DEADLY BOMB ATTACKS IN ASSAM KILL 12 PEOPLE AND INJURE 50

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CALCUTTA 000509 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS PACOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC MARR PTER PHUM IN SUBJECT: DEADLY BOMB ATTACKS IN ASSAM KILL 12 PEOPLE AND INJURE 50 REF: CALCUTTA 0481 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Following Assam's bloodiest month of insurgent violence this year, November began with one of Assam's deadliest bombings in recent years. On November 5, two bomb explosions in Assam's capital Guwahati killed 12 people and injured at least 50 others. GOI and state law enforcement officials blamed the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) for the attacks and have met to discuss the deteriorating security situation in the Northeast. Security officials are increasingly concerned that they are unable to contain the violence and blame political interference for restraining anti-insurgency activity. The increasing frequency of ULFA's attacks, the deadliness of the latest explosions and the targeting of Assam's capital are all strong indications that ULFA is escalating its activities and shifting its focus from targets in more remote areas to key urban centers to demonstrate its strength. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On November 5, two bomb explosions in Assam's state capital, Guwahati, killed 12 people. One bomb detonated in the crowded Fancy Bazaar market and the other at Noonmatai, near an oil refinery. More than 50 people were injured by the explosions. Assam Police Intelligence Chief Kagan Sharma told post that there was no doubt that the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) committed the attacks. Sharma observed that ULFA has been gradually intensifying its operations over the past two weeks and he believed that the initial overtures for talks earlier this year were just a ploy to enable the outfit to reorganize and rearm. The district deputy commissioner in Guwahati said that the blast at Fancy Bazaar may have targeted the Hindi-speaking community, which dominates that area, a community perceived as outsiders by the ethnic Assamese ULFA. ¶3. (U) October was the bloodiest month in Assam so far this year, with 31 civilian deaths due to insurgent violence. Other peak months were: February (12),June (24),July (10),August (20); with only single-digit casualties in January (8),March (3),April (7),May (2) and September (7). ¶4. (SBU) While Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi told the press that initial reports suggested that the blast was the handiwork of ULFA, Assam Chief Secretary S. Kabilan said the blasts could be by ULFA or possibly some Muslim Jihadi groups. Most observers do not share Kabilan's view of possible Jihadi involvement. Assam's Unified Command, which includes all of the state law enforcement and military forces present in the state, met on November 6 to coordinate an action plan to respond to the escalating violence in Assam. ¶5. (U) The peace initiative that began in September 2005 between ULFA's representative People's Consultative Group (PCG) and the GOI derailed in late September 2006 for several reasons: ULFA refused to name its team of negotiators and stuck to its demand for release of five of its detained leaders, while the GOI insisted on written assurance from ULFA that it would commit to peace talks. After three rounds of GOI-PCG talks, Delhi announced a unilateral ceasefire on August 13, but the suspension of security operations was revoked September 24, following reports of ULFA's intensified extortion, attacks on police patrols and the killing of a tea planter. ¶6. (SBU) The almost equal number of militant and the security casualties this year have forced GOI officials to assess whether the militants are possibly gaining an upper hand. For the last decade the security forces have always suffered significantly fewer fatalities than ULFA. Security sources in Assam cite the reduction of operations against ULFA as the reason for ULFA's return to violence, saying, "It is the restraint forced on the security forces by the political establishment that is behind CALCUTTA 00000509 002 OF 002 the trend." State Congress Party officials had asked the central government to limit anti-insurgency activity in the run-up to state assembly elections in May this year, in an effort to garner votes from Assamese sympathetic to ULFA. ¶7. (SBU) The escalating violence is exacerbating existing divisions between GOI military leadership and politicians on the best approach to dealing with ULFA. The Army was opposed to peace talks, convinced that ULFA was just using the lull in fighting to reorganize. Many law enforcement officials are also unhappy about the perceived failure of the "political" solution. An Inspector General of Assam Police told post that the situation is very grim and that the government's "soft approach" has contributed to the rise in violence. ¶8. (SBU) Comment: ULFA is increasing its insurgent activities in the Northeast and security forces seem unable to stem the violence. The large number of casualties from the latest bomb attacks and the fact that the attacks occured in the state capital are strong signs that ULFA is stronger and more emboldened after the recent ceasefire. Growing press coverage of attacks in Assam and the Northeast is forcing the GOI to take a closer look at the security situation in a region often wracked by violence but out of the general public eye. However, pressure on the security forces to clamp down on ULFA may result in an indiscriminate response and human rights violations. Indian paramilitary forces, like the Assam Rifles, are notorious for their heavy handed approach to insurgents, which has contributed to a cycle of greater violence. JARDINE