ARAB LEAGUE'S AMRE MOUSSA TO SENATOR KERRY ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 007165

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC EG LE
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE'S AMRE MOUSSA TO SENATOR KERRY ON
LEBANON AND REGIONAL ISSUES


CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES STUART JONES FOR REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) SENATOR JOHN KERRY MET WITH ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY
GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA ON NOVEMBER 15 TO DISCUSS EVENTS IN
LEBANON, IRAQ, AND THE REGION. MOUSSA BRIEFED ON HIS LEBANON
MEDIATION, CLAIMING LIMITED SUCCESS ON ELECTION-RELATED
ISSUES, AND NOTED PLANS TO VISIT BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AND SAUDI
ARABIA IN COMING DAYS. MOUSSA ADVOCATED DIRECT U.S.-YRIA
DIALOGUE, ADMITTED THAT SECTARIAN DIVIDES DAAGED LEAGUE
MEDIATION EFFORTS IN IRAQ, AND ACCUSD WASHINGTON OF CEDING
ITS PALESTINE POLICY TO IRAEL. MOUSSA BELIEVED A NUCLEAR
WEAPONS FREE MIDLE EAST WOULD HELP WASHINGTON EFFECTIVELY
COUNTR IRAN. MOUSSA WAS HOPEFUL AFTER RECENT DIPLOMATIC
DEVELOPMENTS ON DARFUR, BUT ADMITTED THAT ARAB LAGUE FUNDING
FOR THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION FELL AR SHORT OF COMMITMENTS.
FUNDS CARRIED TO RAFAH Y PALESTINIAN PRIME MINISTER HANIYEH
WILL BE DEPSITED INTO AN ARAB LEAGUE BANK ACCOUNT FOR
TRANSFR TO ABU MAZEN. END SUMMARY.

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LIMITED PROGRESS WITH LEBANESE
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2. (C) DURING A 90MINUTE MEETING ON DECEMBER 15, MOUSSA
DESCRIBED IS BEIRUT TALKS AS A PARTIAL STEP TOWARD AGREEMENT
ON KEY ISSUES BY DISPUTING LEBANESE FACTIONS. MOSSA SAID HE
MET SEPARATELY WITH PM SINIORA, PARLAMENT SPEAKER BERRI,
MARONITE LEADER GENERAL AOU, ORTHODOX PATRIARCH SFEIR,
HIZBALLAH LEADER NASALLAH, AND PRESIDENT LAHOUD BETWEEN
DECEMBER 12-1. MOUSSA CLAIMED THAT THE PARTIES ENTERTAINED
AGREAT DEAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISINFORMATION BOUT THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL. THEREFORE, HE ROPOSED HAVING MARCH
8 AND MARCH 14 REPRESENTATIES SIT TOGETHER AND REVIEW
DOCUMENTATION RELATED O THE TRIBUNAL. MOUSSA SAID HE GOT
AGREEMENT THT TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH SIDE, ALONG WITH
THE TWO LEBANESE JUDGES WORKING WITH THE UN ON THETRIBUNAL,
WOULD MEET TO REVIEW THE TRIBUNAL DOCUENTS. HOWEVER, HE
SAID THE PARTIES DID NOT AGREETO MEET THIS WEEKEND AS HE
PROPOSED AND HAD ATTAHED OTHER (UNSPECIFIED) CONDITIONS.


3. (C) MOUSA SAID HIS SECOND FOCUS WAS ON "GOVERNMENT"
STRCTURES. SPECIFICALLY, MOUSSA SAID HE SOUGHT TO ADRESS
THE MARCH 8 FORCES' DEMAND FOR A BLOCKING MIORITY IN
CABINET. HE PROPOSED AN EXPANDED CABINT OF 30 MINISTERS
WHERE MARCH 8 FORCES WOULD BE IVEN 10 POSITIONS, MARCH 14
FORCES WOULD HAVE 19POSITIONS, AND THE 30TH PORTFOLIO WOULD
GO TO A NEUTRAL" MEMBER. MOUSSA SAID THE PARTIES AGREED TO
THE SINGLE NEUTRAL MEMBER IDEA, BUT THE CRITERIAFOR
SELECTING THAT INDIVIDUAL WAS STILL TO BE DEERMINED.
RETURNING TO THE TRIBUNAL ISSUE, MOUSSASAID HE WAS TRYING TO
"UNTANGLE" THE LEGAL/CONSTTUTIONAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE
MARCH 14 GROUP'S ESIRE TO PUSH FORWARD THE TRIBUNAL
LEGISLATION, HILE THE MARCH 8 GROUP DENIED THE LEGITIMACY OF
HE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. MOUSSA ADDED THAT HE WOULDTRAVEL
"NEXT WEEK" TO SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA TO ELP "EASE THE
SITUATION," AND WOULD RETURN TO BEIUT FOR MORE TALKS. ASKED
HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO RESOLVE THE STAND-OFF MOUSSA SAID
THINGS WILL BECOME "VERY DIFFICULT" IF NOT RESOLVED WITHIN
WO WEEKS. IT IS IMPORTANT, HE ADDED, TO "RAISE TH ARAB
PROFILE" ON THE ISSUE, TO COUNTER IRAN'S INLUENCE.


