AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 001366 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PARM AS SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON OPPOSITION LEADER KIM BEAZLEY Classified By: Ambassador Robert McCallum, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) Opposition Leader Kim Beazley told the Ambassador during his September 6 introductory call that the alliance continued to enjoy broad bipartisan support in Australia. The Labor Party, for its part, could be counted on to continue to support the alliance,s core elements of ship visits, the joint facilities, and joint exercises. If elected to replace Prime Minister John Howard, Beazley would maintain AUSTRALIAN forces in Afghanistan, since they represented a key part of the GOA,s response to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. While he would also leave AUSTRALIAN troops in Baghdad to protect AUSTRALIAN diplomats and Australian naval forces in the Gulf, Beazley would make good on his longstanding pledge to withdraw AUSTRALIAN troops from southern Iraq. In other comments, Beazley urged that the U.S. release David Hicks if he could not be brought before a civil court, since most Australians would never accept his conviction by a military commission, maintained that the Howard government had had full knowledge of the AUSTRALIAN Wheat Board,s violations of the IRAQ sanctions regime, and reiterated Labor opposition to any decision by the government to enrich uranium. BIPARTISAN ALLIANCE SUPPORT -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) The Ambassador began his September 6 introductory call on Labor Party head and Opposition Leader Kim Beazley by noting that he looked forward to remaining in close touch with the opposition during his time in Australia. We greatly valued, he said, the bipartisan underpinnings for the Alliance here, and appreciated that Labor,s continued support for our close ties was of paramount importance. In this connection, the Ambassador recalled he had already met with Shadow Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd, who had observed that the party leadership,s support for the alliance was not cost free, in terms of Labor,s internal dynamics (reported SEPTEL). Rudd had also provided a candid description of where Labor differed from the U.S. approach on certain issues, while reaffirming the leadership,s ironclad commitment to the overall alliance. LABOR'S HISTORIC BACKING OF U.S. TIES -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Opposition Leader Beazley responded by recalling wryly that the Ambassador,s immediate predecessor, with whom he had enjoyed a very constructive relationship, was not adverse to taking Labor publicly to task on occasion. Although this had prompted criticism, Beazley said the former Ambassador was merely doing his job -- and doing it well -- of promoting his country,s interests. AUSTRALIAN politicians needed to be mature, and recognize that U.S representatives would react if their country,s policies were attacked. This came with the territory, and Labor officials had to be prepared to wear it. ¶4. (C/NF) Continuing, Beazley reinforced Rudd,s comments on Labor,s historically strong support for the Alliance, recalling that the immediate post-war Menzies-led Liberal government had real concerns over Washington,s policies at the time, which it believed promoted destabilizing decolonialization in Southeast Asia. Labor, by contrast, was guided by Prime Minister Curtin,s embrace of the United States during World War II as the region,s primary hope for a lasting postwar peace. This said, Beazley recounted that Labor had long recognized the relative power disparity between the United States and Australia on the international scene. The United States is invariably the elephant in the room, he said, and while Australia,s views may not always matter that much in Washington, the reverse was never true. Australians remained obsessed with the United States, and followed Washington,s every move, perhaps to a fault. HIGH-LEVEL U.S. ATTENTION -------------- CANBERRA 00001366 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C/NF) The Ambassador, in responding, cautioned Beazley against underestimating the esteem in which Australia was now held at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. The U.S. media too often could ignore Australia, but policy makers were keenly aware of the multifaceted interests that our two nations share, and that were driving our relations ever closer. In the meantime, the Ambassador told Beazley that he was committed to ensuring Washington had a comprehensive picture of AUSTRALIAN views, which meant those of the Opposition and well as those of the Government. At the same time, the Ambassador stressed his understanding of the key personal role Beazley had played as defense minister under the Hawke Government in defending and strengthening the alliance during crucial periods in the 1980s. SOUTHEAST ASIA/PACIFIC FOCUS -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Beazley affirmed that the alliance continued to enjoy broad bipartisan support in Australia. This did not mean, as Kevin Rudd had noted, that the Labor leadership did not have to pay certain costs within the party when it argued the alliance case. Nonetheless, Labor could be counted upon to continue to support the alliance,s core elements, which