CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: COMING SOON, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007211 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR DORAN AND WATERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: COMING SOON, BUT EXPECTATIONS LOW REF: A. CAIRO 6595 ¶B. CAIRO 6327 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs William R. Stewart, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Mubarak is expected to submit his long-awaited constitutional amendments package to the Egyptian legislature on December 25. While precise details of the substance of the proposed changes are still scarce, likely amendments can be roughly divided into four broad categories: recasting the executive-legislative relationship; electoral issues; deleting socialist terminology; and paving the way for new anti-terror legislation. Judging by the public information to date on the expected changes, it is unlikely that the eventual text of the amendments will live up to the GOE's reformist rhetoric, or satisfy the appetite of the opposition and civil society for meaningful steps forward towards reshaping the Egyptian political terrain. End summary. -------------- TIMELINE -------------- ¶2. (C) It is widely anticipated that President Hosni Mubarak will submit to Parliament and the Shoura Council by the end of December (likely December 25) his long-awaited constitutional amendments package. The package will consist of a recommended list of constitutional articles to be amended (without details on the actual amendment texts, although the de facto language will have been agreed upon within the NDP leadership prior to the commencement of legislative debate). NDP contacts had originally predicted that Mubarak would send the amendments package to Parliament in November, at the opening of the People's Assembly. The delay is attributed by some to the President's insistence on in-depth discussions with his top advisors regarding each possible amendment. Others assert that the tardiness is due to internal dissension within the NDP over some of the proposed changes, especially the likely alteration to enable subsequent passage of a new electoral law, moving Egypt to a proportional representation-party list electoral system. Several of the more independent-minded NDP MP's are anxious about the new electoral system, particularly as they do not feel assured of making the cut for the future party list. ¶3. (C) The delay in the submission of the amendments package �0A;has resulted in some apparent GOE confusion regarding the overall amendments timeline, with PM Ahmed Nazif and NDP Secretary-General Safwat El Sherif issuing conflicting SIPDIS statements regarding the timing of the national referendum on the constitutional amendment. Nazif told the Dubai Arab Strategy Forum on December 5 that, "the referendum on the change of constitution will be sometime in early summer." Meanwhile, NDP SYG Safwat El Sherif has publicly stated that the referendum will be held before April 24 (when the campaign opens for the late spring Shoura Council elections). Other GOE officials have not weighed in with edifying statements on the issue, so for the moment, it is unclear as to when exactly the referendum will be held. -------------- WHAT'S IN THE AMENDMENTS? -------------- ¶4. (C) As reported reftels, details on the substance of the amendments have been scarce to date, likely due to the fact that ongoing internal NDP and GOE discussions are being conducted within a tightly closed circle of trusted government and party apparatchiks. At this point, the anticipated amendments can be roughly divided into four broad categories: -- Recasting the Executive-Legislative Relationship: Strengthen the role of the People's Assembly, cabinet, and Shoura Council, at the alleged expense of presidential prerogatives. Possible changes include: Parliament could withdraw confidence in the cabinet without having to refer the matter to a national referendum; the President would have to obtain Parliamentary approval of a new cabinet; strengthened Parliamentary oversight of the budget, in terms of being able to vote on each "chapter" of the budget individually, rather than an up-or-down vote on the entire budget; compulsory Shoura Council approval of new laws, amendments, and treaties (rather than the Shoura Council merely being "consulted" on them, as is currently the case); and, changing Article 74 (presidential powers during a national crisis) to guarantee continued authorities of the CAIRO 00007211 002.4 OF 002 cabinet and legislative branch. -- Electoral Issues: As reported ref A, Mubarak plans to recommend the amendment of Article 76 (the controversial article setting onerous presidential candidacy requirements), but reportedly will only ease the requirements for presidential candidates from political parties, not independents. Another probable change is the amendment of Article 87 (regarding parliamentary elections) to provide for the establishment of a new proportional representation-party list electoral system. In a recent discussion with the Ambassador, Minister for Parliamentary and Legal Affairs Mufeed Shehab confirmed that Article 88 (judicial supervision of elections) will be amended, through the creation of a Supreme Elections Commission (probably composed in part of high-ranking judges),partnered with the termination of the current practice of judicial oversight at every polling station. -- Deleting Socialist Terminology: Egypt's constitution is loaded with rhetorical relics of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser's embrace of socialism - there are at least 10 socialist-themed articles. The GOE plans to delete most of these references, in an effort to more accurately reflect Egypt's current economic and political reality. -- Paving the Way for the Anti-Terror Law: Article 41 currently prohibits the search, detention, inspection, or restriction of a citizen's "freedom" and "free movement" absent a judicial or prosecutorial warrant. Under the current Emergency Law, this article does not have to be enforced. GOE contacts argue that until this article is revised to allow for more robust police powers, the state of emergency cannot be lifted and new anti-terror legislation enacted. -------------- FLASH POINTS -------------- ¶5. (C) While amendments moderately strengthening the role of Parliament or deleting socialist terminology are likely to have broad support in Parliament and civil society, other proposed changes will doubtless be highly contentious. The influential Judges Club, civil society, and opposition parties would vigorously oppose any change to Article 88 (judicial supervision of elections),viewing it as a thinly-disguised government attempt to dispense with the often "problematic" issue of judges who cry fraud at the ballot box. There is little confidence among our non-GOE interlocutors that the government would create a truly independent supreme elections commission. Any amendment of Article 41 is also likely to be met with significant opposition from the same voices, as well as human rights advocates. The Muslim Brotherhood will be highly critical of any alteration to Article 76 (presidential candidacy requirements) that does not ease the requirements for independents to run for the presidency. The other likely major bone of contention for oppositionists will be the probable lack of any amendment to Article 77 (presidential terms) - as currently written, the article allows for unlimited presidential terms. Opposition parties and civil society activists have called for modifying the article to allow for two 6-year presidential terms only, but to date, the GOE has been dismissive of such calls. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) In advance of Mubarak's formal submission of the amendments package to Parliament, opinion is widespread among civil society, oppositionists, and even some NDP parliamentarians, that the entire exercise will not amount to much more than symbolic tinkering designed to distract from the continuation of the status quo, accompanied by few meaningful substantive changes. Skepticism is the dominant sentiment among non-GOE players in Cairo with regard to the amendments effort. The Egyptian government has long been trumpeting the importance of the upcoming constitutional reforms. Nevertheless, judging by the public information to date on the expected changes, it is unlikely that the eventual text of the amendments will live up to the GOE's reformist rhetoric, or satisfy the appetite of the opposition and civil society for meaningful steps forward towards reshaping the Egyptian political terrain. JONES