4. (C) MOUSSA CLAIMED SUCCESS IN CONVINCING PRESIDENT LAHOUD
AND OTHER PLAYERS THAT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN "EIGHT OR
NINE MONTHS" SHOULD BE BASED ON THE CURRENT PARLIAMENT, NOT A
NEW ONE. THIS ISSUE, MOUSSA SAID, "WAS SETTLED." SIMILARLY,
HE ADDED THAT ALL AGREED THAT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WOULD
ONLY TAKE PLACE UNDER A NEW PRESIDENT, AND THAT A NEW
ELECTION LAW WILL ONLY BE PROMULGATED UNDER A NEW PRESIDENT.
MOUSSA ALSO CLAIMED SUCCESS IN CONVINCING MARCH 8 LEADERS
THAT THEIR DEMONSTRATORS SHOULD NOT BLOCK ROADS OR TAKE OTHER
PROVOCATIVE STEPS TO STRANGLE THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THE
SITUATION, HE ADDED, REMAINS "FRAGILE."


5. (C) ASKED ABOUT HIZBALLAH LEADER NASRALLAH'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD THE PRESENT CRISIS, MOUSSA SAID THAT DURING THEIR
3-HOUR MEETING, NASRALLAH DISPLAYED CONFIDENCE AND COMPOSURE,
AS WELL AS ASSUREDNESS THAT NEW ELECTIONS - IF HELD TODAY -
WOULD PUT HIM IN A NATIONAL LEADERSHIP POSITION. ASKED ABOUT
SYRIA'S ROLE IN LEBANON, MOUSSA SAID THAT SYRIAN INFLUENCE
COULD NEVER BE EXCISED FROM LEBANON - AN ARGUMENT, HE SAID,
FOR THE U.S. TALKING DIRECTLY WITH DAMASCUS ABOUT LEBANON AND
THE REGION. IT IS CRITICAL, HE CONCLUDED, THAT WASHINGTON
NOT FRAME THE LEBANON CRISIS AS ONE OF "WINNERS AND LOSERS,"
AS SUCH TALK HINDERS THE POLITICAL FLEXIBILITY OF THE
LEBANESE AND MAKES VIOLENT CONFLICT MORE LIKELY.

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SYRIA: ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE
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6. (C) ASKED ABOUT THE BAKER-HAMILTON REPORT RECOMMENDATION
TO TALK DIRECTLY WITH SYRIA, MOUSSA STATED HIS VIEW THAT
DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE USG WITH DAMASCUS WOULD "SOFTEN"
SYRIAN POLICIES IN LEBANON, IRAQ, AND WITH THE PALESTINIANS.
BUT, WASHINGTON MUST AVOID THE IMPULSE TO DEMAND SPECIFIC
STEPS BY THE SYRIANS, AS THIS WOULD ONLY PROLONG THE REGIME'S
SENSE OF "ALIENATION" AND STRENGTHEN ITS BONDS WITH TEHRAN.
MOUSSA ALSO CAUTIONED AGAINST "MIXING THE INTERESTS OF THE
U.S. WITH THOSE OF ISRAEL." IN OTHER WORDS, HE EXPLAINED,
PEOPLE IN THE REGION DON'T KNOW "WHERE WASHINGTON'S INTERESTS
END AND WHERE ISRAEL'S BEGIN," AND ARE THEREFORE SUSPICIOUS
AND UNSYMPATHETIC. ARGUING FOR THE U.S. TO RECLAIM AN
"HONEST-BROKER" ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MOUSSA SAID
WASHINGTON HAD TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ITS INTERESTS AND THOSE
OF ISRAEL. KERRY COUNTERED THAT ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S
EXISTENCE, U.S. AND ISRAELI INTERESTS WERE ONE. MOUSSA
REJOINED THAT THE ARAB STATES HAD UNANIMOUSLY AGREED ON
RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, AS CLARIFIED IN THE BEIRUT INITIATIVE:
"DON'T WASTE YOUR TIME ON SOMETHING ALREADY DECIDED."
WASHINGTON SHOULD CEASE RAISING ISSUES ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL,
AND LOOK AFTER ITS OWN INTERESTS, HE ADDED. MOUSSA ALSO
CAUTIONED THE U.S. FROM PUBLICLY IDENTIFYING FRIENDS AND FOES
IN THE REGION (I.E., "ARAB MODERATES") AS SUCH TERMS MADE
ARAB REGIMES UNCOMFORTABLE.