Beazley described as the joint facilities, ship visits, and joint training exercises. At the same time, Labor and the coalition government had different strategic policy outlooks, with Labor more focused on Southeast Asia and the Pacific region and the government less so, as a result of its preoccupation with the Middle East. The government, and Foreign Minister Downer in particular, had badly misstated the facts, Beazley charged, when Downer claimed in August of 2004 in Beijing that a conflict between the U.S. and China over Taiwan would not necessarily trigger Australia,s ANZUS obligations to aid the U.S. In the event of a war between the United States and China, Australia would have absolutely no alternative but to line up militarily beside the U.S., Beazley said. Otherwise, the alliance would be effectively dead and buried, something Australia could never afford to see happen. It was important for Washington and Canberra to do everything possible to prevent such a catastrophe, but Downer should have known better than to have given Beijing any notion that Canberra would be able to sit out a conflict. (COMMENT: Prime Minister Howard, subsequent to Downer,s Beijing remarks (which he insisted had been taken out of context),made clear Australia,s ANZUS alliance responsibilities would always play a key role in the nation,s decisions, while maintaining it was improper to speculate about hypothetical future situations. END COMMENT.) REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT LEAVE IRAQ -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Beazley continued that Labor also disagreed with important aspects of government policy toward the Middle East. Labor supported Australia,s military contributions in Afghanistan, and would continue to do so until Hell freezes over, since Australia,s actions clearly fell under its ANZUS obligations to respond to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. IRAQ was different, he maintained, and was a terrible mistake because it damaged, rather than strengthened, the overall war on terror. Labor would not commit an act of vandalism, however, if it came to power. AUSTRALIAN troops in Baghdad guarding AUSTRALIAN diplomats would remain, as would Australian naval forces protecting gulf oil terminals against terrorist attacks, although Beazley would make good on his longstanding pledge to withdraw AUSTRALIAN troops presently in southern Iraq. FREE DAVID HICKS -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) David Hicks was a ratbag who had almost certainly been up to nefarious things, and should probably spend a long time in jail, Beazley said. Still, he predicted most Australians would never accept his conviction by a military commission, even if the Administration manages to structure one acceptable to the Supreme Court. Unless he can be tried by a civil court or by a fully constituted court marshal, it would be better, Beazley argued, to let him go. The British citizens who were released would never pose a threat again, CANBERRA 00001366 003 OF 003 since they were under constant surveillance by the UK authorities. Hicks would be no different, and would quickly fade into well-deserved obscurity. AUSTRALIAN WHEAT BOARD -------------- ¶9. (C/NF) Beazley maintained the Howard government had had full knowledgeof the AUSTRALIAN WHEAT Board,s appalling bribes that undermined the sanctions regime against Saddam. It had repeatedly turned a blind eye to numerous indications of wrong doing, and had lied about what it had known and when. Not only had it sanctioned blatant wrongdoing, but the government had facilitated the destruction of the one mechanism that might have forced Saddam to satisfy international demands to prove he was not pursuing weapons programs. The U.S. had every reason to be outraged with Howard, and Beazley urged that Washington express disapproval. NO TO ENRICHMENT -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) Australia should not pursue uranium enrichment, Beazley said, while repeating Labor,s public concerns that such a decision by Canberra would be detrimental to international counter-proliferation efforts. Other nations in Australia,s region would use Canberra,s decision to start programs of their own, and it would be virtually impossible to convince them Australia would not seek at some point to use the technology as the basis for a nuclear weapons program. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) Beazley's Chief of Staff David Fredericks and DCM were also present at the meeting, which was very cordial throughout. Beazley, whose own personal support for the alliance has been evident for decades, clearly wanted to make the twin points that he has a deep understanding of its importance and that as Opposition Leader he recognizes most of the AUSTRALIAN electorate are not about to risk the country's security by choosing a prime minister with suspect credentials in this regard. Although the reasons for Mark Latham's loss to John Howard in 2004 are legion, Labor recognizes that his multiple, embarrassing pronouncements on issues affecting the alliance represented blunders of the first order. In this same vein, Beazley's office made a point of issuing a press release on his meeting with the Ambassador shortly after it concluded (which it cleared with us) underscoring Beazley's strong commitment to the ANZUS alliance. MCCALLUM