PLANS TO CUT DEFENSE TIES AND IMPOSE TRAVEL BAN ON BAINIMARAMA AND SUPPORTERS REF: STATE 195037 Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole, for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Australia declined a request by Fijian Prime Minister Qarase for Australian military intervention to prevent a coup by the RFMF Commander Bainimarama. In reaction to events, the Australian Foreign Minister announced December 5 Australia would suspend defense ties with Fiji, including imposing a travel ban on Fijian military personnel and any others involved in the "creeping coup." Meanwhile, senior Australian and New Zealand officials discussed with visiting EAP/ANP Director Steven McGann coordinating policy responses to events in Fiji during a December 5 Canberra-Wellington digital video conference, outlining the range of sanctions under consideration by both governments. End Summary. -------------- AUSTRALIA REFUSES TO INTERVENE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Prime Minister Howard told the press December 5 that Fijian Prime Minister Qarase had telephoned him that morning to request Australian military intervention to prevent a coup by Fijian military commander, Commodore Frank Bainimarama. Howard said he had declined the request because it was "not in Australia's national interest" to intervene, adding that he could not countenance Australian and Fijian troops fighting one another on the streets of Suva. -------------- -- OA TO SUSPEND DEFENSE TIES, IMPOSE TRAVEL BAN ON COUP PERPETRATORS -------------- -- ¶3. (SBU) In Parliament December 5, Foreign Minister Downer strongly condemned the attempted overthrow of a democratically-elected government, deploring the behavior of both Bainimarama and Fiji President Iloilo in supporting the RFMF chief in what he termed a "creeping coup." Warning that the international response to a coup would be "swift and sharp," Downer announced Australia would suspend defence ties with Fiji as soon as it became apparent that the Prime Minister could not longer govern. The suspension of military and defense cooperation would include a ban on all travel of Bainimarama and his family members, Bainimaram's supporters, and any others who might be part of an unconstitutional government. He alluded to the UN Secretary General's warning that Fiji might be removed from peacekeeping operations, and said the GOA would consider taking other steps against an illegal government in Fiji as well, possibly to include recommending suspension from the Commonwealth and removal of Fiji from the chairmanship of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). (Other steps under consideration by Australia are detailed in para 6 below.) -------------- -- U.S.-AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND DVC ON POLICY RESPONSES TO FIJI COUP -------------- -- ¶4. (C) Earlier on December 5, visiting EAP/ANP Director Steven McGann held a DVC with Australia's DFAT Pacific Division First Assistant Secretary David A. Ritchie and New Zealand Deputy Foreign Secretary Alan Williams with the aim of discussing trilateral coordination of policy responses to a possible coup in Fiji. McGann noted the United States would need to consider carefully when to declare events in Suva a "coup," which would trigger immediate suspension of all aid under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act. The U.S. might initially declare that "an unlawful or unconstitutional change of government" had taken place, which would allow flexibility in ending assistance to CANBERRA 00001940 002 OF 004 coup perpetrators while maintaining assistance to the civilian population. -------------- NEW ZEALAND'S PROPOSED STEPS -------------- ¶5. (C) Prime Minister Clark shared the U.S. view, Williams explained. Rather than wait for a formal announcement of a coup by Fiji, New Zealand planned to take steps upon unlawful removal of the Fiji government's authority due to "unconstitutional actions by the military in Fiji." Three immediate steps the GNZ planned to take, subject to approval by Prime Minister Clark, were: -- Imposing travel bans on RFMF officers and their families, as well as others involved in the coup; -- Supporting Commonwealth sanctions, including possibly expulsion from the Commonwealth; -- Suspending bilateral defense ties, except for maritime patrols aimed at illegal fishing or humanitarian operations such as search-and-rescue missions. The latter step would include suspending military visits and training. (Note: As this cable was in preparation, Prime Minister Clark announced implementation of the steps above. See also Ref A.) ¶6. (C) Beyond the immediate actions, New Zealand was considering other sanctions, including: suspension of high-level contacts; a freeze on the recent labor mobility initiative announced at the PIF that would permit Fijians to work in New Zealand; other immigration measures, such as suspending Fiji's eligibility under the access quota; targeted cessation of aid that directly assisted the Fijian government (but not aid for the "lower-end" population); a sports ban; removing Fiji as chair of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF),and freezing of financial assets. Williams said New Zealand was not prepared to invoke trade sanctions or to recall either its High Commissioner or its Defense Attache from Suva, except