7. (C) ASKED WHAT SYRIA COULD DO TO SHOW A NEW, COOPERATIVE
ATTITUDE ON REGIONAL ISSUES, MOUSSA SAID SYRIA HAD ALREADY
STEPPED UP EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH BORDER INFILTRATION INTO IRAQ
FOLLOWING BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT WITH WASHINGTON, AND HAD
RECENTLY IMPROVED ITS DIPLOMATIC TIES TO BAGHDAD.
NEVERTHELESS, ASAD'S BELIEF THAT THE HARIRI TRIBUNAL IS A
POLITICAL TOOL BEING USED BY THE WEST TO "GET HIM," HINDERS
HIS COOPERATION, MOUSSA SAID. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE
TRIBUNAL, HE ADDED, CAN ONLY BE AGREED VIA NATIONAL LEBANESE
DEBATE, WHERE STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARE MET. IN THE
END, MOUSSA SAID, SYRIA WILL ADJUST ITS POLICIES BASED ON THE
BROADER REGIONAL SCENE AND ITS SPECIFIC INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS
GOLAN AND IRAQ.

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IRAQ DISCUSSION
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8. (C) ON IRAQ, MOUSSA LAMENTED CONTINUED FOCUS ON
SUNNI-SHIA DIFFERENCES, NOTING THE DIFFICULTY IN RETURNING
THE "SECTARIAN GENIE" BACK TO ITS BOTTLE. MOUSSA RECOUNTED
EGYPT'S SHIA PAST AND MODERN CULTURAL INFLUENCES TO EMPHASIZE
THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF COHABITATION. IT IS A MISTAKE, HE
SAID, TO EMPHASIZE EGYPTS "SUNNI" CHARACTER, JUST AS IT WAS
WRONG TO FOCUS ON IRAQ'S SECTARIAN DIFFERENCES. THE U.S.
MUST RE-CAST ITS IRAQ POLICY AND HELP RESTORE ORDER THERE VIA
A VIABLE POLITICAL PROCESS. ONLY A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
PROCESS, HE CONTINUED, WOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF HALTING
MILITIAS, SINCE THERE IS "NO VIABLE IRAQI MILITARY" TO TAKE
ON THESE FORCES. PERHAPS, HE MUSED, IT WOULD NOT BE A BAD
IDEA FOR THE U.S. TO INCREASE ITS TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ BY
30 THOUSAND TO TAKE ON THE MILITIAS IN AND AROUND BAGHDAD,
WHILE A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IS CRAFTED.


9. (C) REGARDING ARAB LEAGUE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS IN IRAQ,
MOUSSA SAID HE PROPOSED ORGANIZING A CONFERENCE IN BAGHDAD
NEXT MARCH OR APRIL. WHILE RESULTS OF AN EARLIER MEETING OF
IRAQI POLITICAL FIGURES AT ARAB LEAGUE HEADQUARTERS IN CAIRO
WERE POSITIVE, THE PARTIES - ONCE BACK IN IRAQ - DID NOT FEEL
COMPELLED TO CARRY OUT THEIR COMMITMENTS, HE SAID. ASKED
ABOUT PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S ADVICE TO KERRY TO RETURN A "STRONG
MAN" TO POWER IN IRAQ (SEPTEL),MOUSSA DID NOT BELIEVE IT
POSSIBLE TO "SELECT" SUCH A FIGURE. NOR, WOULD "ANOTHER
SADDAM" BE IN THE INTEREST OF DEMOCRACY OR THE IRAQI PEOPLE.