for consultations. -------------- AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE TO COUP -------------- ¶7. (C) Australia was considering similar sanctions, David Ritchie said, although the GOA did not envision their phased implementation. Australian sanctions under consideration that had been endorsed by FM Downer included: -- Imposing travel bans on Fijian coup perpetrators and those recruited to an interim government; -- Suspending defense cooperation, including funding and technical support for the Pacific Patrol Boat program; -- Ending technical assistance to the RFMF; -- Expelling Fijian students at Australian military training academies; -- Recommending Commonwealth sanctions; -- Removing Fiji as chair of the PIF (noting this was up to PIF Secretary Greg Urwin); -- Seeking further statements from the UN Secretary General and UN Security Council; -- Urging other countries to impose sanctions. (Ritchie noted France and approached the GOA, indicating it wished to cooperate in putting pressure on Fiji.) -- Imposing financial sanctions on Commander Bainimarama; -- Urging the UN to name a Special Representative to Fiji; -- Urging withdrawal from United Nations peacekeeping operations; and -- Examining further actions/sanctions under the Biketawa Declaration. -------------- -------------- U.S. REDLINE ON REMOVING FIJI FROM PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) McGann stressed Washington's concern that parties not rush to remove Fiji's participation in UN peacekeeping operations, noting the importance of Fiji to UN peacekeeping CANBERRA 00001940 003 OF 004 operations in Baghdad and elsewhere. Williams acknowledged the need to ensure that important peacekeeping operations, such as in Baghdad and Darfur, not be hindered, but drew attention to the impact such suspension might make on the Fijian military, which is highly dependent on PKO remittances. Moreover, he pointed out, the effect of reducing military assistance to Fiji would be to degrade the RFMF's capability, thus making Fiji less acceptable for peacekeeping operations. The United Nations itself would need to make a determination whether poor discipline of Fijian troops or adverse impact caused by conditions in their home country might disqualify them from PKO participation. Ritchie concurred, adding that Australia might consider stopping payments to Fijian military elements under the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Williams agreed, saying it would remove Fiji's credentials as an upholder of good government, but cautioned that such move not expand into UN PKO issues. He supported retaining the Fijian police component in RAMSI. ¶9. (C) McGann outlined USG considerations and options for responding to the situation in Fiji, including possibly endorsing the suggestion that Fiji be removed as PIF chair. Unlike New Zealand and Australia, which saw value in issuing statements in advance of a coup, the U.S. did not want to make any pre-emptive statement, but wanted to act when an unlawful change had occurred, including imposing travel bans and other steps. McGann said the U.S. would not recall its Ambassador to Suva, who would be key in coordinating the U.S. response. McGann said EAP DAS Davies planned to convene countries represented at the Nandy PIF to outline U.S. steps in detail. Ritchie said the GOA planned to call PIF countries together for a briefing on the afternoon of December 5. Williams noted the importance of seeking views of India. ¶10. (C) In the midst of the DVC, Williams relayed breaking news that Fiji President Iloilo had announced that the military could take over the government; the Australian and New Zealand participants concluded that the President was acting outside his constitutional authority and that their governments would likely make statements later in the day. All agreed to continue close coordination, including with other countries that had been represented at the PIF. -------------- EMINENT PERSONS GROUP -------------- ¶11. (C) In a discussion about the Eminent Persons Group (EPG),McGann said the United States was not prepared to nominate a representative in advance of a coup but could issue a statement associating the United States with the EPG's objectives of urging adherence to the rule of law. The U.S. might be interested in participating in a post-coup EPG that sought to restore constitutional government, he added. Williams questioned whether the EPG would have any utility, but pledged New Zealand support it if the current Fijian Government asked for an EPG to visit. He listed several suggestions by PIF Secretary Greg Urwin regarding composition of the EPG. (Note: Ref A was not received until after the DVC. Embassy will convey substance separately to First Assistant Secretary Ritchie.) -------------- -- AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND ACCEPT INVITATION TO FEBRUARY 1 SUBREGIONAL CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE -------------- -- ¶12. (SBU) Williams and Ritchie accepted McGann's invitation to participate in the United States subregional Chiefs of Mission conference in Honolulu on February 1. ¶13. (U) This message was cleared with Embassy Wellington. EAP/ANP Director McGann did not have an opportunity to review CANBERRA 00001940 004 OF 004 this message prior to his departure from Canberra. MCCALLUM