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DEALING WITH HAMAS
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10. (C) MOUSSA RESPONDED TO A QUESTION ABOUT DEALING WITH
HAMAS BY RECALLING HIS JANUARY 2005 POST-HAMAS ELECTION
ADVICE TO BRING THE GROUP INTO THE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL BODY
AND THEN MODERATE IT. RETURNING TO AN EARLIER THEME, MOUSSA
ACCUSED WASHINGTON OF DOING ISRAEL'S BUSINESS VIS-A-VIS
HAMAS, INSTEAD OF PURSUING ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. ON
THE ISSUE OF A DECEMBER 14 ATTEMPT BY PALESTINIAN PRIME
MINISTER HANIYEH TO BRING A LARGE SUM OF CASH INTO GAZA VIA
RAFAH, MOUSSAS CHIEF OF STAFF HISHAM YOUSSEF CONFIRMED
REPORTS THAT HANIYEH LEFT USD 35 MILLION DOLLARS WITH HIS
STAFF IN ARISH, AND THAT THE FUNDS WERE TO BE DEPOSITED INTO
THE ARAB LEAGUE'S ACCOUNT FOR PALESTINIAN ASSISTANCE. THE
FUNDS, YOUSSEF TOLD THE DCM, WOULD THEN BE CHANNELED TO

PALESTINIAN PRESIDENT MAHMOUD ABBAS.

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NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
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11. (C) KERRY RAISED THE ISSUE OF IRAN'S DEFIANCE OF THE
IAEA, AND THE ARAB RESPONSE. MOUSSA INSISTED THAT NO ARAB
STATE WANTED TO ACQUIRE A NUCLEAR WEAPON, BUT, NONE WOULD
CHALLENGE IRAN'S NPT-GUARANTEED RIGHT TO PEACEFUL USES OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY. THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE ARABS, HE SAID, IS
THE SEEMING "DOUBLE-STANDARD" OF U.S.-LED EFFORTS TO COUNTER
IRAN'S AMBITIONS WHILE DOING NOTHING TO PRESS ISRAEL TO
ACCOUNT FOR, AND DISMANTLE ITS PROGRAM. IF THE U.S. FOCUSED
ON RIDDING THE ENTIRE REGION - INCLUDING ISRAEL - OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, REGIONAL SUPPORT WOULD FOLLOW. ASKED ABOUT RUSSIAN
AND CHINESE INFLUENCE OVER IRAN'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS, MOUSSA
BELIEVED THEY TOO WERE "CONCERNED," BUT WOULD NOT BE
PERSUADED TO RESORT TO SANCTIONS. MOUSSA DISAGREED WITH
KERRY'S ASSERTION ON THE LIKELY EFFECTIVENESS OF "TRUE
MULTILATERAL" SANCTIONS ON IRAN, AND WARNED THAT IF THE USG
SUCCEEDED IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS, TEHRAN WOULD RETALIATE VIA
IRAQ.

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DARFUR
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12. (C) REPLYING TO A QUESTION ON DARFUR, MOUSSA COMPLAINED
THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, A MEMBER OF
CONGRESS HAD CALLED FOR U.S. BOMBING OF KHARTOUM IN
RETALIATION FOR ITS POLICIES IN DARFUR. HE CRITICIZED U.S.
POLICY AT THE "OVER-USED" SECURITY COUNCIL - AND AMBASSADOR
BOLTON SPECIFICALLY - FOR ALIENATING THE SUDANESE REGIME AND
PUTTING IT INTO A CORNER. THE PASSAGE OF UNSCR 1706 WITH
CHAPTER 7 LANGUAGE, HE SAID, DID MORE DAMAGE THAN GOOD AND
RESULTED IN "SHUTTING DOWN" THE GOSS WILLINGNESS TO
COMPROMISE. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION REGARDING THE ARAB
LEAGUE MARCH 2006 SUMMIT COMMITMENT TO FUND THE AFRICAN
UNION'S DARFUR MISSION FROM OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, MOUSSA
ADMITTED TO ONLY HAVING RECEIVED USD 5 MILLION DOLLARS FROM
AL MEMBERS, WHICH WOULD BE TRANSFERRED SOON TO THE AU. HE
ADMITTED THAT HE WAS EMBARRASSED TO TRANSFER SUCH A PALTRY
SUM AND, ONLY HALF-JOKINGLY, REQUESTED WASHINGTON TO "PRESS
ITS RICH GULF FRIENDS" FOR DARFUR CONTRIBUTIONS.


13. (U) SENATOR KERRY'S DELEGATION DID NOT HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THIS MESSAGE.

JONES